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INTRODUCTION 
I am legally free to reveal embarrassing information about 
you. Generally speaking, I am also free to negotiate payment to 
refrain from exercising a legal right. But if I combine the two-of- 
fering to remain silent for a fee I am guilty of a felony: black- 
mail. Why? 
The so-called paradox of blackmail1 has garnered an extraor- 
dinary degree of interdisciplinary scholarly attention. Contribu- 
' Although the reason why the addition of a conditional threat should make a legal 
difference is obscure, this puzzle is not, as a matter of strict logic, a paradox. See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U Pa L Rev 
1741, 1742-43 (1993). Nonetheless, following convention, we need not insist upon the 
point. 
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tors to the debate have included law professors and judges, moral 
philosophers and economists. Despite many efforts, however, it is 
an understatement to observe that no consensus has emerged in 
support of any one or combination of the proffered theories.2 In- 
deed, in his afterword to a symposium devoted to the subject a 
few years ago, Professor James Lindgren, the most intensely 
committed contributor to the debate, ventured that the blackmail 
paradox remains "one of the most elusive intellectual puzzles in 
all of law."3 
This Article proposes a new solution to the puzzle. Specifi- 
cally, it endeavors both to justify blackmail's criminalization as 
fully consistent with the central tenets of the criminal aw and to 
explain why, and under what circumstances, blackmail is prop- 
erly criminalized. 
The Article begins, in Section I, by arguing that no current 
theory adequately unravels the paradox. Each fails to account for 
significant and substantial aspects of prevailing blackmail law as 
well as widespread intuitions about what the law should be. Fur- 
thermore, Section I seeks to demonstrate that the two predomi- 
nant approaches to resolving the paradox (in addition to the spe- 
cific answers thus far proposed) are doomed to failure. Conse- 
quentialist theories, which turn upon the particular social conse- 
quences of blackmail, and deontological theories, which seek to 
identify the objective moral difference between the conditional 
threat to perform an act and the unconditional performance of 
that same act, will both always prove unable to distinguish 
blackmail from much behavior that is, and should remain, free 
from criminal sanction. 
Section II develops and defends what I call the evidentiary 
theory of blackmail. It begins with the proposition that, consis- 
tent with consequentialist as well as retributivist conceptions of 
the justifying aim of the criminal law, society may criminalize 
conduct that tends both to cause harm and to be undertaken with 
wrongful motives. On this animating supposition, and because 
society could (and often does) recognize injury to reputation as le- 
2 The fullest elaboration of the puzzle, including critiques of initial efforts to solve it, 
appears in James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 Colum L Rev 670 
(1984). Other especially noteworthy contributions to the literature include Douglas H. 
Ginsburg and Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U Pa L 
Rev 1849 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U 
Pa L Rev 1817 (1993); Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 240-58 (Oxford 1988); Richard 
A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U Chi L Rev 553 (1983); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 63 Monist 156 (1980); and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
84-87 (Basic Books 1974). 
3 James Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U Pa L Rev 1975, 1975 (1993). 
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gally cognizable harm, a legislature could unproblematically4 
criminalize all disclosures of embarrassing information so long as 
we could reasonably believe that most persons who make such 
disclosures do so with morally unacceptable motives. But the op- 
posite is true: we know that people reveal embarrassing informa- 
tion about others for all types of reasons and, consequently, out of 
varying moral postures-good, bad, and (arguably) neutral. The 
diversity of motives for revealing hurtful information about oth- 
ers thus provides a sufficient (if not necessary) explanation for 
society's refusal to proscribe and punish all such revelations. To 
be sure, the legislature could try to tailor the offense so as to 
punish only those persons who disclose embarrassing information 
with, in Blackstone's term, "vitious will."5 But in that event the 
factfinder would confront a hefty challenge: how to determine 
whether any given defendant acted with the requisite bad motive. 
If the defendant were a blackmailer, the task would be much 
easier. For reasons to be explained, we can usually infer that an 
individual who discloses embarrassing information only after the 
person embarrassed by the disclosure fails to pay a requested 
sum is driven by morally bad motivation to make that disclosure. 
The act of blackmail thus has evidentiary significance only: it re- 
veals something about the moral character of the actor's motiva- 
tion that we would be less likely to suspect had he disclosed with- 
out first having made the conditional threat. Armed with that 
(supposed) knowledge, society can punish the blackmailer for the 
same reason that is sufficient to punish those who engage in un- 
paradoxical, garden variety crimes: because the actor causes (or 
threatens) harm while acting with morally culpable motives. 
Section III simultaneously tests and elaborates the eviden- 
tiary theory by analyzing a range of variations within and beyond 
blackmail's paradigmatic ase. This Section justifies criminaliz- 
ing several types of blackmail that intuition (and, often, existing 
law) suggests should be criminal, but that one or more prominent 
theories have been unable to account for. It also explains why 
several other classes of conduct hat share the formal structure of 
core cases of blackmail should not be criminal. In so doing, this 
Section invites lawmakers to consider whether it would be feasi- 
ble to exclude such conduct from the blackmail ban.6 
4 Unproblematically, that is, as far as criminal theory is concerned. I here put aside 
considerations strictly exogenous to the criminal law. 
' William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *21. 
6 This is not to demand a perfect identity between the positive law and the moral im- 
port of the evidentiary theory. Law is always somewhat over- and/or underinclusive r la- 
tive to the dictates of its theoretical justifications. See generally Joseph Story, 1 Commen- 
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Section IV suggests some broader lessons of the evidentiary 
theory. After all, the blackmail paradox is not merely a tantaliz- 
ing intellectual puzzle. The number and stature of minds it has 
attracted bespeak a widely held belief that a solution to this sin- 
gle conundrum will bear broad and deep implications. As Lind- 
gren has put it, simply if dramatically: "The struggle to under- 
stand blackmail is a struggle for the soul of the criminal law."7 
This Section offers ome thoughts regarding what significance the 
evidentiary solution to the blackmail puzzle might have for the 
fundamental questions of criminal theory. Also, in an effort both 
to buttress the validity of the evidentiary theory in its core appli- 
cation and to demonstrate its utility outside the context of black- 
mail, I indicate how the analysis developed in Sections II and III 
might help to resolve yet another of the great mysteries of the 
law-the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
I. EXISTING THEORIES: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE 
The blackmail paradox has attracted an impressive array of 
thinkers from a wide range of disciplines. For purposes of exposi- 
tion and analysis (and following Lindgren), this Section divides 
their theories into two broad groups.8 Section I.A examines sev- 
eral theories that justify criminalization of blackmail by reference 
to the supposedly adverse social consequences that could be ex- 
pected in a regime that tolerated blackmail. Section I.B investi- 
gates theories that advocate criminalization on the grounds that 
blackmail is wrong in and of itself. 
Any satisfactory theory must account for both parts of the 
blackmail puzzle. First, it must explain whether and why black- 
mail should be made criminal. Second, if it supports criminaliza- 
tion of blackmail, it must explain whether and why unconditional 
performance of the acts a blackmailer might threaten should re- 
main lawful. Put otherwise, the theory should provide an account 
of the blackmail threat that both justifies its criminalization9 and 
taries on Equity Jurisprudence ? 7 (Little, Brown 12th ed 1877); Frederick Schauer, Play- 
ing By the Rules 31-34 (Oxford 1991). 
Lindgren, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1975 (cited in note 3). 
8 See Lindgren, 84 Colum L Rev at 680 (cited in note 2). This is not quite to label the 
first category "consequentialists" and the second "deontologists." See, for example, Gordon, 
141 U Pa L Rev at 1741-46 (cited in note 1) (applying these labels to the two categories). 
One who believes that blackmail is wrong on deontological grounds could approve its 
criminalization on consequentialist grounds. In other words, it can be important o distin- 
guish the moral bases of claims about the wrongfulness of given conduct from the moral 
bases of justifications for punishing that conduct. See notes 138-39 and accompanying 
text. 
9 Few theories dispute that at least some substantial subset of the present offense of 
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distinguishes it, in a manner relevant to that justification, from 
the act upon which the threat is leveraged. By and large, the 
theories in the first group passably perform the second task of 
distinguishing the threat from the act. But they fail to accomplish 
the first ask-showing why blackmail should be criminal. In con- 
trast, several theories in the second group provide seemingly per- 
suasive explanations for blackmail's criminalization, but fail to 
account adequately for the difference between the threat and the 
act. No prior theory performs both jobs satisfactorily.10 
A. The Social Consequences of Blackmail 
This Section considers theories that justify blackmail's 
criminalization on the grounds that decriminalization would pro- 
duce undesirable social consequences. 
1. Law and Economics: criminalizing inefficient conduct. 
The principal puzzle of blackmail is this: why is it (and 
should it be) illegal to threaten to do what it is legal to do absent 
a threat?11 In other words, blackmail is an exception to the gen- 
eral rule of law and morals that one may threaten to exercise 
one's rights. However, blackmail is also unusual in another re- 
spect. Ex post, the successful blackmail transaction looks like a 
garden variety voluntary exchange: the blackmail "victim" buys 
blackmail is properly made criminal. The contested questions, then, concern the reason for 
its criminalization a d the proper contours of the crime. One exception comes from liber- 
tarianism. See Murray N. Rothbard, 1Man, Economy, and State 157 n 49 (Van Nostrand 
1962) ("[B]lackmail would not be illegal in the free society. For blackmail is the receipt of 
money in exchange for the service of not publicizing certain information about the other 
person. No violence or threat of violence to person or property is involved."). Because 
Rothbard's conclusion stands or falls upon familiar libertarian premises, however, it need 
not be addressed here. 
10 This is not to say that a theory is necessarily infirm unless its lessons precisely con- 
form to either present law or common moral intuitions. Rather, the theory must be able to 
explain outcomes we would deem proper upon considered reflection. For a discussion of 
this method of "reflective quilibrium," see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48-51 
(Belknap 1971). Naturally, the "burden of persuasion" will fall most heavily on those theo- 
ries that depart from the status quo by arguing either that blackmail (or some substantial 
subset thereof) should be made legal, or that the unconditional performance ofsome pres- 
ently legal acts should be made criminal. 
" See, for example, Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second 
Paradox, 141 U Pa L Rev 1663, 1663 (1993) (The criminalization of blackmail has been 
considered paradoxical because it would make unlawful a threat to do something the 
threatener has a legal right to do."); Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1850, 
1873 (cited in note 2); Gordon, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1742 (cited in note 1); Ronald H. Coase, 
The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 Va L Rev 655, 667 (1988); Feinberg, Harmless 
Wrongdoing at 252 (cited in note 2); Glanville L. Williams, Blackmail, 1954 Crim L Rev 
79, 162-63. 
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the blackmailer's promise not to disclose certain information to 
which the blackmailer is privy. And, ex ante, the blackmailer's 
threat to disclose the information unless the deal is consummated 
looks just like any seller's threat to withhold a good or service 
unless the potential buyer meets the seller's price. But voluntary 
transactions are generally favored in the law. A second puzzle of 
blackmail, then, is this: Why is blackmail, in contrast to other 
voluntary transactions, illegal?"2 
Because economists are great believers in voluntary transac- 
tions, this second puzzle has attracted some of the most distin- 
guished minds in the field of law and economics. Almost all"3 fa- 
vor continuing to criminalize blackmail-at least in its paradig- 
matic case -ven while acknowledging that it is a voluntary 
transaction. Unlike most other voluntary transactions, they ar- 
gue, blackmail is economically inefficient. This Section presents 
this economic thesis and then offers three reasons why it is in- 
firm. 
a) The argument: blackmail produces deadweight loss. The cen- 
tral insight, associated principally with Judge Douglas Ginsburg 
and Professor Ronald Coase, is simple: In an ordinary market 
transaction, goods, services and/or money move in different direc- 
tions. A gives $x to B, and B transfers good y to A. Because the 
parties would not consummate the deal unless each valued her 
expected end state higher than her initial state, the transaction 
must make both parties better off. And, all things being equal, it 
increases net social welfare. In contrast, the objective and the 
usual result of a blackmail proposal is to redistribute conomic 
resources from the victim, A, to the blackmailer, B, without oth- 
12 One answer to this puzzle would deny the premise. Under a theory traced to the 
philosopher Robert Nozick, the blackmail proposal is coercive and, therefore, the consum- 
mated blackmail transaction is not a "voluntary" exchange. If the exchange is not volun- 
tary because the blackmailer coerces the victim (and assuming that coercion is a prima fa- 
cie wrong), the coercion theory belongs to the second category-those that justify crimi- 
nalization of blackmail as a wrong in itself. See Section I.B.4. In any event, although ad- 
herents of the law and economics approach by and large approve of criminalizing black- 
mail, few if any agree that the deal between blackmailer and victim is "involuntary." See, 
for example, Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1819 (cited in note 2) ("One alternative to eco- 
nomic analysis in ... the blackmail cases is to play with the meaning of 'voluntary,' for 
example by confining 'voluntary' acts to those in which severe constraints are absent; but 
this just adds a layer of uncertainty."); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Jus- 
tice, 141 U Pa L Rev 1935, 1950 n 32 (1993) ("That the blackmailee may be faced with a 
hard choice between the consequences of disclosure and paying the blackmailer does not 
necessarily make the blackmail any more coercive than the choice facing many parties to 
wholly legitimate conomic transactions."). 
13 For one exception, see Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail From A to C, 141 U Pa L Rev 
1905 (1993) (discussed at notes 48-52 and accompanying text). 
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erwise changing the status quo ante; B gives nothing of value to A. 
The blackmail transaction is thus a sterile redistributive x- 
change. Crucially, moreover, it is not a costless one, for the prac- 
tice consumes two types of resources. The blackmailer invests re- 
sources into "digging up the dirt," and both he and his victim in- 
cur transaction costs. Blackmail therefore is likely to be ineffi- 
cient, producing deadweight losses and reducing overall social 
utility. Hence, Ginsburg, Coase, and others conclude, it should be 
prohibited.'4 
b) Adventitious blackmail: underinclusiveness. The first prob- 
lem with the economic thesis is that it is based on a dubious, if 
not manifestly incorrect, premise. Were blackmail legal and 
blackmail contracts enforceable, B would be transferring some- 
thing of value to A-B's right to perform the act he threatens. Be- 
fore the transaction is completed, B is legally free to reveal A's 
adultery to A's spouse. By accepting B's blackmail proposal and 
tendering payment, however, A buys B's promise of silence (along, 
very likely, with such tangible things as photographs and nega- 
tives).'5 If both B and A exchange something of value, then the 
existence of transaction costs (including resources B invests to 
procure something valuable to offer A) seems irrelevant. The eco- 
nomic thesis does not distinguish blackmail from any other eco- 
nomic exchange. Put otherwise, "something does happen in a 
blackmail bargain: a reframing of property rights between A and 
B."16 
For the economic thesis to make sense, then, this "some- 
thing" just cannot count. However, it is not immediately obvious 
precisely why not.'7 For Ginsburg and Professor Paul Schecht- 
man, the reason is that the above criticism misconceives the 
proper time of comparison. The key, they argue, is to "view the 
transaction at its outset," when B first contemplates blackmail 
and has yet to unearth dirt on A: "No rational economic planner 
" See, for example, Coase, 74 Va L Rev at 673 (cited in note 11); Ginsburg and 
Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1865 (cited in note 2). 
1 It would be begging the question to object that B's promise is of no value on the 
grounds that blackmail is illegal and blackmail contracts are unenforceable. Whether 
blackmail should be illegal is precisely the question. 
6 Isenbergh, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1920 (cited in note 13). 
17 The reason for not counting it cannot be derived from the supposition that B has no 
intent to do as he threatens. If the victim has confidence that the blackmailer will not 
carry out his threat then, as a practical matter, the promise might well be valueless. In 
that event, however, the victim will call the blackmailer's bluff. If, instead, the victim does 
consummate a deal with the blackmailer, itcan only be because he was not confident that 
the blackmailer's threat was a bluff, in which case the latter's (legally enforceable) prom- 
ise not to carry out his threat has value. 
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would tolerate the existence of an industry dedicated to digging 
up dirt, at real resource cost, and then reburying it.""8 In other 
words, blackmail appears "nonallocative" if we compare the situa- 
tion after the blackmail to that before the blackmailer began to 
ferret for embarrassing information. 
But this response hits an intractable difficulty. If the eco- 
nomic thesis must focus on the blackmailer's project before he ac- 
quires the potentially damaging information, it carnnot justify 
banning blackmail based on infornation that he happened upon 
adventitiously. Professor Mike Hepworth has distinguished four 
types of blackmail based on the manner in which the damaging 
information is obtained: in "opportunistic blackmail," the black- 
mailer innocently stumbles upon information he subsequently re- 
alizes will serve as useful blackmail fodder; in "participant 
blackmail," he was a participant in the conduct about which he 
later blackmails the victim; in "commercial research blackmail," 
the blackmailer consciously seeks information in order to black- 
mail his victim; and in "entrepreneurial blackmail," the black- 
mailer entices a victim into a compromising situation for the spe- 
cific purpose of producing the material with which he can black- 
mail.'9 Relying on this vocabulary, Lindgren objected years ago 
(in response to Ginsburg's then unpublished manuscript) that the 
economic approach is substantially underinclusive because it 
cannot justify prohibition of either participant or opportunistic 
blackmail`0-likely a large percentage of all blackmail. 
Note that Lindgren's objection is not that the potential mag- 
nitude of the deadweight loss is significantly smaller in cases of 
participant and opportunistic blackmail than Ginsburg and 
Shechtman suppose. It is true that in commercial research and 
entrepreneurial blackmail, the deadweight loss is measured by 
the sum of (1) the resources expended to discover the information 
and (2) the transaction costs, whereas in opportunistic and par- 
ticipant blackmail, transaction costs constitute the entire dead- 
weight loss. Properly understood, though, Lindgren's criticism is 
far more profound. When the blackmailer does not make an inde- 
pendent effort o dig up information-that is, when the status 
quo ante cannot be identified as any point prior to when he com- 
municates the blackmail proposal to his victim-then there is no 
basis for characterizing the completed transaction as nonalloca- 
tive. The transaction costs, whatever they may be, are facilita- 
18 Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1860 (cited in note 2). 
19 Mike Hepworth, Blackmail: Publicity and Secrecy in Everyday Life 73-77 (Routledge 
1975). 
' Lindgren, 84 Colum L Rev at 694-95 (cited in note 2). 
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tive, not deadweight-and mirror transaction costs present in or- 
dinary bargaining situations.2' 
Instead of agreeing that their theory cannot explain the 
criminalization of participant and opportunistic blackmail, Gins- 
burg and Shechtman argue that the transaction costs still justify 
prohibiting blackmail even when the information the blackmailer 
threatens to disclose is adventitiously obtained. In direct re- 
sponse to Lindgren, they claim that 
it is of no moment that a particular B may have come by 
compromising information accidentally. Should A refuse to 
pay him, B has no reason to begin incurring expenses, such 
as are necessary to secure publication of the information, ex- 
cept insofar as he is looking to future opportunities for 
blackmail. The resources he expends in order to publish the 
information (and presumably to get credit as the source of it) 
are justified only from his ex ante perspective on the next 
blackmailing opportunity-regardless ofwhether B sets out 
to find it or waits for it again to come knocking at his door. 
Thus, assuming that the first blackmail opportunity arrives 
by accident, when B asks for payment o suppress what he 
knows, he has become an entrepreneur of blackmail; for B 
then to carry out his threat to reveal the information is an 
investment decision, not a part of the earlier accident.22 
This response does not withstand scrutiny. First, and least 
significantly, insofar as it assumes substantial costs to the 
blackmailer, the truth is more likely that "[t]he direct cost to a 
21 As Pigou observed, bargaining itself imposes social costs. See A.C. Pigou, The Eco- 
nomics of Welfare 200-03 (Macmillan 4th ed 1932). But because there is no more efficient 
way of allocating oods and services than by private bargaining, itis hard to know what to 
do with his observation. There is no way to eliminate bargaining, and the deception that 
comes with it, without hrowing out the baby with the bathwater. See Coase, 74 Va L Rev 
at 671-73 (cited in note 11) (criticizing Pigou). Notably, when it comes to proposing a spe- 
cific definition of blackmail, Ginsburg and Shechtman appear to overlook the fact that 
bargaining even in ordinary commercial settings inherently "involves bluff, threats, and, 
to some degree, deception." Id at 672. Blackmail, in their view, is a threat to perform a 
lawful act that would confer no material benefit on the party making the threat. Ginsburg 
and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1865 (cited in note 2). A moment's reflection reveals 
that this articulation is overbroad, for it encompasses every "threat" to hold out for a bet- 
ter deal in circumstances where the "threatener's" next best option is inferior to the offer 
on the table. (For example, it would make an athlete's threat to sit out the season a crimi- 
nal offense. Would the consequence be that teams could sign most of their draft choices for 
something close to the minimum wage?) In short, no matter what might be said of their 
theory, Ginsburg's and Shechtman's definition plainly does not accomplish the task they 
set for themselves-namely, todistinguish blackmail from the ordinary bargaining that is 
"actually relied upon in a competitive exchange conomy to discipline the market." Id at 
1849. 
m Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1875-76 (cited in note 2). 
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blackmailer of actually carrying out his threat is ordinarily triv- 
ial; it takes almost no effort o mail a photograph or a document 
to someone."23 Second, the claim that B has no reason to incur ex- 
penses other than to bolster his reputation as a blackmailer is 
dubious. If A rejects B's proposal, B might carry out his threat out 
of spite. And as Ginsburg and Shechtman themselves acknowl- 
edge, there is "no reason in economic theory to dishonor [B's] 
preference for making A suffer."24 
Most significantly (and this is a sufficient objection, even if B 
incurs nontrivial costs to carry out his threat and even if he does 
so solely in order to strengthen his reputation as a credible 
threatener), Ginsburg and Schectman are wrong to conclude that 
"[t]he resources [B] expends . . . are justified only from his ex ante 
perspective on the next blackmailing opportunity."25 Rather, any 
expenses incurred might well be justified by the blackmailer's an- 
ticipation of the next bargaining opportunity. That Ginsburg and 
Shechtman overlook this basic point is starkly illustrated by their 
earlier argument hat "B's only potential gain . . . is in establish- 
ing his credibility as someone willing to incur a cost if not obliged. 
But that is an asset only insofar as B is an entrepreneur of 
blackmail, i.e., someone who expects to engage in similar future 
transactions."26 Not at all. A reputation as someone willing to 
forego a benefit or incur costs if not obliged is extraordinarily 
valuable in the "legitimate" business world. It allows one to se- 
cure a disproportionately arge share of the potential benefits of 
exchange. And, when it comes to exploiting that reputation, it 
should make no difference whether it was forged as an adventi- 
tious blackmailer, or as a used car salesman, or as a distributor of 
fava beans. 
It remains to consider one other rejoinder to Lindgren's cri- 
tique of the law and economic theory-a rejoinder that does not 
' Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, 
Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U Pa L Rev 1877, 1889 (1993). Shavell also notes that "[t]he 
cost to a blackmailer of carrying out his threat probably inheres mainly in any resulting 
increase in the risk of his being caught and punished. But the blackmailer can usually re- 
veal his information a onymously, using the mail or the telephone." Id. Shavell's point is 
even stronger than he seems to realize. The blackmailer's costs of avoiding detection and 
punishment are not relevant when deciding whether blackmail should be punishable. 
24 Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1864 (cited in note 2) (emphasis 
added). They proceed to argue, however, that the rational economic planner can ignore B's 
welfare interest in acting spitefully on the grounds that "some potential gains are not re- 
alizable because they are not as great as the cost entailed in their identification." Id.But if 
B's pleasure in harming A counts in the welfare calculus, then a realistic appraisal of the 
costs incurred by the adventitious blackmailer becomes critical. 
5 Id at 1876 (emphasis altered). 
' Id at 1865 (emphasis added). 
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rely on transaction costs. Professor Steven Shavell has agreed 
that the criminality of participant and opportunistic blackmail 
"cannot be explained by a need to discourage wasteful efforts to 
obtain information."27 Instead, he argues that if adventitious 
blackmail is not illegal, "potential victims will exercise excessive 
precautions or reduce their level of innocent, yet embarrassing, 
activities" to prevent being blackmailed by persons who chance 
upon damaging information.28 
This argument, however, will not work. Assume that, were 
participant and opportunistic blackmail legalized, people would 
reduce the level of activities that might serve as a basis for 
blackmail, and would increase precautions against being discov- 
ered when they do engage in such activities. Such an assumption 
is an economic reason for making blackmail illegal only if the 
costs of these consequences outweigh their social benefits. Surely 
that is so if we accept Shavell's invitation to consider only inno- 
cent activities. However, there is no warrant for adopting such a 
narrow focus. 
As Shavell himself recognizes, three categories of "embar- 
rassing" activities might serve as the basis for blackmail: (1) 
purely innocent socially harmless acts like "engaging in conven- 
tional sexual intercourse with one's spouse, or even taking a 
shower"; (2) socially harmful but legal acts such as adultery; and 
(3) criminal acts.29 As to the second category-which surely would 
be as numerous as the first30-Shavell concludes that the social 
value of legalizing blackmail is ambiguous because it is uncertain 
whether (a) the beneficial effect of reducing socially undesirable 
activities would outweigh the sum of (b) the blackmailer's "waste- 
ful efforts to obtain information" and (c) the victims' costs of 
7 Shavell, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1903 (cited in note 23). 
28 Id. 
2 Id at 1897-99. 
' One could object that, because everybody is vulnerable to first category blackmail, 
its incidence would far exceed that of second category blackmail in a world where black- 
mail were legalized. I do not think this is the case. In most instances of first category 
blackmail, the blackmailer must be threatening, not just to reveal information, but to 
publicize tangible vidence. A blackmailer will not get rich, to take Professor Shavell's ex- 
ample, by threatening to tell a married couple's neighbors and coworkers that the couple 
engages in conventional sexual intercourse; as Shavell recognizes, the blackmailer must 
threaten to distribute photos of the act. Id at 1897. But this will not be so easy, for laws 
(and norms) against privacy invasions would remain operable ven under a regime of legal 
blackmail. Moreover, the potential payoff rom such threats would often be too small to 
encourage the practice. Despite Shavell's examples, the most likely subject of first cate- 
gory blackmail must be innocent, harmless acts that are nonetheless the target of social 
prejudice. The incidence of first category blackmail would, therefore, diminish in propor- 
tion as general social tolerance increases. 
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guarding against blackmail.3' We will consider shortly whether 
such an ambivalent conclusion about the overall consequentialist 
balance warrants much support for a generalized ban on black- 
mail.32 But it is surely not enough to justify criminalizing adventi- 
tious blackmail, for it is implausible that the balance would re- 
main ambiguous when no resources have been expended to obtain 
the information in question.33 Consequently, Shavell's "incentive- 
based" response to Lindgren succeeds at most in justifying con- 
tinued prohibition of adventitious blackmail of innocent conduct 
that society has no interest in discouraging. 
Therefore, Shavell's contributions notwithstanding, the law 
and economics approach still cannot justify prohibiting condi- 
tional threats to reveal information about socially undesirable34 
behavior where such information was obtained without cost.35 
3' Id at 1899. 
32 See notes 38-42 and accompanying text. 
A complete demonstration of this argument would consume more space than the 
subject warrants, especially since Shavell never expressly develops the contrary claim. In 
simplified form, the argument assumes that, in a regime where all blackmail is criminal, 
the discounted cost of detection to a person, P, who engages in second category conduct is 
x. Were an exception to the blackmail ban carved out for adventitious blackmail, P would 
face an additional discounted cost of detection of y. Let n equal the costs to P of taking ex- 
tra precautions to avoid detection, and let m equal the costs to P of foregoing the second 
category conduct. For any given P, allowing adventitious blackmail is costly for society, on 
Shavell's reasoning, only when (i) x ? n < x + y < m. (If x > n, P takes the precautions re- 
gardless of whether adventitious blackmail is legalized; if n > x + y, P eschews extra pre- 
cautions even if adventitious blackmail is legalized; if x + y > m, P chooses to forego the ac- 
tivity rather than take additional precautions.) Meanwhile, legalizing adventitious black- 
mail incurs positive social value if (ii) x < m < x + y. If the values for y are low, events (i) 
and (ii) are both fairly unlikely. However, assuming that the benefit o society from any 
one P foregoing the activity at issue is greater than the cost to society from any one P 
taking extra precautions at cost to him of n, event (i) would have to be considerably more 
common than event (ii) for legalizing adventitious blackmail of second category conduct o 
be a bad social bargain on Shavell's reasoning. This is not provably false, but seems sub- 
stantially unlikely. 
This argument can be illustrated by considering Shavell's own example of the type of 
activity that might form the basis for second category blackmail: "the wasteful but not il- 
legal spending of church funds by a minister." Shavell, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1898 (cited in 
note 23). The beneficial effects of permitting blackmail in such cases is clear-to induce 
ministers "to use church funds more responsibly." Id at 1899. The principal adverse effect 
is "the effort expended [by profligate ministers] to .. . avoid blackmail." Id. If, as Shavell 
asks us to suppose, "the minister can avoid detection if he goes to the trouble of making all 
purchases with cash instead of his credit card," id, how often would the threat of legalized 
adventitious blackmail (over and above the threat of detection in a regime that criminal- 
ized adventitious blackmail) induce such behavior? 
3 We will bracket the question of whether law and economics justifies the prohibition 
against blackmail based on threats to reveal socially undesirable and illegal behavior 
(where the information is obtained with or without expenditure of resources). See Section 
III.B.3. 
3 Acknowledging in a recent article that the economic responses to Lindgren's chal- 
lenge have been inadequate, Professor Richard McAdams has proposed a "second-best" 
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c) Nonadventitious blackmail: the indeterminacy ofexternalities. 
The foregoing analysis does not imply that the economic thesis 
succeeds in justifying a ban on blackmail based on information 
that is obtained by the expenditure of resources, for the fact (if 
true) that a given transaction reduces the aggregate wealth of the 
actual parties to the exchange does not prove that the transaction 
reduces the overall wealth of society. As Shavell's effort to resus- 
citate the economic thesis for prohibiting participant and oppor- 
tunistic blackmail reflects, economists are as concerned with ex- 
ternalities as they are fond of voluntary exchanges. Accordingly, 
if the threat and practice of blackmail produced positive exter- 
nalities (by encouraging socially useful activity or discouraging 
socially harmful behavior), then a regime that permitted black- 
mail might be wealth maximizing relative to a regime that pro- 
hibited it. 
Indeed, Judge Richard Posner has systematically assessed 
the various types of informational b ackmail in an effort to evalu- 
ate this very possibility.36 Adopting a purportedly exhaustive 
seven-part classification of acts or conditions that a blackmailer 
might threaten to reveal,37 Posner concludes that in none of the 
economic defense of the criminal ban against adventitious blackmail. See Richard H. 
MeAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U Pa L Rev 2237, 2266-92 (1996). In 
MeAdams's view, absent social norms, adventitious blackmail produces a suboptimal dis- 
semination of adventitiously discovered information, while a blackmail ban produces a su- 
peroptimal dissemination of such information. However, he argues, norms favoring pri- 
vacy correct he latter inefficiency better than norms favoring disclosure correct he for- 
mer. Therefore, criminalization of adventitious blackmail is more efficient than legaliza- 
tion. 
Though McAdams's argument is intriguing, its consequences are more far-reaching 
than he concedes and than are acceptable. McAdams claims only to "supplement[ ] the 
economic theory of blackmail." Id at 2287. See also id at 2267 n 82. In fact, his analysis 
rests on a very different footing. The economic ase against blackmail rests on the premise 
that it is appropriate to criminalize conduct hat results in deadweight economic losses. 
McAdams recognizes that much adventitious blackmail cannot be justified on that princi- 
ple. Id at 2287. He also eschews reliance on any administrative difficulties ofexcepting 
adventitious blackmail from a general blackmail prohibition. Id at 2270 n 93. Therefore, 
the unstated premise of his argument is that it is a sufficient condition for criminalization 
that a legal prohibition would likely produce a more "efficient" social distribution of infor- 
mation. It follows that his theory would tolerate an elaborate regime of criminal aws 
mandating disclosure of certain categories of information a d prohibiting concealment of 
others. 
3 See Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev 1817 (cited in note 2). 
37 Posner's categories are as follows: (1) criminal acts for which the blackmailer's vic- 
tim has been punished; (2) undetected criminal acts; (3) acts that are wrongful, perhaps 
tortious, but not criminal; (4) wrongful acts of which the blackmailer (or his principal) was 
the victim; (5) disreputable or otherwise censurable acts that do not, however, violate any 
enforced law; (6) involuntary acts or conditions that are a source of potential humiliation; 
and (7) any of the first six categories, except that the victim did not commit he act for 
which he is being blackmailed. Id at 1820. 
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cases could we be confident hat there would be a countervailing 
social benefit. On this basis, he agrees with the Ginsburg- 
Shechtman thesis that blackmail is on average wealth reducing 
and therefore should be prohibited by the criminal aw.38 
One potential problem with Posner's approach arises from 
the fact that his taxonomy is not as exhaustive as he suggests. He 
provides no account of threats to do anything other than disclose 
information or of demands for something other than pecuniary 
gain. More troubling is the questionable nature of some of Pos- 
ner's central conclusions. For example, Posner concedes that the 
social welfare arguments against his "category two" and "category 
five" blackmail-threats to reveal that a victim has engaged ei- 
ther in a criminal act for which he was not caught and punished 
or in disreputable or immoral acts that do not violate any com- 
monly enforced law-are inconclusive.39 He is able to disfavor le- 
galizing such forms of blackmail, therefore, only by privileging "a 
presumption against the expenditure of scarce political capital on 
an effort o change laws that are not demonstrably inefficient" 
over a contrasting "presumption against government intervention 
in private affairs that is not demonstrably efficient."t0 
Although Posner's characteristic andor is commendable, his 
argument is doubly odd. First, it is telling that Posner's analysis 
yields ambivalent conclusions with regard to these two categories 
of blackmail. Most people, I venture, would find criminalizing 
both entirely appropriate.4" But it is even more peculiar that Pos- 
ner is so willing to see both forms of blackmail criminalized not- 
withstanding the ambivalence of his conclusions especially 
given his explicit recognition of the distinction "between an ana- 
lytical evaluation and a policy recommendation."42 I suspect that 
most readers would read his article to support the very different 
conclusion that the economic case against blackmail cannot sur- 
vive without more rigorous empirical work and predictive model- 
3 Id at 1818. 
3 Id at 1827, 1835. Posner had visited such issues before. See William M. Landes and 
Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J Legal Stud 1, 42-43 (1975) (con- 
sidering whether a blackmail threat to reveal that the blackmail victim committed a crime 
might increase social utility-and therefore warrant legalization-by reducing other 
crimes). 
40 Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1827 (cited in note 2). See also id at 1835 ("[O]nce again, 
the argument for allowing blackmail is too speculative to make a strong case for decrimi- 
nalizing this particular form of extortion."). 
41 As further evidence of Posner's departure from common moral intuition, consider his 
suggestion that where A is an adulterer, it should be legal for B to threaten to beat him up 
unless paid if the data revealed "that allowing such threats would reduce breaches of the 
marital obligation at a cost commensurate with this benefit." Id at 1835. 
42 Id at 1827. 
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ling. Unless and until the law and economics cholars can demon- 
strate more persuasively that blackmail reduces social wealth, it 
will remain diffilcult to reconcile their defense of blackmail's 
criminalization with their methodology's scientific and positivist 
aspirations. 
d) The unbridged gap: why criminalize? Even if nonadventi- 
tious blackmail were shown to reduce social wealth, and even if 
the theory's apparent failure to cover adventitious blackmail 
could be rectified or excused, reliance on considerations of eco- 
nomic efficiency cannot explain why blackmail is not merely dis- 
couraged or even prohibited, but criminalized. 
From a retributivist perspective, the premise underlying the 
economic argument-that economic inefficiency is a sufficient 
condition for imposing criminal punishment-is anathema. Hence 
Scott Altman's observation that the economic justification for the 
criminalization of blackmail must prove unsatisfactory to"all but 
the most committed consequentialist."43 More significantly, 
though, the premise is false even for committed consequentialists. 
Because any utilitarian calculus must take into account the pain 
suffered by the individual whose liberty and happiness is cur- 
tailed for the greater good of others,44 utilitarianism commands 
that society adopt the least restrictive means of social control. 
Similarly, under principles of wealth maximization,45 criminaliza- 
tion can be justified only if its incremental deterrent effect com- 
pared with other means of deterrence xceeds the greater cost of 
employing the criminal aw.46 So on both utilitarian and wealth 
maximizing rounds, criminalization of blackmail cannot be justi- 
fied unless the marginal benefit of criminal sanction-relative, 
say, to making blackmail agreements unenforceable as a matter 
of contract law (as is presently the case) or making blackmail a 
tort-outweigh the marginal social cost.47 
43 Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail, 141 U Pa L Rev 1639, 1656 (1993). 
" See generally Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction tothe Principles of Morals and Leg- 
islation 165-74 (Methuen 1970) (originally published in 1789). 
4 For a brief explanation of the difference b tween utilitarianism and wealth maximi- 
zation, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 12-17 (Aspen 5th ed 1998). Very 
roughly, utilitarians eek to maximize happiness, defined as the aggregation of private 
subjective desires; wealth maximizers seek to maximize fficiency, defined as the assign- 
ing of property rights (broadly understood) to those who value them most highly as meas- 
ured by their willingness and ability to pay for them, taking into account the cost of any 
particular assignment. 
" See, for example, id at 242-50. 
4 While taking for granted that blackmail is properly criminalized, Posner has ex- 
plored the related question of why it is "punished severely in comparison with other non- 
violent hefts." Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1836 (cited in note 2). Criminalizing blackmail, 
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The one proponent of the law and economics thesis to have 
even attempted the necessary cost-benefit demonstration, Profes- 
sor Joseph Isenbergh, has concluded that the marginal social 
benefit does not outweigh the marginal social cost. Isenbergh be- 
gins by observing that "A gains no real control over disclosure 
from an unenforceable bargain with B. And if B cannot assure A 
of any increased control over disclosure, B cannot extract much 
from A, and therefore has little reason to invest much effort in 
bargaining."48 Therefore, there is likely to be little (nonadventi- 
Posner theorizes, reduces its occurrence by three mechanisms. It 
(1) gives the blackmailer an incentive not to reveal the victim's ecret after the victim 
has complained to the police, which makes such complaints more likely and therefore 
blackmail less likely; (2) makes it impossible to conduct blackmail in the open; (3) 
prevents the blackmailer from offering his victim a legally enforceable promise of se- 
crecy. 
Id at 1840. Posner recognizes that the latter two effects work independently of the severity 
of the penalty. He even notes that increasing penalties may actually decrease the deter- 
rent value of the second effect because when blackmail cannot be conducted openly, it is 
most likely to be conducted by an intimate of the victim; when the victim and blackmailer 
are intimates, proof of the blackmail is more difficult; and when proof is less convincing, 
the likelihood that juries will convict stands in inverse proportion to the severity of the 
punishment. Id. 
Thus, in Posner's argument, attaching severe penalties to blackmail can be justified 
only to the extent that the first alleged effect-which depends on Posner's assertion that 
the 'blackmailer, once caught, usually will keep mum in an effort to obtain leniency," id at 
1838-39-outweighs the second. But why would this be? Even putting aside skepticism 
that "keeping mum" will be a major element in a plea bargain, the dispositive issue con- 
cerns the extent to which the attraction of leniency depends upon the severity of the pre- 
scribed penalty. Although Posner does not elaborate on his contention that "[tihe first ef- 
fect is enhanced by severe punishment," id at 1840, I suppose it is based on his assump- 
tion that the defendant's objective in plea negotiations is to purchase the largest possible 
reduction in sentence. If so, the likelihood of reaching a successful plea bargain is en- 
hanced by longer potential sentences: the larger the possible penalty, the greater the deal 
the prosecutor can offer. But if the defendant is more interested in the length of the actual 
sentence imposed than in the magnitude of the difference between the actual and poten- 
tial sentences, large penalties on the books can reduce the prospects for reaching a plea 
insofar as there exist any institutional nd/or psychological constraints on the amount of 
time a prosecutor can bargain away. And if the defendant can only be induced to silence 
by large relative reductions of sentence, the severity of the prescribed penalty is mostly ir- 
relevant. These are, of course, highly simplified assumptions. They nonetheless uggest 
that, if efficiency concerns justify criminalizing blackmail at all, the economic onsidera- 
tions Posner identifies are as likely to weigh in favor of lenient punishment as strict. 
4 Isenbergh, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1928 (cited in note 13). See also Posner, 141 U Pa L 
Rev at 1841 (cited in note 2) (noting that the third of his proposed mechanisms by which 
criminalization deters blackmail "could be achieved without criminal aw simply by mak- 
ing blackmail contracts unenforceable as a matter of contract law"). This proposition is 
slightly more problematic than Isenbergh acknowledges. Making blackmail agreements 
unenforceable might substantially deter payment when the blackmailer is not a repeat 
performer because the victim could not be sure that the blackmailer would remain silent. 
But repeat performers present a different case. Regardless of whether the contract is le- 
gally enforceable, the hypothetical blackmail firm that might arise were blackmail de- 
criminalized would find a reputation for trustworthiness critical (the apparent irony not- 
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tious) blackmail in a regime that seeks to deter blackmail simply 
by making blackmail agreements unenforceable as a matter of 
contract law.49 
Of course, it is possible that there would be even less black- 
mail in a regime that made blackmail agreements unenforceable 
and barred blackmail through the criminal aw. Noting the rarity 
of blackmail in the case law, Posner has speculated that the few 
reported cases accurately reflect a low incidence of the crime. An- 
ticipating that potential victims would refuse to pay blackmail, 
he surmises, a vast number of would-be blackmailers choose not 
to risk the criminal penalty.50 This is unpersuasive. It is more 
likely that blackmail is far more frequent han the incidence of 
reported cases suggests, and that the low rate of prosecution re- 
flects the substantial willingness of victims to pay. One would ex- 
pect an economically rational blackmailer to conceive and propose 
a blackmail price low enough to reduce substantially the prob- 
ability that his victim will report the blackmailer to the police 
rather than accept the deal. Thus, although the social cost of the 
blackmail prohibition is apparently low (commensurate with the 
infrequency of prosecution and conviction), the deterrent value of 
the criminal ban is likely to be as small or smaller. Because the 
goal from an economic standpoint is to achieve not maximum de- 
terrence but optimal deterrence, it is hard to conclude that 
blackmail's criminalization is a good buy. 
Moreover, the economic ase against criminalization may be 
even stronger, for the blackmail ban might be positively counter- 
productive. As Isenbergh has explained, 
if blackmail is made a crime, A gains considerable control 
over disclosure from entering into a bargain with B, because 
B, by incurring the criminal exposure of a blackmailer, can 
now sell A a much higher likelihood of silence. . . . The 
criminal prohibition of blackmail, therefore, makes the 
withstanding). Such an entity would find ways to make its guarantee of silence credible. 
But this observation still does not warrant criminalization, for there are other ways to dis- 
courage Epstein's "Blackmail, Inc.' (discussed in Section I.A.2 below). For instance, in ad- 
dition to making blackmail contracts void, the state could ban blackmail advertising 
and/or withhold the benefits of incorporation from firms engaged in blackmailing. 
4 This conclusion is further einforced when we re-examine Posner's three proposed 
mechanisms by which criminalization deters blackmail. As noted above, Posner himself 
recognizes that the third mechanism can be achieved without criminalization. See Posner, 
141 U Pa L Rev at 1840-41 (cited in note 2). Depending upon the degree of moral censure 
attaching to blackmail, the second mechanism could as well. 
50 Id at 1841. 
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blackmail bargains entered into across the threshold of pro- 
hibition highly enforceable.5' 
And if the would-be blackmailer anticipates that a consummated 
bargain will be meaningfully enforceable, he is more likely to 
commit he resources necessary to undertake the activity. 
In short, making blackmail a criminal offense might deter 
some blackmail that would not be deterred in a regime that 
merely made the blackmail contracts unenforceable. But, if so, its 
deterrent effect is likely to be small. The ban might be moder- 
ately efficient or moderately inefficient. On the other hand, 
criminalizing blackmail might even increase its incidence. In that 
event, resort to the criminal law is inefficient-maybe substan- 
tially so. Given such indeterminacy, the proposition (necessary to 
the economic justification for criminalization) that the expected 
value of criminalizing blackmail is positive seems highly dubious. 
* * * 
The foregoing analysis supports three conclusions about the 
law and economics argument on blackmail. First, the economic 
approach fails to justify prohibitions against adventitious black- 
mail. Second, whether other major forms of blackmail are truly 
disadvantageous on law and economics principles is far from cer- 
tain once one takes externalities into proper account. Third, it is 
unlikely that the economic argument warrants resort to the 
criminal law. Accepting the first and third of these conclusions, 
Isenbergh has argued that the law can adequately deter any inef- 
ficiency blackmail causes simply by making contracts of silence 
entered into between a blackmailer and his victim void and unen- 
forceable, except for contracts involving adventitious blackmail.52 
But if the economic approach to the blackmail puzzle leads 
ultimately to Isenbergh, then we should look elsewhere to solve 
it. For although he concludes confidently that "[t]here is no other 
way to explain the law of blackmail,"53 Isenbergh's radical pro- 
posals to decriminalize certain types of blackmail reveal that the 
economists' purported explanation is no justification. Before we 
agree that commercial research, and even entrepreneurial, 
blackmail should be freed from the criminal law's grasp, we 
5' Isenbergh, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1928 (cited in note 13). 
52 More precisely, in light of the difficulty in ascertaining whether given information 
was costlessly obtained, Isenbergh would, as a proxy, make all contracts to remain silent 
enforceable if the parties knew each other before the blackmail bargain. He would also 
make an exception to that exception in cases where the blackmail contract concerns i- 
lence about the commission of torts or crimes. Id at 1925-32. 
53 Id at 1921. 
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would do well to search for an account more in tune with current 
law and common intuition. 
2. Richard Epstein: blackmail as the "hand-maiden to 
corruption and deceit." 
Professor Richard Epstein has proposed a different conse- 
quentalist solution to the blackmail puzzle. Although himself a 
prominent law and economics cholar, Epstein's specific oncern 
is not the deadweight economic losses that trouble Posner, Gins- 
burg, and Coase. Instead, Epstein argues that blackmail is crimi- 
nal because it has a necessary tendency to induce other acts of 
theft and deception, the criminalization of which is wholly unpuz- 
zling.5 This difference notwithstanding, Epstein's theory suffers 
from some of the same flaws as does the argument from economic 
efficiency. 
Epstein "begin[s] with a brief account of the moral theory of 
criminal responsibility"55-to wit, that there is no criminal iabil- 
ity without mens rea and actus reus. Blackmail, he concludes, 
easily satisfies the mens rea requirement, for "[t]he element of in- 
tent is always present in vivid form."56 But the actus reus re- 
quirement presents a problem. Only the threat or use of force or 
fraud can satisfy it, Epstein argues,57 and blackmail (ordinarily) 
involves neither.58 One could "argue that the threat to disclose is 
illegal precisely because the disclosure itself, if made, ought to be 
illegal."59 But this argument fails, Epstein concludes, because it 
"jettisons the basic theory of criminal responsibility by holding 
that deliberate acts, not involving the use of force or fraud, may 
themselves be regarded as criminal.'0 
Epstein maintains that the solution to the blackmail puzzle 
appears when one imagines a world in which blackmail were le- 
galized: 
5 Epstein, 50 U Chi L Rev at 553 (cited in note 2). Precisely why the traditional, un- 
problematic, rimes should be criminal is not clear from Epstein's essay. As we will see, 
however, Epstein's account of blackmail is incompatible with any plausible justification 
(beyond his own idiosyncratic interpretation fthe actus reus and mens rea requirements) 
for the criminalization fcommon law larceny offenses. 
5 Id at 555. 
56 Id. 
Id at 555-57. 
Epstein notes that blackmail can contain force or fraud, as, for example, when the 
blackmailer threatens to disclose information gleaned from stolen documents. Id at 558. 
But in such a case, making blackmail criminal presents no puzzle, for [i]t is easy to re- 
gard blackmail as a criminal offense whenever the disclosure is itself regarded as wrong- 
ful." Id. 
59 Id at 560. 
60 Id. 
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[T]here would then be an open and public market for a new 
set of social institutions to exploit the gains from this new 
form of legal activity. Blackmail, Inc. could with impunity 
place advertisements in the newspaper offering to acquire for 
top dollar any information with the capacity to degrade or 
humiliate persons in the eyes of their families or business 
associates.6" 
The existence of Blackmail, Inc. would produce at least two unde- 
sirable consequences, Epstein claims. First, the greater preva- 
lence of blackmail would lead to more blackmail victims and, con- 
sequently, greater incidences of theft and fraud by victims des- 
perate to obtain the funds necessary to pay the blackmailer.62 
Second, because Blackmail, Inc. would "recognizeE ] that its abil- 
ity to extract future payments from [the victim] depends upon 
[the third party to whom the disclosure would be made] being 
kept in the dark," it would "instruct [the victim] in the proper 
way to arrange his affairs in order to keep the disclosures from 
being made."63 In short, Epstein concludes, "[b]lackmail is made a 
crime not only because of what it is, but because of what it neces- 
sarily leads to.... [I]t is the handmaiden to corruption and de- 
ceit."' 
Epstein's conclusion, however, does not follow from his 
analysis. The real thrust of Blackmail, Inc. is that blackmail is 
properly made a crime not because of "what it is," but only be- 
cause of its consequences. Epstein's assertion that force and fraud 
exhaust the concerns of the criminal aw necessarily entails that 
criminalization of blackmail would be impermissible (given that 
blackmail does not itself constitute fraud or force) but for the 
fraudulent conduct it engenders. In other words, Epstein's theory 
provides not only that the systemic onsequences he identifies are 
sufficient for imposition of criminal iability as a general matter, 
but also that those consequences constitute a necessary condition 
for imposition of criminal iability in the particular case of black- 
mail. Were this true, the proper scope of the crime of blackmail 
would be substantially narrower than it is at present. Consider, 
for example, a blackmail proposal in which the blackmailer de- 
mands sexual favors for the nondisclosure of embarrassing in- 
formation that the victim has no moral obligation to divulge (such 
as her own illegitimate birth). This form of blackmail would nei- 
6 Id at 562. 
62 Id at 564. 
63 Id. 
64 Id at 566. 
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ther induce the victim to engage in theft or fraud nor encourage 
any "deception" that society has a legitimate interest in deter- 
ring. Under Epstein's reasoning, it should not be criminalized.65 
A second problem with Epstein's theory is that the claim 
upon which it rests-that force and fraud demarcate the criminal 
law's proper reach-is extremely dubious. Even aside from 'vic- 
timless" offenses uch as gambling, prostitution, and drug use, 
criminalization of which is notoriously suspect on liberal princi- 
ples, the state makes numerous activities criminal that appear 
not to involve either force or fraud. These offenses cover a wide 
range of conduct from statutory rape to indecent exposure to lar- 
ceny by stealth. Conceivably, Epstein could respond either by ar- 
ticulating conceptions of force and fraud sufficiently expansive to 
encompass all of the foregoing activities or by explaining why it is 
morally unjustifiable for the state to make such conduct criminal. 
But he has not done so. 
Finally, the internal logic of Epstein's theory is fundamen- 
tally flawed. Epstein maintains (1) that the "basic," "moral" the- 
ory of criminal aw holds that acts not involving force or fraud 
may not themselves be criminalized, and (2) that actions that in- 
duce force and fraud may also be criminalized.66 This second prin- 
ciple is frustratingly underdeveloped.67 More profoundly, these 
two principles are not compatible: claim (2) empties claim (1) of 
any meaningful moral content. 
Epstein claims that it is morally wrongful for the state to 
punish people for engaging in nonforceful, nonfraudulent actions. 
This assertion must rest on reasons, even though Epstein does 
not state what they are. Those reasons will be either deontologi- 
cal or consequentialist in nature. A deontologic reason would be 
that people have a moral right to be free from punishment by the 
state for actions not involving force or fraud, no matter what the 
consequences. But Epstein's second principle is inconsistent with 
this justification-it allows the state to punish acts outside these 
areas, if they lead to force or fraud. So claim (1) must rest on con- 
sequentialist reasons. But if Epstein allows such reasons, his ar- 
5 Unless, that is, the practical difficulties in excepting such cases from a general 
blackmail ban would be insurmountable or too costly-a contention Epstein does not 
make. 
Epstein, 50 U Chi L Rev at 555, 565-66 (cited in note 2). 
67 Consider, for instance, the pricing and marketing strategies of major sneaker manu- 
facturers. Though we might not have predicted it ex ante, we now know that kids rob and 
kill for other kids' sneakers and for the money with which to buy sneakers. Under Ep- 
stein's principle, we could make it a criminal offense for Nike to advertise in inner cities or 
to price Air Jordans far out of the comfortable r ach of the average low-income adolescent 
male. And the standards by which to measure whether we should are not at all apparent. 
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ticulation of "the moral theory of crminal responsibility" seems 
too narrow: in principle, anything that leads to the same types of 
consequences as acts of force and fraud could be made crminal. 
This conclusion could be avoided, I think, only by adopting a con- 
sequentialist moral theory in which acts of force and fraud consti- 
tute the essential, irreducible units of measurement. Why this 
should be, though, is a mystery. Unfortunately, Epstein provides 
no explanation himself. It follows, then, that Epstein's assertion 
that "deliberate acts, not involving the use of force or fraud may 
[not] themselves be regarded as criminal"'8 must be understood 
either as a descriptive claim (in which case, as we have seen, it 
would be false) or as a rule of prudence; it is not a statement of 
politico moral obligation. 
In sum, Epstein's theory fails for three reasons. First, it 
would leave a significant subset of blackmail-that which neither 
induces the victim to engage in theft or fraud nor encourages any 
deception-uncriminalizable. Second, it rests on the questionable 
moral principle that force or fraud should be necessary conditions 
for criminalization. Third, and fatally, were Epstein nonetheless 
correct hat force or fraud should be necessary conditions for im- 
posing criminal punishment, his further claim that it is morally 
justifiable to criminalize conduct that is not itself forceful or 
fraudulent, if that conduct encourages other acts of force or fraud, 
cannot be sustained. 
3. Jeffrie Murphy: blackmail encourages invasions 
of privacy. 
A third theory, proposed by Professor Jeifrie Murphy,69 ex- 
hibits similarities to both of the approaches already discussed. 
Like Epstein, Murphy focuses on the antisocial conduct that le- 
galizing blackmail might encourage. Like proponents of the 
deadweight loss hypothesis, Murphy seems principally driven to 
explain and justify the distinction between blackmail and "other 
hard economic transactions."70 Like both earlier approaches, how- 
ever, Murphy's theory is substantially underinclusive and rests 
on contestable premises. 
Murphy proceeds in three steps. He begins with twin as- 
sumptions about the moral underpinnings of the criminal aw: 
The first is that immorality should be a necessary condition 
for criminalization but not a sufficient condition. The second 
6 Epstein, 50 U Chi L Rev at 560 (cited in note 2). 
69 See Murphy, 63 Monist 156 (cited in note 2). 
70 Id at 156. 
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is that utilitarian considerations, though unsatisfactory in 
explicating the concept of immorality, are a reasonable basis 
on which to answer the question "Which of all immoral ac- 
tions should be criminalized?"71 
He then asserts that blackmail and hard economic transactions 
"are both intrinsically immoral (and immoral for the same rea- 
son-e.g., taking an unfair advantage of the victim's vulnerabil- 
ity)."'2 Third, he explains that utilitarian considerations support 
(1) criminalizing the blackmail of persons who are not public fig- 
ures, because legalized blackmail would create a new incentive to 
invade the privacy of average persons,73 and (2) not criminalizing 
hard economic transactions, because there is no apparent way to 
draw objectively sensible and enforceable lines between immoral 
and moral transactions.74 
One problem with Murphy's theory should be apparent. As 
Lindgren has pointed out, Murphy's theory cannot justify crimi- 
nalizing participant and opportunistic blackmail, because any in- 
vasions of privacy such forms of blackmail occasion would be un- 
affected by blackmail aws.75 There is, however, a far greater dif- 
ficulty: Murphy's theory cannot survive on a bare assertion that 
blackmail is immoral because it takes unfair advantage of a vic- 
71 Id at 163. 
72 Id. 
73 Noting that substantial economic incentives to invade the privacy of "public figures" 
already exist, Murphy would generally permit blackmail of such figures at rates that do 
not exceed the market price for the information i question. However, because concealing 
embarrassing information about some public figures can be harmful to the legitimate in- 
terests of a democratic citizenry, Murphy would bar even the "market price" blackmail of 
"public officials." Idat 164-65. 
74 Id at 163-66. 
75 Lindgren, 84 Colum L Rev at 690 (cited in note 2). Lindgren levels three other criti- 
cisms at Murphy's theory. According to Lindgren: (1) Murphy errs by assuming there is no 
market for embarrassing information about private individuals: spouses, employers, credit 
agencies, and potential business associates are all interested in details about nonpublic 
figures; (2) Murphy's proposed exception for market price blackmail is unconvincing and 
morally unacceptable; and (3) there is much embarrassing information about public offi- 
cials the concealment of which appears morally unproblematic. Idat 692-94. 
These latter three objections do not cut as sharply as Lindgren believes. First, that 
there is some market for embarrassing information about private individuals eems ir- 
relevant. Murphy could respond that blackmail should be criminal so as not to increase 
substantially the existing incentives for privacy invasion. Second, intuitions about market 
price blackmail are more diverse than Lindgren assumes. See Section III.B.2. Third, Mur- 
phy concedes that some embarrassing information about public officials i not relevant o 
the public, but suggests that here line-drawing difficulties weigh in favor of the rule he 
crafts. Murphy, 63 Monist at 164 (cited in note 2). Lindgren provides no compelling reason 
to disagree with Murphy's judgment on this point. 
This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1998] Taking Motives Seriously 819 
tim's vulnerability.76 Consider the example Murphy offers of a 
paradigmatic "hard economic transaction": 
I know that your son, whom you love more than anything 
else in the world, is dying of leukemia. I also know two other 
things: (1) that he is a great baseball fan who would love to 
have a baseball autographed by Babe Ruth to cheer him 
during his final days and (2) that $6,000 is all the money you 
have in the world. Now I happen to own the last such base- 
ball available in the world, and I will make you a proposi- 
tion-namely, to sell you this baseball for $6,000.77 
That does sound hard. And let us agree that it is immoral as 
well. But Murphy does not claim that the baseball owner has a 
moral obligation to give the baseball to the dying boy. Presuma- 
bly the owner is morally free to sell it to the boy's parents for a 
"fair" price. Additionally, there would seem to be circumstances in 
which other dispositions of the baseball would also be immoral 
because "unfair," such as dropping it in the Pacific Ocean. 
This has several consequences for Murphy's theory of black- 
mail. First, if the baseball owner is morally free to sell his prop- 
erty for a fair price, the blackmailer should be too, whether that 
price is set by the "market" or by another means. That is, "the 
morality of the criminal law'78 would seem to forbid criminaliza- 
tion of what might be termed "fair-price blackmail." Second, if it 
might be immoral for the baseball owner to refuse to deal with 
the boy's parents, it might be immoral for someone in possession 
of embarrassing information to reveal it instead of becoming a 
blackmailer. 
These last objections are telling. Murphy is most readily 
grouped among those who would justify criminalizing blackmail 
on consequential grounds, for he emphasizes the ways that 
blackmail laws can encourage or discourage invasions of privacy. 
And yet he explicitly premises his theory on both deontological 
and utilitarian concerns. Ultimately, the most revealing aspect of 
his theory lies in its unexamined deontological basis. That the 
blackmail proposal is "unfair"-let alone why it is unfair-is far 
from transparently obvious. Murphy's "preliminary inquiry" rein- 
76 In fairness, Murphy does not say that "taking an unfair advantage of the victim's 
vulnerability" constitutes the whole of the immorality of blackmail and hard economic 
transactions; he says only that it is an example of their immorality. Murphy, 63 Monist at 
163 (cited in note 2). But if there are other ways in which blackmail is "intrinsically im- 
moral," id, Murphy does not hint at what they may be. 
77 Id at 156-57. 
78 Id at 163. 
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forces the need to study carefully the arguments for blackmail's 
intrinsic immorality; blackmail's wrongfulness cannot be blithely 
assumed. 
B. Blackmail as an Inherent Wrong: Of Unconditional Acts and 
Conditional Threats 
As demonstrated, the consequentialist heories suffer from 
various analytical faults. Beyond that, they fail even to approxi- 
mate common intuitions regarding what's wrong with blackmail. 
It should be no surprise, therefore, that many other theorists 
start from the assumption that blackmail is properly criminal be- 
cause it is a nonconsequential moral wrong. Their challenge is to 
explain why the threat is wrong in a way that either distin- 
guishes the threat from the unconditional performance of the act 
threatened or explains why unconditional performance of the act 
threatened should also be criminal. This Section considers four 
very different efforts to answer this challenge. 
1. Feinberg and Gorr: the wrongful act. 
In Harmless Wrongdoing, Professor Joel Feinberg advances a 
complex and nuanced argument hat, at its core, argues that the 
morality of blackmail is a function of the morality of the act that 
the blackmailer threatens or offers.79 Under this view, the key is 
to determine whether unconditional performance of the act 
threatened or offered by the blackmailer would be wrongful. If so, 
blackmail is likewise wrongful,80 and wrongful to that same de- 
gree. Because blackmail, as a species of theft, is also harm- 
causing, it is consistent with liberal principles to make it crimi- 
nal. Correspondingly, if neither the act threatened nor the act of- 
fered is wrongful, then the conditional blackmail proposition is 
also not wrongful and may not be made criminal. 
Two illustrations are helpful. Because it is clearly wrongful 
not to report he identity of someone who has committed a felony, 
there would be nothing puzzling or problematic about criminal- 
izing the conditional offer not to report a crime. (That society 
might opt not to criminalize unconditional performance of the 
7 Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 240-58 (cited in note 2). Feinberg speaks of acts 
"threatened" and "offered" inrecognition of the fact that blackmail is always a double con- 
ditional proposition of the form: if -x then y; and if x then -y, where the first statement is a 
'threat" and the second is an "offer." 
' Although e recognizes numerous cases of "justified blackmail," id at 258-74, Fein- 
berg presents them as piecemeal exceptions, not as examples shedding any light on the 
nature of the puzzle. 
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underlying wrongful act is irrelevant, according to Feinberg; it is 
enough that society could reasonably decide to impose either 
criminal or civil sanctions.8") In contrast, Feinberg argues, a per- 
son who comes to learn of another's adultery will often have nei- 
ther a moral duty to reveal that fact nor a moral duty to remain 
silent. Consequently, society could not justifiably impose a legal 
obligation, criminal or civil, upon persons either to disclose or not 
to disclose the commission of adultery. It follows, Feinberg con- 
cludes, that the corresponding blackmail proposal-call it "adul- 
tery blackmail"-should be decriminalized.82 
Given that adultery blackmail might well be a modal case of 
the crime, Feinberg's conclusion is startling. Michael Gorr has 
tried to salvage Feinberg's basic approach by showing why it ac- 
tually supports the morally intuitive conclusion that adultery 
blackmail is properly criminalized.83 Gorr begins by asserting, 
contrary to Feinberg, that every act likely to arise in situations 
involving blackmail is either morally obligatory or morally pro- 
hibited. He agrees that society should not impose a legal duty ei- 
ther to disclose or not to disclose adultery, but bases his conclu- 
sion on epistemic uncertainty: we may not know whether the con- 
sequences of such a disclosure would be morally beneficial or 
would cause unnecessary misery,84 and we may lack necessary in- 
formation "about the prior distribution of moral rights and duties 
among the related parties."5 But for these considerations, Gorr 
argues, 
there would be a morally conclusive reason for imposing on 
third-party observers a legal requirement either to report the 
occurrence of adultery or (depending upon the circum- 
stances) to refrain from reporting its occurrence. It follows 
that, in the absence of such concerns, there would also be a 
morally conclusive reason for prohibiting the corresponding 
blackmail proposals since these would constitute attempts to 
81 In a similar vein, Professor Arthur Goodhart years earlier sought, by distinguishing 
between moral and immoral iberties, to downplay the lawfulness of the act a blackmailer 
threatens to perform. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common 
Law 175-89 (Cambridge 1931). He concluded that it is blackmail when the act threatened, 
though lawful, is immoral. Unfortunately, Goodhart's conception of immoral iberties ap- 
pears much like Justice Stewart's conception of obscenity-although e may have known 
it when he saw it, he did not provide the tools necessary for others to draw the difficult 
lines. See Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart concurring). 
82 Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 246-49 (cited in note 2). 
8' See Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 Phil & Pub Aff 43 
(1992). 
Id at 55. 
Id at 56, quoting Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 248 (cited in note 2). 
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acquire some of the adulterer's assets either by offering to 
conceal what ought morally to be disclosed or by threatening 
to disclose what ought morally to be concealed. But, ex hy- 
pothesi, although such difficulties do serve to inhibit us from 
imposing duties with respect to the mere disclosure or non- 
disclosure of the adulterer's activities, they do not prevent us 
from imposing duties not to engage in the blackmailing of 
such persons.86 
The crux of Gorr's claim appears to be that Feinberg errs by 
focusing seriatim on each leg of the double conditional that con- 
stitutes a blackmail proposal. We might not know which of the 
two acts-the one threatened or the one offered-would be im- 
moral, but we do know that one of them must be. Consequently, 
adultery blackmail's wrongfulness derives neither from the act 
threatened nor from the act offered (because either might be 
morally permissible), but from the blackmailer's communicating a 
threat that will commit him to either divulging or remaining si- 
lent, depending on his victim's response. Adultery blackmail is 
wrongful, then, because the blackmailer knowingly takes an un- 
justifiable risk of committing an immoral act. 
But this is surely wrong. Even accepting for the sake of ar- 
gument Gorr's dubious assumption that one of the options must 
be-from a God's eye perspective-the morally obligatory course 
of action, the fact that the adultery blackmailer commits herself, 
at the moment of her threat, to risking an immoral act does not 
entail that taking that risk is itself an immoral act. Recall Gorr's 
moral-consequentialist claim that the effects of disclosure are 
morally relevant and that those effects may be difficult or impos- 
sible to predict. It follows that even the prospective discloser her- 
self might not know whether her moral duty is to disclose or not 
to disclose. And if we do not believe that an actor knows where 
her moral duty lies, it makes no sense to hold her morally culpa- 
ble for risking violation of that duty. Otherwise, any decision- 
making strategy one might use in a morally uncertain situation- 
from flipping a coin to delegating the choice to a third party- 
would be morally equivalent to blackmail. Because Gorr provides 
no reason for believing this is so," his effort to salvage Feinberg's 
thesis fails.88 
' Gorr, 21 Phil & Pub Aff at 56-57 (cited in note 83). 
87 At least one theorist has intimated that a coin toss is the morally preferable deci- 
sionmaking strategy for those forced to choose between harms in cases of moral uncer- 
tainty. See John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 Phil & Pub Aff 293, 303 
(1977). 
' Some threads of Gorr's analysis do hint toward a departure from Feinberg's belief 
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2. Lindgren and Fletcher: the wrongful threat. 
At the opposite pole from Feinberg and Gorr stand Professors 
James Lindgren and George Fletcher. Whereas the former pair 
contend that the blackmail proposal is morally equivalent to the 
act threatened or offered, the latter argue-for vastly different 
reasons-that the key to the blackmail puzzle inheres entirely in 
the wrongfulness of the threat. 
In a highly influential 1984 article, Lindgren claimed to solve 
the blackmail puzzle by observing that the blackmail threat dif- 
fers from ordinary and legitimate threats, such as a threat "to sell 
to someone else unless the buyer agrees to pay the price de- 
manded," in that only the former involves using for one's gain 
leverage that properly belongs to another (for example, the adul- 
terer's spouse).89 What makes the blackmailer's conduct distinct 
from legitimate threats, and therefore wrongful, Lindgren argues, 
"is that he interposes himself parasitically in an actual or poten- 
tial dispute in which he lacks a sufficiently direct interest. What 
right has he to make money by settling other people's claims?"' 
At the heart of blackmail, then, is the triangular nature of 
the transaction, and particularly this disjunction between 
the blackmailer's personal benefit and the interests of the 
third parties whose leverage he uses. In effect, the black- 
mailer attempts to gain an advantage in return for sup- 
pressing someone else's actual or potential interest. The 
blackmailer is negotiating for his own gain with someone 
else's leverage or bargaining chips.9" 
Lindgren's approach has been subjected to extensive criti- 
cism that need not be repeated here in full.92 While Lindgren's 
theory enjoys claims to rough-though surely not perfect93-de- 
that the unconditional act and the conditional threat are morally equivalent. If Gorr 
means to claim that an "attempt o acquire some of the adulterer's assets" is itself a 
wrongful act that makes the blackmail proposal morally worse than the acts threatened 
and offered, his argument approximates Leo Katz's (discussed in Section I.B.3) and suffers 
from the same failings. 
89 Lindgren, 84 Colum L Rev at 701 (cited in note 2). 
90 Id at 702. 
91 Id. 
9 See, for example, Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U Pa 
L Rev 1567, 1580-81 (1993); DeLong, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1681-88 (cited in note 11); Walter 
Block and David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Posner, Ep- 
stein, Nozick and Lindgren, 19 Loyola LA L Rev 37, 51-54 (1985). 
9 Consider, for example, a threat by Nazis to march in Skokie unless the town's resi- 
dents buy them off with a large cash payment. I assume that this is blackmail. If so, the 
Nazis are merely leveraging their own constitutional rights, which they are threatening to 
exercise as an instrument of cruelty towards the town's many Holocaust survivors. (It 
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scriptive accuracy, its normative appeal is extremely weak, as 
Lindgren himself has conceded,' because he provides no reason 
why using someone else's leverage for individual gain should be 
unlawful, let alone criminal. Furthermore, ifthe use of such lev- 
erage or "chips" is wrongful, it is not clear why squandering an- 
other's chips-by neither threatening nor making a given disclo- 
sure-is not likewise wrongful and thus properly criminal.95 
Whereas Lindgren's theory amounts to an insightful descrip- 
tion in futile search of a normative rationale, Fletcher relies on a 
novel and explicit theory of crime and punishment.' The core 
concern of the criminal aw, he ventures, is to deter and negate 
conditions of dominance and subordination.97 If so, there is no 
reason to criminalize the mere disclosure of embarrassing infor- 
mation. Once undertaken, the disclosure is over and done with. 
The blackmail threat to disclose the same information is another 
story. Precisely because of "the prospect of repeated demands,"98 
blackmail tends to create a continuing relationship of dominance 
and submission. In consequence, blackmail "is not an anomalous 
crime but rather a paradigm for understanding both criminal 
wrongdoing and punishment."99 
Though provocative, Fletcher's theory runs into a host of dif- 
ficulties. Maybe the least troubling difficulty concerns Fletcher's 
foundational theory of crime and punishment. As Fletcher ac- 
knowledges, not all crimes-homicide is an obvious example ap- 
pear to implicate relationships of dominance and subordination.'" 
Second, even if negating dominance is of fundamental, per- 
haps defining, importance to the criminal aw, Fletcher's theory 
is underinclusive. In response to the objection "that if the after- 
math of the alleged blackmail is the determinative factor," the 
crime should be defined "as the second act of blackmail," Fletcher 
emphasizes that "the relationship of dominance and subordina- 
tion comes into being as a result of the victim's making the first 
payment or engaging in the first coerced act of submission. The 
could be argued that the Nazis are really leveraging the informational interests of the 
public-within or without Skokie-that might wish to view the march. But this is a forced 
and artificial construction. The public could not compel the Nazis to march if they chose 
not to, nor could the Nazis be viewed as having even a weak moral obligation to march.) 
See Lindgren, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1988 (cited in note 3). 
9 See Isenbergh, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1917 n 35 (cited in note 13). 
George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U Pa L Rev 1617, 1618 
(1993). 
Id at 1629-35. 
Id at 1626. 
Id at 1617. 
'??Id at 1635. 
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dominance consists in the knowledge that the victim is now fair 
game for repeated demands. Dominance and subordination are 
states of anticipation."'01 While this may be so, Fletcher's theory 
remains underinclusive insofar as it cannot justify criminalizing 
blackmail proposals that do not reasonably create apprehension 
of repeated demands. Consider a judicial nominee who has com- 
mitted some minor indiscretion in his past-say he smoked 
marijuana, and inhaled-for which he is not ashamed but the 
disclosure of which he (rightly) fears might doom his nomination. 
Assume that Blackmailer approaches Nominee on the eve of the 
confirmation vote and threatens to disclose his prior drug use to 
the Senate unless Nominee pays $10,000. If he does not fear dis- 
closure after his confirmation, Nominee may accede to the de- 
mand without initiating a submissive relationship. Under 
Fletcheres theory, Blackmailer's conduct should not be criminal- 
ized-a conclusion contrary to prevailing law as well as, I would 
suspect, to common moral intuition. 
The third problem with Fletcher's argument is the most pro- 
found. Properly, Fletcher does not aver that a relationship of 
dominance and subordination is sufficient o justify criminal 
punishment. After all, innumerable relationships-parent and 
child, employer and employee, teacher and student, etc. -xhibit 
aspects of dominance and subordination, yet raise no suspicion in 
the eyes of the law. Indeed, some such relationships such as 
prison guard and inmate-are products of the criminal law. The 
existence of such a dynamic cannot be a sufficient condition for 
criminalization. As one of Fletcher's critics objected, "It must be 
the case, therefore, that the blackmailer's actions are somehow 
intrinsically wrong and unjustified."'02 Fletcher appears to agree 
with this observation, but does not believe it has any critical 
force: 
Many words and expressions at hand express what is wrong 
with blackmail. In fact, too many things are wrong with it. 
Blackmail represents coercion of the victim, exploitation of 
the victim's weakness, and trading unfairly in assets or chips 
that belong to others. It represents an undesirable and abu- 
sive form of private law enforcement. It leads to the waste of 
resources so far as blackmailers are induced to collect infor- 
mation that they are willing to suppress for a fee.'03 
'' Id at 1637-38. 
02 Id at 1636-37 (noting objection raised by Stephen Latham). 
103Id. 
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In short, Fletcher seems to suggest, of course blackmail is wrong 
and unjustified. 
But Fletcher's litany of blackmairs evils cannot do the work 
he expects of it precisely because each (loaded) observation is so 
hotly contested. What makes blackmail "coercive" or "exploita- 
tive" in a morally meaningful sense? Why is trading on another's 
chips "unfair"? What moral significance should we attribute to 
the fact, if true, that, on balance, blackmail wastes resources? As 
this Section endeavors to demonstrate, these are challenging 
questions. Mere reference to theories that elicit, but do not con- 
vincingly resolve, them cannot answer what Fletcher seems to 
acknowledge is the crucial question for his theory: what about the 
blackmailer's actions creates a wrongful type of dominance? 
3. Katz: the punishment puzzle. 
A middle ground between the poles defined by Feinberg and 
Gorr on the one hand and Lindgren and Fletcher on the other has 
been carved out by Leo Katz in his imaginative contribution to 
the blackmail debate." In contrast to Feinberg and Gorr, Katz 
asserts that blackmail is morally worse than the act threatened. 
Unlike Lindgren and Fletcher, Katz denies that the act threat- 
ened might be a moral right. Instead, he insists that the act a 
blackmailer leverages into his threat is (1) a moral wrong, and (2) 
a relatively minor one at that.105 He thus restates the blackmail 
puzzle as follows: 'If revealing the infidelities is only a minor 
immorality, then how can the taking of money which the victim 
prefers to that minor immorality be anything more than a minor 
immorality itself?"1?` More generally, given that a blackmail pro- 
posal consists of two analytically distinct elements-the black- 
mailer's threatened act and his attempt o secure the victim's re- 
sources-why should it be assigned the greater moral and legal 
censure that attaches to the latter element alone? 
Katz responds to this question by introducing, and proposing 
to resolve, what he calls the "punishment puzzle," a conundrum 
he illustrates with the following hypothetical: Smithy the burglar 
breaks into Bartleby's house to commit larceny. Inside, he de- 
mands that Bartleby divulge the combination to his safe and 
threatens to beat Bartleby senseless if he does not comply. 
" See Katz, 141 U Pa L Rev 1567 (cited in note 92). 
"See, for example, id at 1597 (The blackmailer puts the victim to a choice between a
theft (or some other criminal encroachment) and some other, minor wrong.... To be sure, 
the wrong must not be too minor.... But it need not-and this is the crucial point-be an 
immorality that comes anywhere close to being criminal."). 
"Id at 1598 (emphasis altered). 
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Bartleby declares that he cannot bear to part with the items in 
his safe (which have only sentimental value) and regrets that he 
will have to submit to the beating. Smithy batters Bartleby sav- 
agely and leaves. When Louie the burglar breaks into Bartleby's 
house the next night, the identical scenario transpires-with one 
exception. Just as Louie is about to strike Bartleby, he notices a 
scrap of paper containing the safe's combination. Despite 
Bartleby's plea that he would rather be pummeled than lose his 
goods, Louie opens the safe and leaves with the contents.'07 
The law, of course, would punish Smithy the batterer more 
severely than Louie the thief, and Katz approves. The criminal 
law, he argues, should not take account of a victim's idiosyncratic 
preferences. Whereas victims are concerned solely with harm, the 
law is concerned with the defendant's culpability, of which harm 
is but a minor ingredient.'08 Hence "the lesson of the punishment 
puzzle": "when the defendant has the victim choose between either 
of two immoralities which he must endure, the gravity of the de- 
fendant's wrongdoing is to be judged by what he actually did (or 
sought to achieve), not by what he threatened to do."'09 Smithy is 
punished more severely than Louie because battery is morally 
worse than theft. For the same reason, the law rightly views 
blackmail in light of what the blackmailer intends to do-take 
money from one who does not want to part with it. Thus, to Katz, 
blackmail is a form of robbery-a graver offense than the act 
threatened."' 
For all the wit and insight of Katz's effort, itfails to solve the 
blackmail puzzle. Katz simply asserts that the act the black- 
mailer threatens is immoral. However, as Lindgren has objected, 
"this merely assumes away the paradox, which is in part that of- 
ten what the blackmailer threatens to do is a moral right.""' 
While Lindgren's claim that the threatened act is often moral 
demands qualification (because the act's moral status is far more 
complex and contingent han he recognizes"2), his general point 
still holds: whether the act threatened is a moral right or a moral 
wrong (or something else) cannot be simply assumed without ar- 
gument."13 
07 Id at 1582-83. 
1 Id at 1590. 
'"Id at 1598. 
""Id at 1599. 
"'Lindgren, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1977 (cited in note 3). 
"'See Section II. 
113 Even if Katz is correct hat the act threatened is wrongful, his further contention 
that the threat is less wrongful than what the blackmailer "actually did (or sought to 
achieve)" is unpersuasive. See text accompanying notes 188-91. We need a more developed 
This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
828 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:795 
4. Nozick: blackmail as coercion. 
All of the nonconsequentialists are driven to explain why the 
blackmail threat is a moral wrong. In addition, each of the theo- 
rists so far discussed considers the moral status of the acts a 
blackmailer might threaten. The final theory here addressed- 
which derives from Professor Robert Nozick's seminal study of 
coercion14-does not. This oversight is significant. Instead of 
solving the blackmail puzzle, the coercion thesis further 
complicates the moral relationship between the conditional threat 
(or offer) that constitutes blackmail and the unconditional 
performance of the act threatened (or offered). 
Nozick's most familiar remarks on blackmail appear in his 
1974 classic, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, during a brief explora- 
tion of the concept of "productive xchange."115 Most voluntary 
transactions are "productive" in the sense that they make both 
parties better off. Nozick proposes that an exchange between A 
and B is unproductive under the following circumstances: (1) A is 
no better off as a result of the transaction than if he had nothing 
to do with B; and (2) if B's part of the transaction consists solely 
of abstaining from performing some action, x, B did not propose to 
perform x solely to sell A his abstention.116 Blackmail, he notes, is 
one example of an unproductive exchange."7 
If this discussion is to be read as an argument for blackmail's 
criminalization, two problems arise. First, it presents an inaccu- 
rate description of blackmail: the victim may prefer that the 
blackmailer exists. Imagine that Adulterer dumps Mistress, who 
then decides to reveal their affair to Wife. However, an adver- 
tisement for Blackmail, Inc. causes her to reconsider. Although 
she would like to hurt her ex-lover, a possible windfall is also at- 
tractive. She sells her love letters to the professionals who in turn 
sell them to Adulterer. Adulterer's acceptance of the blackmail of- 
theory than Katz provides to understand why the blackmailer's attempt o secure his vic- 
tim's resources is necessarily more wrongful than the act threatened. 
'Although traced to Nozick, this basic approach has been elaborated by others. See, 
for example, Altman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1640-51 (cited in note 43). 
1 5Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 84-87 (cited in note 2). 
"'Id at 84-85. Gorr articulates Nozick's definition i  similar terms. See Michael Gorr, 
Nozick's Argument Against Blackmail, 58 Personalist 187, 188 (1977). The principal dif- 
ference between Gorr's definition and that presented in the text is that Gorr does not pre- 
sent the second criterion as a conditional. Under Gorr's definition, itis a sine qua non of 
an unproductive exchange that one of the parties sells forbearance from an act; in other 
words, if forbearance is not part of the transaction, the transaction cannot be unproduc- 
tive. Nozick does not address this point explicitly. As note 127 indicates, however, I think 
Gorr's is not the better view. 
1'7Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 85-86 (cited in note 2). 
This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1998] Taking Motives Seriously 829 
fer is arguably conclusive evidence that he is better off because of 
the blackmailer.'18 This blackmail transaction is not unproduc- 
tive. 
Second, assuming that the blackmail deal is unproductive, 
the question remains why it should be illegal, let alone criminal. 
We expect consequentialists to disfavor such transactions. But, as 
we have seen, not even the law and economics theorists have 
credibly justified blackmail's criminalization. How Nozick could 
find such a justification, compatible with his libertarianism, is 
hard to fathom. As Gorr has argued, "the reasons which Nozick 
offers for prohibiting 'unproductive' xchanges could not plausibly 
be made to cohere with the principles that are generally taken to 
underlie a libertarian society."119 
This is a powerful objection. Indeed, it is so forceful as to in- 
vite us to question whether Nozick is in fact arguing that unpro- 
ductive exchanges are ipso facto criminalizable. Unfortunately, 
Nozick is not entirely clear on this point. Careful attention to the 
structure of his argument, however, suggests that he does not 
mean to argue that the unproductiveness of an exchange is suffl- 
cient for the state to make it criminal. 
The productive xchange test serves a very different func- 
tion. Assume an action would violate the natural rights of others 
or, in Nozick's terms, would cross a moral boundary. May the 
state prohibit the action, Nozick asks, or may it only require 
those who undertake it to compensate individuals whose rights 
are thereby violated?120 Ifthe latter, how does one set the proper 
compensation level? Ideally, the state should replicate the market 
price for the boundary crossing-that is, the price upon which the 
persons threatened by the conduct and the person who wishes to 
""Nozick responds to this problem as follows: "To state the point exactly in order to 
exclude such complications i not worth the effort it would require." Id at 85 n * (cited in 
note 2). Perhaps Nozick means to agree that the blackmail agreement in such circum- 
stances is not "unproductive." The further implication that such instances should be law- 
ful would make this a profound concession, deeply inconsistent with prevailing law. More 
probably, Nozick means that he could recraft his test for unproductive exchanges so as to 
make the deal between Adulterer and Blackmail, Inc. unproductive by definition. But the 
difficulty injustifying blackmail's criminalization would be exacerbated. 
"9See Gorr, 58 Personalist at 187 (cited in note 116). See also Murphy, 63 Monist at 
158 (cited in note 2) (observing that Nozick argues that "blackmail should be prohibited 
because it is an unproductive economic exchange" and criticizing Nozick for failing to pro- 
vide any argument for the proposition "that unproductive conomic exchanges are im- 
moral"). 
' Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 57 (cited in note 2). In the vocabulary fa- 
mously introduced by Professors Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, may the state 
employ property or liability rules for the protection of rights? See Guido Calabresi and A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Ca- 
thedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972). 
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engage in it would agree in a voluntary transaction. However, the 
likely existence of a transactional surplus (where the minimum 
price acceptable to the seller is less than the maximum price ac- 
ceptable to the buyer) makes it impossible to ascertain the hypo- 
thetical market price. And it would be unfair to allow the bound- 
ary crosser to appropriate all the benefits of the exchange by 
compensating the "seller" of the right in an amount (less than the 
market price) necessary to keep him on the same indifference 
curve. The impossibility of identifying a fair compensation price 
without ex ante bargaining between the parties is, for Nozick, one 
argument for allowing the state to prohibit conduct that would 
cause or risk a boundary crossing.'2' However, Nozick continues, 
when the state does prohibit conduct that risks crossing the 
moral boundary of another, it should usually compensate the 
party whose liberty is thus infringed.'22 Again the question arises 
of how much to pay. Just enough, Nozick answers, to keep him on 
the same indifference urve he would occupy were he not disad- 
vantaged by the prohibition.'23 In this case, that is, the state may 
appropriate the entire transactional surplus. Why? Because the 
exchange is "unproductive." 
For present purposes, whether the foregoing argument is co- 
gent is unimportant. What is important is that the productive x- 
change test is only a tool for determining how much compensa- 
tion is due an individual whose risky conduct he state prohibits. 
Whether the state is justified in prohibiting particular conduct is 
a wholly separate question.'24 In short, not only is the productive 
exchange test an implausible basis for making blackmail crimi- 
nal, but Nozick should no longer be read to contend otherwise. 
This is not to claim, though, that he has nothing to say about 
blackmail's criminalization. But we must look elsewhere to find 
it. 
The definition of an unproductive exchange Nozick offers in 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia closely tracks the test of coercion that 
he offered some years earlier when he argued (roughly) that a 
proposal is coercive if it is properly deemed a "threat" rather than 
an "offer."'25 A proposal is a threat if it makes the recipient worse 
'21 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 63-65 (cited in note 2). 
'2Id at 78-85. 
">Id at 86-87. For preliminary remarks regarding Nozick's notion of "disadvantage," 
see id at 82-83. 
24 See id at 67 n *. 
' Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton 
White, eds, Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel 440, 447 
(St. Martin's 1969). 
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off relative to his expected baseline, where "[t]he term 'expected' 
is meant to shift between or straddle predicted and morally re- 
quired.""6 Insofar as we are seeking a justification for criminal- 
izing blackmail, this approach seems more promising.'27 Although 
the relationship between freedom and coercion may not be easy to 
articulate with precision,'28 the two concepts plainly stand in 
rough opposition: generally, one who is coerced is at least to that 
extent unfree. Therefore, for one who values human freedom (as 
Nozick does), coercion is prima facie wrongful.'29 So if a blackmail 
proposal is coercive, there is good reason to believe that it should 
be made illegal.'30 
On inspection, though, Nozick's "coercion" thesis proves no 
more satisfactory than the "unproductive exchange" rationale at 
solving blackmail's paradox. First, it is unclear whether most 
126Id. 
" In most cases, the tests for coercion and unproductive exchange come out the same. 
That is, a consummated exchange is "unproductive" if and only if the proposal that 
launched the exchange was a "threat." Such is the case, for example, with the illustration 
Nozick offers to elucidate the second criterion of an unproductive exchange: 
If your next-door neighbor plans to erect a certain structure on his land, which he has 
a right to do, you might be better off if he didn't exist at all.... Yet purchasing his 
abstention from proceeding with his plans will be a productive xchange. Suppose, 
however, that the neighbor has no desire to erect the structure on the land; he for- 
mulates his plan and informs you of it solely in order to sell you his abstention from 
it. Such an exchange would not be a productive one; it merely gives you relief from 
something that would not threaten if not for the possibility of an exchange to get re- 
lief from it. 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 84-85 (cited in note 2). As Nozick's last sentence 
suggests, the proposal eading up to the hypothesized unproductive exchange is a threat- 
because it is coercive-not an offer. 
But the equivalence between coercion and unproductive exchanges does not always 
hold. Imagine that your coworker announces that his daughter is selling Girl Scout cook- 
ies and that he will be taking orders. You subscribe for four boxes of Thin Mints at $2.50 
per box. Although you'd prefer the $10 to the cookies, you estimate that to decline the offer 
might cause you some reputational harm, and you value the cookies and the preservation 
of your reputation more highly than $10 plus a possible slight diminution of your office 
status. This is plainly an unproductive exchange-you would have preferred that your co- 
worker had never mentioned his daughter and the cookies. But the offer to sell you Girl 
Scout cookies is not a threat (because it doesn't put you worse off than your expected or 
morally deserved baselines). 
See, for example, Nozick, Coercion at 440 (cited in note 125). 
See Altman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1641 (cited in note 43). 
'" Note that Nozick's shift from viewing blackmail as unproductive (bad consequences) 
to viewing it as coercive (wrongful) justifies placing him in Section I.B rather than with 
the consequentialists in I.A. Not surprisingly, Nozick's excursus on "unproductive ex- 
changes" has caused other commentators difficulty in characterizing his position on 
blackmail. See Gordon, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1758, 1772 n 137 (cited in note 1) (wondering 
whether Nozick's blackmail argument is deontological or consequentialist); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1413, 1447 n 140, 1449 n 145 
(1989) (noting both that Nozick has "used utilitarian grounds to defend the ban on black- 
mail" and that his theory "reflects conceptions of negative liberty"). 
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blackmail proposals count as threats under Nozick's defimntion. 
As noted, the "expected baseline" upon which Nozick's theory de- 
pends is a function of empirical and moral components. Nozick 
proposes that the normal and morally required course of events 
usually coincide and, further, that when they do not, the latter 
ordinarily takes precedence over the former."3' This being the 
case, it becomes essential to know whether the "victim" of the 
garden variety blackmail proposal has a moral right to nondisclo- 
sure. Rights and duties being correlative,132 the question, in other 
words, is whether the blackmailer has a moral duty to remain si- 
lent.'33 As we have seen, this is a tricky question. Nozick's analy- 
sis provides no answer. 
Worse, no simple categorical answer can resolve the puzzle. 
If the answer is no-the blackmailer does not have a moral duty 
to remain silent-then blackmail is not coercive and Nozick 
leaves us no basis for prohibiting it. If the answer is yes, then, if 
Nozick has succeeded in justifying making blackmail criminal, he 
has done so only by advancing effectively the same solution as 
has Feinberg: if a blackmail proposal is coercive only because the 
act "threatened" is wrongful, then the propriety of criminalizing 
blackmail turns entirely on the morality of the act threatened. 
And this resolution of the puzzle raises the question why uncon- 
ditional performance of the acts leveraged into blackmail propos- 
als should remain lawful. After all, other instances of criminal co- 
ercion represent hreats to perform illegal acts; just as the law 
prohibits the gunman from coercing his victim ("your money or 
your life"), so too does it forbid his shooting the victim without 
even having voiced a threat. In short, if Nozick's proposed solu- 
tion (blackmail is criminal because it is coercive) is correct, it 
merely reformulates the puzzle-why should it be a legal right to 
perform what it is illegal to threaten?-without resolving it. 
C. Summary 
The failure of the theories assessed in Section L.A suggests 
that we cannot explain and justify blackmail's criminalization by 
1' Nozick, Coercion at 449-51 (cited in note 125). 
'"Ordinarily, at least. For an argued qualification (that does not undermine the point 
in the body), see David Lyons, The Correlativity ofRights and Duties, 4 Nous 45 (1970). 
'"As Kathleen Sullivan has concluded, 'coercion . . . is inevitably normative, not 
merely descriptive, mpirical, or psychological. Itnecessarily embodies a conclusion about 
the wrongfulness ofa proposal, not merely the degree of constraint it imposes on choice." 
Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1443 (cited in note 130). See also id at 1448-50 & n 142 (dis- 
cussing the normative judgments underlying Nozick's and others' definitions of the base- 
line from which coercive proposals are measured). 
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attending only to its supposed social consequences. Any satisfac- 
tory resolution of the blackmail puzzle must acknowledge and ex- 
plain the moral wrongfulness of the blackmail threat. The failure 
of the theories assessed in Section I.B demonstrates: first, that 
there is a moral difference between blackmail and the uncondi- 
tional performance of the act threatened or offered (that is, we 
cannot establish the moral character of a blackmail proposal sim- 
ply by first determining the moral status of the act upon which 
the blackmail is predicated); and second, that one cannot explain 
this moral difference by treating the conditional threat or offer as 
a morally aggravating factor. One should thus question the 
dominant assumption of this latter group of theories-that we al- 
ready know that the conditional blackmail proposition is morally 
worse than unconditional performance of the act threatened, and 
that it remains only to explain why. Section II is animated by the 
suspicion that blackmail remains puzzling because we have yet to 
understand how the threat and the act differ. 
II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Those inclined toward two-part categorization could propose 
numerous ways to divide the universe of blackmail theories. As 
we have seen, the well-rehearsed istinction between deontologi- 
cal and consequentialist moral theory suggests a division between 
those scholars who urge that blackmail is criminal because it is 
wrong in itself and those who focus on the its allegedly adverse 
social consequences. Alternatively, itcould be revealing to distin- 
guish contributions based on the particular question they appear 
devised to answer. Most theorists view the blackmail puzzle prin- 
cipally as a challenge to understand why this conditional threat 
to perform a legal act is different from all other threats to per- 
form legal acts; others propose to explain how this voluntary 
transaction differs from other voluntary transactions. Yet a third 
possible classification would track the familiar distinction be- 
tween bottom-up and top-down modes of analysis. Whereas some 
writers attempt first to understand blackmail as a social phe- 
nomenon and only then to explain why some purportedly peculiar 
feature of the practice makes it a fit subject for the criminal aw, 
others start with an explicit theoretical model of the criminal aw 
and then seek to locate blackmail within the model. 
This Section proceeds in the latter mode. Section II.A enu- 
merates three independent conditions that might constitute at 
least prima facie justification for criminalizing particular con- 
duct. Section II.B demonstrates that one of these three criteria 
justifies criminalizing "central case" blackmail-defined as a 
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blackmailer's threat to disclose embarrassing information about 
his victim unless the victim pays him a specified sum. This dem- 
onstration constitutes what I have called the evidentiary theory. 
Section I.C summarizes the evidentiary theory and answers 
blackmail's two principal puzzles. It explains why blackmail is an 
exception to two general rules: that it should be legal to threaten 
what it is legal to do, and that voluntary transactions hould be 
lawful. 
A. Criteria of Criminalization 
If we are to determine, in other than ad hoc fashion, whether 
it is justifiable to make blackmail criminal, we will first need 
standards or rules detailing when society may legitimately 
threaten criminal punishment. This Section sets forth three crite- 
ria that independently might explain and justify when society 
may criminalize given conduct. It then elaborates upon the one- 
the notion that a liberal society may criminalize morally blame- 
worthy, harm-causing conduct-that provides the strongest basis 
for making blackmail criminal. 
1. General justifying aims. 
If a criterion of criminalization is not to be freestanding and 
arbitrary, itshould rest on an understanding of what H.L.A. Hart 
termed the "general justifying aim" of the institution of punish- 
ment.'34 By common consensus, there are two justifying aims.'35 A 
consequentialist heory justifies punishment as a means to re- 
duce socially undesirable behavior through such mechanisms as 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.'36 A retributivist 
theory, in contrast, justifies punishment on deontological grounds 
by the inherent rightness of inflicting retribution upon a wrong- 
doer.'37 A point commonly overlooked is that a consequentialist 
' H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 8-11 (Oxford 1968). 
'"See, for example, id at 8-13; Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in Sanford H. Kadish, 
ed, 4 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 1336, 1336-38 (Macmillan 1983); George P. 
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 414-20 (Little, Brown 1978); Herbert L. Packer, The 
Limits of the Criminal Sanction 35-61 (Stanford 1968); John Rawls, Two Concepts of 
Rules, 64 Phil Rev 3, 4-5 (1955). 
'" Most contemporary theorists espouse a consequentialist justifying aim. For a classic 
elaboration and defense, see Packer, Limits of the Criminal Sanction at 39-61 (cited in 
note 135). 
"'The most prominent contemporary advocate of this position is Professor Michael 
Moore. See, for example, Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, inFerdinand 
Schoeman, ed, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge 1987). Unfortu- 
nately, the common formulation of retributivism as the theory that "[w]e are justified in 
punishing because and only because offenders deserve it," id at 181, speaks only to the 
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justifying aim can itself be the product of either of two radically 
opposed ethical theories, depending upon what content is as- 
cribed to the notion of "socially undesirable behavior." If the be- 
havior sought to be reduced is deemed undesirable because it is 
thought o effect a net diminution in social welfare, then the jus- 
tification is, at root, utilitarian. But it is a mistake to assert that 
the nonretributive justifying aim of punishment is inherently 
"utilitarian in nature."'38 One who justifies the institution of 
criminal punishment on consequentialist rather than retributive 
grounds might be seeking to prevent acts believed to be wrong in 
themselves.'39 In this way, one could, as a matter of political the- 
ory, consistently defend punishment for consequentialist reasons 
as serving a deontologic moral theory.'40 
2. Three criteria of criminalization. 
The foregoing brief review suggests three principal factors 
that, depending upon the particular justifying aim of punishment 
adopted, would be especially relevant in determining whether 
justification for imposing punishment in any given case, not to the justification for the in- 
stitution of punishment. See also id at 181 n 1 (adopting a conception of 'moral culpabil- 
ity" that 'does not presuppose that the act done is morally bad, only that it is legally pro- 
hibited"). As a justification for creating a system of criminal aws backed by threat of 
punishment, he notion that persons who break those laws deserve to be punished would 
be circular. Nonetheless, belief in the intrinsic moral worth-or perhaps duty, see id at 
182-of punishing individuals for "morally bad" actions plainly implies a retributivist jus- 
tification for criminalization as well as for punishment. Indeed, Moore himself conceives of 
retributivism as both a general justifying aim of criminal punishment and a justification 
for its imposition in a given case. See, for example, Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retribu- 
tivism, 27 Israel L Rev 15, 16-17 (1993). 
"3See, for example, Richard J. Bonnie, et al, eds, Criminal Law 2 (Foundation 1997) 
(describing the view that "punishment is threatened and imposed in order to achieve bene- 
ficial social consequences" as "utilitarian in nature"). 
13 This was St. Thomas Aquinas's justification for the institution of human, as distinct 
from divine, law. Since some persons 
are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was 
necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, 
they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they them- 
selves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought o do willingly what hith- 
erto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which 
compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. 
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q 95, Art 1. Therefore, insofar as we speak 
of only two general justifying aims, it seems preferable to term them "consequentialist" 
and "retributive," see Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 415 (cited in note 135), saving 
the utilitarian label for one of the two broad species of consequentialist theories. 
140This position might be internally inconsistent if one holds a strong Kantian belief 
that there is no moral value in performing the right action for fear of punishment. See 
Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 399-401 (Hackett 1993) (origi- 
nally published in 1785). But this is not a necessary view. 
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particular conduct141 should be made criminal: (1) whether the 
conduct is utility reducing; (2) whether the conduct is wrongful in 
itself; and (3) whether commission of the conduct is morally 
blameworthy. This is not to say, though, that the presence of any 
one of the these factors alone permits a liberal society to impose 
crminal sanctions. As we have seen, a consistent utilitarian the- 
ory must account for the costs of trying to prohibit undesirable 
conduct. Also, a rule that would authorize criminal punishment 
for any wrongful or blameworthy conduct would prove unbearably 
intrusive. It seems necessary, therefore, to qualify the second and 
third factors with some form of harm principle in order to limit 
their reach. 
These qualifications lead to three independent prima facie 
criteria for when a liberal society may employ the criminal aw- 
criteria that should appear as fairly obvious (if not logically neces- 
sary) derivations from the standard proposed justifying aims. 
Conduct may be made criminal if: 
(1) it is likely in the aggregate to yield net adverse social con- 
sequences (taking into account the costs imposed by the criminal 
ban itself); 
(2) it (a) tends to cause or threaten identifiable harm and (b) 
is morally wrongful in itself; or 
(3) it tends both (a) to cause or threaten identifiable harm, 
and (b) to be undertaken by a morally blameworthy actor. 
These three criteria are not identical. Although much con- 
duct (consider the mala in se offenses of the common law) will 
satisfy all three, each justifies some use of the criminal aw that 
the others cannot. The practical differences between the second 
and third criteria, on the one hand, and the first on the other, 
should be apparent: for purposes of the first criterion, it is irrele- 
vant whether the conduct that is a candidate for being made 
criminal is wrongful on deontologic grounds or is ordinarily 
blameworthy in the absence of a criminal prohibition.'42 And al- 
"' "Conduct" here and throughout should be understood broadly to connote any de- 
scribable combination of action, attendant circumstances, results, and mental states. 
'42After conduct is criminalized in accordance with condition (1), commission of the 
proscribed conduct is ordinarily morally blameworthy insofar as it reflects the knowing 
violation of a valid criminal aw. See, for example, Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the 
Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp Prob 401, 416 (1958) ("[I]f the actor knowingly goes 
counter to a valid legislative determination that the risk he is taking is excessive, even 
though he himself does not believe it to be, there is an independent basis for moral con- 
demnation in this deliberate defiance of law."). For this reason, a consequentialist general 
justifying aim can coexist with the retributive principle of distribution, which requires 
that punishment only be meted out to the morally guilty. See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment 
and Responsibility at 9 (cited in note 134). See also Rawls, 64 Phil Rev at 4-13 (cited in 
note 135); S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems of Punishment, 33 Phil 325 (1958). 
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though the second and third criteria demand some harm, neither 
requires that the expected harm outweigh expected benefits. The 
distinction between the second and third criteria turns on the 
claim that an actor is not blameworthy for engaging in a wrongful 
action if, for example, he lacks information critical to determinng 
its wrongfulness or acts out of a bona fide and reasonable judg- 
ment (albeit one a majority of society deems mistaken) that his 
act is morally justified. For example, a legislator who concludes 
that euthanasia is morally wrong but also believes that, in prac- 
tice, the euthanizer rarely acts in a morally blameworthy fashion 
could vote to criminalize the conduct in accord with the second 
criterion but not the third. Conversely, an actor who causes harm 
for reasons that are not justified is deserving of blame regardless 
of whether the act is deemed wrongful in itself. To use a familiar 
example, if someone kills an assailant in a situation where the 
use of deadly force is justified because necessary for self-defense, 
but the killer is unaware of the necessity, the killing is justifiably 
made criminal under the third criterion but not the second.'43 
3. The third criterion: defining terms. 
Provisionally accepting the foregoing criteria invites the 
question whether blackmail (however defined) satisfies any of 
them. My criticisms of the theories canvassed in Section I suggest 
that blackmail is not likely to satisfy either the first or the sec- 
ond. It is unclear, once one takes account of the costs imposed by 
the criminal ban itself, whether any substantial category of 
blackmail yields net adverse social consequences; and it seems 
extremely likely that a large subset of presently criminalized 
conduct-adventitious blackmail-does not. Also, efforts to ex- 
plain why the blackmail act is wrongful appear unable to answer 
the questions of whether and why the act threatened is likewise 
wrongful. Consequently, this Section endeavors to show that 
blackmail is properly criminal because it satisfies the third crite- 
rion. A successful demonstration will both explain why blackmail 
is criminal and amount to a conditional justification-condi- 
tioned, that is, on the validity of the claim that it is permissible 
for the state to criminalize conduct because it is morally blame- 
worthy and harm-causing.'" Because the argument o follow will 
'For an interesting debate over this issue, compare Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of 
Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L Rev 266 
(1975), with George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. 
Robinson, 23 UCLA L Rev 293 (1975). 
4" Because this solution to the blackmail puzzle will rest on the third criterion, we 
need not at this time expressly affirm either a retributivist or consequentialist general 
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necessarily depend on the particular content ascribed to "harm" 
and "moral blameworthiness," some explication of these notori- 
ously ambiguous terms is in order. 
In legal, as in common, parlance, "harm" can connote injury 
to an almost limitless variety of interests. A cursory review of 
existing crimes indicates that the law does recognize as "harm" 
injuries to, among other things, bodily integrity (homicide, rape, 
battery), psychic or emotional well-being (assault, stalking, hate 
speech, child pornography), property interests (theft, vandalism, 
trespass), public institutions and processes (treason, bribery of 
public officials, insider trading), and public morals (prostitution, 
obscenity, drug use, gambling). The important question, however, 
is normative: what types of harms may a liberal society rely on to 
justify limiting individual liberty?'45 This is an extraordinarily 
challenging question, raising issues of kind and degree that have 
bedeviled some of our most prominent heorists of the criminal 
law.'46 If a thoroughly developed, foundational answer to this 
question were necessary in order to resolve the blackmail puzzle, 
we would be in for a long digression indeed. Happily, such an ac- 
count is not needed. As we will see, my contention that blackmail 
satisfies the harm requirement fits well within the existing legal 
landscape and is unlikely, I think, to strain our intuitions. For 
justifying aim. The retributivist foundations of the third criterion should be self-evident. 
But I assume that (with one caveat noted below) the third criterion could also be com- 
fortably grounded in a sufficiently expansive consequentialism-one that focuses not 
solely on the consequences of the conduct at issue, but also on, for example, the potential 
harm to the "social fabric' caused by failure to punish those who engage in such conduct, 
and the concrete future harms that might be averted by incapacitating and specially de- 
terring one who has exhibited a potential predisposition tocause harm. Indeed, reasons 
such as these have fueled long-running suspicion that most self-proclaimed justifying-aim 
retributivists are really disguised consequentialists. See, for example, Gregg v Georgia, 
428 US 153, 23741 (1976) (Marshall dissenting); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsi- 
bility at 9 (cited in note 134). For an extended recent argument hat society can best serve 
utilitarian aims by structuring all punishment decisions in accord with the community's 
moral judgments of desert, see Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, The Utility of Des- 
ert, 91 Nw U L Rev 453 (1997). 
The caveat: insofar as the third criterion rests on retributivist premises, we must be 
concerned with actual moral blameworthiness; insofar as it rests on a consequentialist in- 
terest in constructing a shared moral universe, it is the perception of moral blameworthi- 
ness that matters. 
146 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,' and 
Article III, 91 Mich L Rev 163, 188-91 (1992) (criticizing the notion that the shifting focus 
in standing jurisprudence from "legal injury' to "injury in fact" effected a change from a
question of law to a question of fact, and observing that "the real question is what harms 
that people perceive as such ought to be judicially cognizable"). 
146The most thorough' exploration of this question is found in Professor Feinberg's dis- 
tinguished four volume work collectively titled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. See 
Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford 1984); Offense to Others (Oxford 1985); Harm to 
Self (Oxford 1986); Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford 1988). 
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present purposes, then, it should be sufficient o observe that 
whether a claimed injury counts as a "harm" with which the 
criminal law will be concerned "is a product of legal conventions 
and nothing else."147 
"Moral blameworthiness" is also a nebulous concept. Al- 
though all the factors of which it is a function cannot be fully elu- 
cidated in this space, a few guideposts can be marked. In the 
easiest case, an individual's conduct is morally blameworthy 
when his objective is to inflict harm-such as when he acts out of 
malice (in the lay sense) or spite. But this does not exhaust the 
subject. The average thief, after all, steals not in order to impose 
a loss on his victim, but for the purpose of obtaining a gain for 
himself. Yet this conduct, too, appears blameworthy-even ab- 
sent a law prohibiting it.148 The category of "morally blamewor- 
thy" conduct, therefore, must be broad enough to include the con- 
scious willingness to cause harm without adequate moral justifi- 
cation, where the amount and quality of justification required is 
commensurate with the magnitude of harm caused. Similarly, it 
should include the conscious willingness to risk harm to others 
without adequate moral justification. (Consider drag racers on 
public roads.) Lastly, an actor is morally blameworthy when his 
conduct reflects an unjustifiable failure to appreciate the risks he 
creates.'49 Putting aside questions concerning the moral blame- 
worthiness of negligent harm-causing conduct (which the black- 
mail puzzle does not implicate), we can articulate moral blame- 
worthiness in terms of the actor's motivations for acting. Thus (as 
a first and rough pass), an actor has "morally bad motives"-50 
and is therefore morally blameworthy"5'-when he acts with the 
knowledge that his conduct will cause, threaten, or risk harm to 
others, unless: (1) he actually believes that his action will produce 
147 Sunstein, 91 Mich L Rev at 190 (cited in note 145) (discussing the "actual injury" re- 
quirement in standing doctrine). 
"8See note 142. 
149 See Model Penal Code ? 2.02 (ALI 1962) (defining culpability levels). 
" In ethics, "wrongful" is sometimes limited to acts, whereas 'bad' is applied to an ac- 
tor's motives in perforning an act. See, for example, William K Frankena, Ethics 8-9 
(Prentice-Hall 1963); Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 141 (Bobbs-Merrill 
1947). Following this usage, this Article speaks generally of "wrongful acts" and "bad mo- 
tives." A "bad act" is one that is badly motivated, whether or not it is wrongful. 
"6'Arguably, an actor may have blameworthy motives without being morally blame- 
worthy himself, if he lacks moral agency. Because the law presupposes that people are 
moral agents, this qualification does not bear upon whether to make particular conduct 
criminal. For an argument hat it should be afforded greater relevance at the punishment 
stage than present law allows, see Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Re- 
assessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L Rev 1511 
(1992). 
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more good than evil; (2) that belief is a but-for cause of his action; 
and (3) the standards the actor employs for measuring and 
evaluating "evil" and "good" in this case are defensible under 
common moral standards. 
B. Criminalizing Blackmail: Of Harm and Bad Motive 
With these preliminaries out of the way, we have reached the 
critical questions: (a) does blackmail (ordinarily) cause cognizable 
harm? and (b) does the blackmailer (ordinarily) harbor bad mo- 
tives?"52 
1. A direct approach. 
To some readers, "yes" is the obvious answer to both of these 
questions. Professor Wendy Gordon has opined that "the deon- 
tologic case against blackmail seems clear. One person deliber- 
ately seeks to harm another to serve her own ends-to exact 
money or other advantage and does so in a context where she 
has no conceivable justification for her act."153 The task, though, 
is to explain how we know the blackmailer seeks to cause harm 
without adequate justification. 
Professor Gordon offers a thoughtful and elaborate explana- 
tion, but not, I think, one that ultimately persuades. Inverting 
the familiar doctrine of double effect,"M Gordon proposes to dem- 
onstrate the wrongfulness of a blackmailer's motives by relying 
on her so-called doctrine of single effect, which holds that "when 
one's direct intent is to do harm, beneficial side-effects have little 
or no deontological significance."155 Under this principle, Gordon 
concludes, 
the blackmailer violates deontological constraints if he 
threatens disclosure in order to obtain money or other ad- 
vantage because his intent is directed to the money, not to 
152 Regardless of whether the third criterion for criminalization rests on consequen- 
tialist or retributive justifications, ee note 144, it cannot require that the conduct exam- 
ined always cause (or threaten) harm and be undertaken with bad motives. Such a re- 
quirement would make ex ante line drawing impossible. Although one or another more 
precise qualifiers might appear more apt on further scrutiny, "ordinarily" serves as a sat- 
isfactory placeholder-with the important qualification that it not be understood to re- 
quire that harm or bad motives occur "more often than not." There is no a priori reason 
why making certain conduct criminal must be improper when "only," say, 40 percent of 
given conduct is undertaken with bad motives. 
' Gordon, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1758 (cited in note 1). 
'"The doctrine of double effect provides that it is "morally permissible to do an act 
that has bad consequences if they are outweighed by the good, so long as the harms are 
not directly intended." Id at 1763. 
'm Id at 1764-65. 
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the [lawfulness of] the disclosure or beneficial side-effects hat 
might be produced. These latter factors are thus outside the 
intent of the blackmailer in the same way the killing of ci- 
vilians is outside the intent of the strategic bomber: if 
blackmail's purported beneficial effects were eliminated or if 
civilians were protected, the actors would go forward. Since 
the blackmailer's end is harm, the act is not redeemable by 
the possibility that some component of the means he uses 
might be lawful or beneficial.'56 
The greatest problem with this analysis is Gordon's assertion 
that "the blackmailer's end is harm." What does this mean? 
Surely not that his motive is to cause harm, for presumably the 
average blackmailer's motive, like that of the garden variety 
thief, is merely to obtain a personal benefit. Perhaps Gordon 
means that blackmail is wrong only because the blackmailer has 
no interest in benefitting his victim.157 But so what? Without 
more, Gordon seems merely to describe a narrow self-interest 
most observers would already ascribe to the blackmailer even 
without the benefit of her doctrine of single effect. Moreover, her 
doctrine does not explain why the criminal aw should care about 
such self-interest. 
Consequently, two questions remain. First, the question 
Gordon addresses but does not adequately answer: in what way is 
a blackmailer's motive bad? Second, a question Gordon overlooks: 
how does the blackmailer's motive differ from that of the person 
who discloses harmful information without first trying to sell his 
silence? I propose to answer these questions by tackling the latter 
one first, believing that we can best understand why blackmail is 
criminalized by examining whether our third criterion of crimi- 
nalization justifies criminalization of the unconditional disclosure 
of information likely to be injurious to the reputation of an- 
other.'58 
'"Id at 1765-66. 
157 Gordon considers a "libertarian" objection: 
[A]n ordinary buyer would be delighted to obtain goods without paying, and an ordi- 
nary seller would be delighted to obtain money without giving up goods. If so, the 
parties to the commercial transaction have the "real" or direct intent of extracting 
money or other advantage-just like the blackmailer. 
Id at 1770. Not so, she counters, proposing that, as an empirical matter, most people value 
reciprocity in exchange. "Take away the component of the buyer or seller's activity that 
benefits others, and she will find the activity less attractive; if so, then under the DSE 
test, part of the 'real' or direct intent is to exchange and not to extract." Id at 1771. 
'"It will be apparent that we are entering through the first door-attacking the 
blackmail puzzle by focusing on blackmail as an exception to the rule that it should be le- 
gal to threaten what it is legal to do, rather than as an exception to the rule that volun- 
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2. Detour: criminalizing the unconditional disclosure. 
The third criterion, recall, requires that the conduct tends 
both to cause or threaten identifiable harm and to be undertaken 
by a morally blameworthy actor. Plainly, the simple disclosure of 
information likely to injure another's reputation satisfies the 
harm requirement (at least when the claimed injury is of a suffi- 
ciently substantial degree as to warrant society's protection159). 
Injury to reputation is clearly other-regarding harm. Moreover, it 
is a harm that has long been legally cognizable--civilly and 
criminally-under both common and statutory law.Y60 At this 
stage of the inquiry, it is irrelevant whether the disclosure is true 
or false; either can cause real harm.161 It is likewise immaterial 
whether disclosure causes greater aggregate benefit han aggre- 
gate harm, as may occur when an adulterer's infidelity is dis- 
closed to the wronged spouse or when an embezzler's offenses are 
disclosed to his business associates. A weighing of harms versus 
benefits would be essential to an effort o criminalize the conduct 
in accord with the first criterion articulated above, which requires 
that the conduct yields net adverse social consequences.162 But it 
tary transactions should be legal. See introduction toSection II. In Gorr's estimation, 
most theorists have . .. tended to suppose that there is nothing especially problem- 
atic about the fact that we permit blackmailers to do what they threaten, and that all 
that really needs explaining is how, in light of this, it could ever make sense to pro- 
hibit the threats themselves. My contention, however, is that this is precisely the 
wrong way to view the matter and that the key to resolving the paradox of blackmail 
(and to meeting some of the other important objections to its continued criminaliza- 
tion) is to determine just why blackmailers are given the liberty to do the acts that 
they threaten. 
Gorr, 21 Phil & Pub Aff at 44 (cited in note 83). Despite the rightness and importance of 
this insight, Gorr's argument hat a given act and its corresponding blackmail proposal 
are morally equivalent fails for reasons already assayed. See notes 83-88 and accompany- 
ing text. 
9Consistent with the maxim de minimis non curat lex, the mildly insulting or indis- 
creet tattle of everyday discourse does not count. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ? 559 
(1977) ("A communication is defamatory ifit tends so to harm the reputation of another as 
to lower him in the estimation of the community orto deter third persons from associating 
or dealing with him.") (emphasis added). 
1"See Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323, 341-46 (1974). See also id at 341 (stating 
that "the individual's right o the protection of his good name 'reflects no more than our 
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the 
root of any decent system of ordered liberty'"), quoting Rosenblatt vBaer, 383 US 75, 92 
(1966) (Stewart concurring). 
161 See generally Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64, 72 (1964) (acknowledging general 
"abhorrence that 'a man's forgotten misconduct, or the misconduct of a relation, in which 
the public had no interest, should be wantonly raked up, and published to the world, on 
the ground of its being true') (emphasis omitted), quoting Thomas Curson Hansard, ed, 
69 Parliamentary Debates 1230 (Hansard 3d series 1843) (remarks of Lord Campbell); 
Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy ? 6.1 at 201 (Prentice Hall 1991 & Supp 1997). 
'62See Section II.A.2. 
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has no bearing on the permissibility of using the third criterion 
(or the second) to make reputation-threatening disclosures crimi- 
nal. For purposes of the third criterion, to repeat, the "harm" con- 
dition requires only that the conduct at issue causes or threatens 
identifiable harm, not that the aggregation of all possible harms 
and benefits yields a net diminution of social welfare. 
The second requirement of the third criterion, however-that 
the disclosure of reputationally harmful information be ordinarily 
undertaken with bad motives-is not satisfied. Doubtless some 
disclosures are malicious or unjustified. But many others are 
made with good motives-to protect a potential victim of a con 
man or to provide presumably helpful and deserved information 
to a benighted spouse, for example. It seems unlikely that the in- 
stances in which persons disclose reputationally harmful infor- 
mation with morally bad motives constitute a sufficiently large 
subset of all reputationally harmful disclosures to warrant crimi- 
nalization under the third criterion.163 
There is no reason, however, that an explicit description of 
motivation cannot be imported into a definition of the conduct to 
be criminalized. This being so, conduct described as "the morally 
blameworthy disclosure of information likely to harm the reputa- 
tion of another" could be made criminal consistent with the third 
criterion (where, if necessary to satisfy notice requirements, 
"moral blameworthiness" is further defined consistent with my 
earlier discussion). In fact, through the law of criminal libel, 
many states have prohibited precisely that: by the time of the 
Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Garrison v Louisiana," a ma- 
jority of states had constitutional or statutory provisions that 
made truth a defense to a criminal libel prosecution only when 
"published with good motives and for justifiable ends.""l The Su- 
preme Court's holding in Garrison that the First Amendment 
prohibits tates from prosecuting any but the knowing or reckless 
falsehood when the alleged libel relates to public affairs has led to 
judicial invalidation of several such statutes166 and to desuetude 
of many others.167 But neither Garrison nor the prospect that the 
Court may expand it to prohibit criminal libel prosecutions for 
1'6 ep in mind that most gossiping does not inflict cognizable harm. See note 159. 
14379 US 64 (1964). 
16Id at 70-72 & n 7. Although criminal ibel was generally justified as a means to pro- 
tect against breaches of the peace, see id at 67-68, some jurisdictions had expressly con- 
ceived of the offense as a means to guard against injury to the libeled party. See, for ex- 
ample, Gardner v Arizona, 15 Ariz 403, 139 P 474, 476-77 (1914). 
'"See, for example, Montana v Helfrich, 277 Mont 452, 922 P2d 1159, 1161 (1996) 
(citing cases). 
167 See, for example, Tollett v United States, 485 F2d 1087, 1094 (8th Cir 1973). 
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any maliciously defamatory statements absent proof of falsity"6 is 
germane to the present inquiry, for First Amendment constraints 
are external to the criminal aw proper. As far as criminal theory 
is concerned, the unconditional disclosure of harmful information, 
without more, is not properly made criminal; the morally wrong- 
ful disclosure is. 
3. Bad motive and the conditional threat. 
This discussion offers one sufficient response to Gorr's sug- 
gestion that we need 'to determine just why blackmailers are 
given the liberty to do the acts that they threaten":'69 the likeli- 
hood that such persons act with good motives seems too high to 
justify a criminal ban. But it does not directly explain the crimi- 
nalization of blackmail. In order to solve that puzzle we might 
first examine how a state that criminalizes the disclosure of repu- 
tationally harmful information with malice or without justifica- 
tion might prove those factors in a given case.170 Because it is pro- 
foundly difficult o obtain direct evidence of an actor's mental 
state,"7' this is a challenging task. 
In theory, bad motivation might be provable in a variety of 
manners. Admissions by the defendant himself in conversation or 
private writings would be the best evidence. In certain circum- 
stances, perhaps, the state might be able to rely on the fact that 
the defendant made the disclosure anonymously.172 How about 
evidence that the accused had offered to remain silent for a fee 
'The Garrison Court explicitly left this question open. See 379 US at 72 n 8. A decade 
later, the Court again refused to decide "whether truthful publications may ever be sub- 
jected to civil or criminal iability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amend- 
ments." Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469, 491 (1975). 
"'See note 158. 
'70 Many criminal ibel statutes, following the common law, mitigated this problem by 
making good motive and justification affirmative d fenses. See Garrison, 379 US at 70 n 7 
(cataloguing state provisions). But a simple allocation of the burdens of production or per- 
suasion (or both) to the defendant cannot eliminate all difficulty because the state must be 
prepared to introduce vidence of bad motive if the defendant invokes the defense. Fur- 
thermore, in criminal slander prosecutions the state often has the burden of proving bad 
motive. See, for example, California v Faber, 29 Cal App 2d Supp 751, 77 P2d 921, 923 
(1938). 
7' See Kimberlin vQuinlan, 6 F3d 789, 809 & n 11 (DC Cir 1993) (Edwards dissent- 
ing), vacated and remanded, 515 US 321 (1995); Ginsburg and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L 
Rev at 1864 (cited in note 2). 
'See Pennsylvania v Foley, 292 Pa 277, 141 A 50, 51-52 (1928) (affirming conviction 
under statute prohibiting "the sending of anonymous communications ofa . . . defamatory 
. . . nature," and explaining that anonymous publications of defamatory material "show 
such a malignity of heart and a desire to do personal injury that the Legislature or the 
courts may properly hold that such publications are so far malicious or negligent as to be 
unjustifiable"). 
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prior to making the disclosure? Does this tend to show the requi- 
site blameworthiness? 
Surely it is probative. Consider, for example, a criminal libel 
prosecution (in a jurisdiction where blackmail is legal) involving 
defendant's (D's) disclosure of a husband's (H's) infidelities to his 
wife (W). Here, D's prior (unaccepted) offer to refrain, for a pay- 
ment of $1,000, from disclosing the adultery is circumstantial 
evidence that, when he proceeded to reveal H's secrets, D was not 
motivated by loyalty to W, or by an interest in achieving some 
measure of corrective justice, or by devotion to The Truth. A rea- 
sonable factfinder could suspect that, had any of these interests 
motivated D, he would not have offered to sell H his silence. This 
is not just a covert way of giving effect o the factfinder's own 
ethical belief that D should not have offered to remain silent for 
individual gain. It is empirically true that people value goods and 
interests in diverse and incommensurable ways and, relatedly, 
that most people have internalized a norm against commodifying 
certain types of nonmaterial interests and obligations.'73 It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that most people who recognize 
morally persuasive grounds for undertaking a given course of ac- 
tion would not offer to sell abstention from it for personal gain.'74 
At the same time, assuming a relative infrequency of unbridled 
malice, many people who make a given disclosure with morally 
blameworthy motives would refrain from making the disclosure if 
paid off.'75 For these two reasons, the probability that a morally 
bad disclosure of adultery occurred after the discloser had offered 
to remain silent for a fee is greater than the probability that a 
morally good adultery disclosure occurred subsequent to such an 
offer. It follows that a prior conditional offer of silence is proba- 
tive evidence that, in revealing H's infidelity to W, the defendant 
acted with the morally bad motives necessary to make his action 
"'For a thoughtful e aboration of these claims, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensura- 
bility and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779, 782-812 (1994). 
1'7 This is an empirical claim. Whether society should employ the criminal aw for pur- 
poses of reinforcing oreven prescribing norms of value incommensurability is a decidedly 
separate question. See id at 790-93. Precisely because so many people already do act in 
ways reflective of value incommensurability and resistant o wholesale commodification, it 
is a question we need not resolve in order to explain blackmail's criminalization. In other 
words, we are still proceeding in accordance with the third proposed criterion of criminali- 
zation, not the second. 
175Recall that morally bad motives are not limited to circumstances in which the ac- 
tor's purpose is to harm H, but include cases in which he acts with knowledge of harm to H 
without actually harboring motives that would amount to adequate moral justification. 
Very possibly, D did not reveal the harmful information for the purpose of injuring H. D 
may have acted merely to avoid the loss of reputation he felt he would suffer by failing to 
carry out his threat. 
This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
846 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:795 
(taken with knowledge of the harm it would cause) morally 
blameworthy."76 
That the conditional threat is probative evidence making it 
more likely that the particular disclosure of adultery was morally 
blameworthy is important, but it is not yet what we need to 
know. The critical question is: how likely? Although it would be 
foolish to hope for much precision here, straightforward applica- 
tion of probability theory might allow us to hazard a very rough 
estimate. As Bayes's Rule teaches, the odds that the post-threat 
disclosure is morally blameworthy are the product of the odds 
that any given disclosure of adultery is morally blameworthy and 
the evidential value, or probative weight, of the conditional of- 
fer.177 For the reasons just discussed, the offer's probative weight 
is likely to be fairly high. That is, the conditional threat probably 
makes it significantly more likely that the disclosure was morally 
blameworthy. Absent any reason to suspect that only an insig- 
nificantly small percentage of all disclosures of adultery are badly 
motivated, it seems fair to conclude that it is "ordinarily"'78 the 
case that the disclosure of adultery occurring after a conditional 
offer of silence is morally blameworthy.179 
'76To be sure, that the offer is probative, all things being equal, does not mean it es- 
tablishes the proposition that D lacked morally good motives when engaging in the disclo- 
sure. The assumed empirical fact that there exist individuals who would be motivated by 
morally permissible reasons were they to expose an adulterer and nonetheless would be 
willing to remain silent for payment entails that the evidentiary inference cannot be iron- 
clad. Indeed, we can well imagine cases in which it is quite plausible that the defendant 
lacked bad motives when exposing H's infidelity. For example, D might ell a compelling 
story of both his friendship with W and a pressing need for funds (say, D's child needs an 
emergency operation) arising in sudden coincidence with his discovery of His adultery. 
Lacking any other source of income, D decides, after painful soul-searching, toblackmail 
H to obtain the desperately needed funds. When H rejects D's offer, D proceeds to spill the 
beans to W, believing as he had all along that W had a strong moral claim to the informa- 
tion, and even feeling somewhat relieved to be 'freed" to perform his moral duty. In this 
scenario-and by hypothesis only!-D lacks bad motives when engaging in his harm- 
causing disclosure, notwithstanding his unsuccessful blackmail proposal. But this conclu- 
sion has no bearing on the pivotal question of whether a reasonable factfinder would view 
the unsuccessful blackmail threat as making it more likely that D possessed bad motives. 
We are speaking of inferring bad motives, not deducing them, and the strength of the in- 
ference depends, here as elsewhere, upon the totality of circumstances. After all, if "[l]ife is 
the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises," Samuel Butler, The 
Note-Books of Samuel Butler 11 (Mitchell Kennerly 1913) (Henry Festing Jones, ed), no 
less is the criminal law. 
177 Bayes's Rule provides that the posterior odds are equal to the prior odds times the 
likelihood ratio. For a particularly lucid introduction toBayesian probability, see Bernard 
Robertson and G.A. Vignaux, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the 
Courtroom ch 2 (Wiley 1995). 
"78See note 152. 
'7 This conclusion can be supported with an example based on conservative assump- 
tions consistent with the foregoing discussion. Where P(B I 0) = the probability that a dis- 
closure is morally bad given a prior conditional offer, P(G I 0) = the probability that a dis- 
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Insofar as these assumptions hold true more generally, a 
state could, consistent with the third criterion of criminalization, 
make it a crime intentionally to disclose information harmful to 
the reputation of another after having first offered to remain si- 
lent for a fee."8 Because it is ordinarily, and uncontroversially, 
illegal to threaten what it is illegal to do, the state could also 
make it a crime to threaten to disclose information harmful to an- 
other after first having offered to remain silent only if paid. That, 
of course, is blackmail."8' 
Having reached blackmail in this roundabout manner, we 
are positioned to offer a conceptual definition of the offense:'82 
closure is morally good given a prior conditional offer, P(O I B) = the probability of a prior 
conditional offer given that the disclosure was made with morally bad motives, and 
P(O I G) = the probability of a prior conditional offer given a disclosure made with morally 
good motives, Bayes's Rule provides as follows: 
[P(B 10) / P(G I O)] = [P(B) / P(G)] * [P(O I B) / P(O I G)] (1) 
Assume now that the background probability that a disclosure of adultery is made 
with bad motives is .2, that the probability that a disclosure made with good motives was 
made after a conditional offer of silence is .1, and that the probability that a disclosure 
made with bad motives was made after a conditional offer of silence is .6. On these (con- 
cededly unverifiable) assumptions, the probability that an adultery disclosure made after 
a conditional offer of silence is morally blameworthy can be determined as follows: 
[P(B I O) / P(G I O)] = (.2 /.8) * (.6 /.1) (2) 
[P(B I O) / P(G I O)] = 1.5 (3) 
P(B I10) = 1.5 * (1 - P(B I10)) (4) 
P(B I0)= .6 (5) 
Whatever the "actual" numbers might be (in some contrivedly empirical sense), social 
actors are likely to suspect that this figure is quite high, for the modern mind's strong 
preference for univocal, linear narrative is antagonistic to the psychologically more com- 
plex tales (as in note 176) that throw the evidentiary inference into question. See Richard 
K Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 
Stan L Rev 39, 40 (1994). And insofar as we might prefer to ground the third criterion of 
criminalization i a consequentialist (rather than retributivist) general justifying aim con- 
cerned with social reinforcement of moral norms, it is the perception, not the reality, of the 
incidence of morally blameworthy motives that matters. See note 144. 
'This is not to say that such conduct should be criminal. Each of the three criteria 
provides only prima facie justification for criminalizing conduct; none demands it. A leg- 
islature could choose not to criminalize reputation-threatening disclosures undertaken 
with morally bad motives if it concludes that such disclosures advance social welfare. 
Moreover, other legal norms, including a constitutional guarantee, might mandate non- 
criminalization. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has already construed the First 
Amendment o prohibit criminal punishment of true speech regarding matters of public 
interest. See note 168. 
181 It should make no difference whether the state chooses to enact the first offense. 
Imagine that the state had criminalized both the act and the threat and then decided to 
repeal the first for practical reasons (perhaps because it was deemed too vague, or too 
likely to chill well-intentioned disclosures). There is no reason that it should have to re- 
peal the second as well. 
182 In describing the definition as conceptual, I mean to emphasize that I do not intend 
here to propose a legal definition. The definition in the text does not correlate perfectly 
with blackmail as law and common parlance presently define it. More to the point, I do not 
suggest that this definition should be codified. I take it that the first step when drafting a
This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:25:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
848 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:795 
blackmail is a conditional threat by B to harm A under circum- 
stances in which a reasonable factfinder could infer with confi- 
dence sufficient for purposes of criminalization that if B carried 
out his threat he would be engaging in harm-causing conduct 
with bad motives-specifically, that B would lack morally ade- 
quate reasons for knowingly causing harm-yet in which the 
moral character of B's motives would have been opaque had he 
acted without having made the threat. Put otherwise, blackmail 
is a conditional threat to perform a legal but harmful act under 
circumstances where the threat itself provides reason for making 
the act criminal by suggesting that the actor would be inflicting 
harm knowingly and without good motives.183 
C. Summary: Resolving the Puzzles 
1. The principal puzzle: why the act is legal and the 
threat illegal. 
The foregoing discussion and proposed definition should 
make clear why the threat is illegal and the unconditional per- 
formance of the threatened act is not. As many theorists have 
noted, there is a moral difference between the two. But, contrary 
to prevailing opinion,"M that difference is not that the threat is 
somehow a morally aggravating factor. In the usual cases, merely 
doing an act that has been leveraged into a blackmail proposal is 
morally indeterminate in two senses-it is not clearly right or 
wrong itself, and, all else being equal, it carries insufficient data 
to support a secure inference about the moral character of the ac- 
tor's motives. The threat, however, is presumptively undertaken 
for bad motives. Insofar as we can explain why blackmail is 
criminal only in accord with the third criterion of criminaliza- 
criminal law is to identify, as closely as possible, the true contours of the conduct we wish 
to proscribe. The set of legal rules consisting of both elements and defenses, crafted in re- 
sponse to that understanding, will inevitably be both over- and underinclusive inrelation 
to the underlying conduct hat society would ideally want to deter and punish. In this 
way, the legal definition will be a product of, but unlikely identical with, the conceptual 
definition. 
183It follows that, where practicable, the state should except from the blackmail ban 
(through offense lements or affirmative defenses) conditional threats as to which the 
likelihood of bad motives if undertaken can be expected, ex ante, to be particularly weak. 
See Section III. 
184 See, for example, Katz, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1595 (cited in note 92) (concluding that 
the blackmailer's "accommodation fthe victim's preferences [by proposing, and agreeing, 
to remain silent for a fee] aggravates rather than improves his moral position"); Altman, 
141 U Pa L Rev at 1657 (cited in note 43). 
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tion-which turns on the mental state and motivations of the ac- 
tor-the blackmail threat has only evidentiary significance.185 
Professor Wesley Hohfeld's distinction between "operative" 
and "evidential" facts provides a useful vehicle for understanding 
this bedrock point. According to Hohfeld, "[o]perative, constitu- 
tive, causal, or 'dispositive' facts are those which . . . suffice to 
change legal relations."186 In contrast, "[a]n evidential fact is one 
which, on being ascertained, affords ome logical basis-not con- 
clusive-for inferring some other fact. . .. either a constitutive 
fact or an intermediate evidential fact."187 Plainly, the black- 
mailer's conditional threat is an operative fact under the existing 
law of blackmail. Indeed, to ask why blackmail is a crime while 
the act threatened is not is really only to inquire into why the 
threat is an operative legal fact. Ordinarily, a fact is operative 
under the criminal law because it has pre-legal constitutive or 
causal significance. That the deceased was a human being is an 
operative fact under the law of homicide, for example, because 
something of independent importance turns on the fact that it 
was a person (rather than, say, a chicken or a tomato plant) that 
was killed. The evidentiary theory of blackmail recognizes that 
the blackmail threat is not this type of operative fact. Fundamen- 
tally, the conditional threat is not "operative" at all, but eviden- 
tial-it "affords ome logical basis (not conclusive) for inferring 
some other fact," namely, that the threatener had morally 
blameworthy motives. In short, for purposes of explaining the 
surprising conjunction that it is illegal to make a blackmail 
threat while it is legal to engage in the conduct threatened, the 
actor's bad motivation, not the threat itself, is properly viewed as 
"operative." 
Not only is the threat to disclose embarrassing information 
not necessarily morally worse than the unconditional disclosure 
of information absent the threat, but it may well be that a given 
"86To deny any categorical moral difference between wrongful disclosure of damaging 
personal information about a person and blackmailing him over the same information is
not to assert that the criminal aw need punish the behaviors with equal severity if the 
state chooses to criminalize them both. Deciding how much punishment o mete out for 
particular offenses involves different considerations than does determining whether to 
criminalize particular conduct. Although an exploration of the former question is well be- 
yond the scope of this Article, it is worth observing that the two varieties of conduct differ 
in potentially relevant ways. For example, Fletcher is surely right to emphasize that 
blackmail is particularly harmful because it is usually a repeat affair (although his con- 
clusion that blackmail is therefore a "paradigmatic" rime seems a non sequitur). Fletcher, 
141 U Pa L Rev at 1626 (cited in note 96). 
"8Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju- 
dicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L J 16, 25 (1913). 
187 Id at 27. 
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discloser of information acts with even greater moral blamewor- 
thiness than does the ordinary blackmailer. Consider the case of 
Charles Augustus Milverton, the master blackmailer concocted 
by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.188 Milverton's method 
is as follows: He allows it to be known that he is prepared to 
pay very high sums for letters which compromise people of 
wealth and position. . . Everything which is in the market 
goes to Milverton, and there are hundreds in this great city 
who turn white at his name. No one knows where his grip 
may fall, for he is far too rich and cunning to work from hand 
to mouth. He will hold a card back for years in order to play 
it at the moment when the stake is best worth winning."89 
Reasoning that one cannot "compare the ruffian who in hot blood 
bludgeons his mate with this man, who methodically and at his 
leisure tortures the soul and wrings the nerves in order to add to 
his already swollen money-bags," Sherlock Holmes deems Milver- 
ton "the worst man in London."'190 
Maybe so, but Milverton could be worse still. Imagine that he 
is as cunning and ruthless as Conan Doyle represents, but that 
he is motivated by something other than money. Already rich as 
Croesus, Milverton acquires information ot to blackmail but 
merely to reveal, for he takes greater pleasure in causing pain 
and suffering than in aggregating further wealth. This Milverton 
would never consider offering his victim a choice of harms; he will 
disclose every bit of embarrassing and discrediting information 
he obtains-at the moment most damaging to its subject. To be 
sure, this Milverton is a less likely character than Conan Doyle's 
because spite is a less common and less all-consuming motive 
than avarice"9' (and because, unlike blackmail, the enterprise of 
revealing information is not likely to be self-financing). But is 
there any doubt that the "Master Fink"-who "methodically and 
at his leisure tortures the soul and wrings the nerves" in order to 
torture the soul and wring the nerves-could more fairly lay 
claim to the title "the worst man in London" than could the Mas- 
ter Blackmailer? 
"See Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of Charles Augustus Milverton, in 1 Sher- 
lock Holmes: The Complete Novels and Stories 791 (Bantam 1986). Milverton is discussed 
in Hepworth, Blackmail at 46-47 (cited in note 19). 
89 Doyle, Adventures of Charles Augustus Milverton at 792. 
9Id. 
191 It is partially for this reason that the evidentiary inference is probative. See text ac- 
companying notes 174-75. 
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All this suggests that, First Amendment considerations 
aside, the morally blameworthy disclosure of harmful information 
could be made criminal. However, because the state would have 
to prove that the defendant had a bad motive, successful prosecu- 
tions would be rare. At the same time, adoption of such a crime 
would impose many costs-for example, it would waste resources 
in failed prosecutions, chill the disclosure of socially useful facts, 
and likely sow disrespect for the law. Moreover, when the state 
did successfully prosecute, it would likely do so on the strength of 
evidence that the defendant had first attempted to blackmail the 
victim-in which event a prosecution for the crime of blackmail 
would be available anyway. For all these reasons, a decision not 
to enact such a law seems, at the least, prudent. 
2. The secondary puzzle: distinguishing other 
voluntary transactions. 
The answer to the second blackmail puzzle should be clear 
now, too. The law and economics cholars have tended to suppose 
that blackmail is a voluntary exchange between the blackmailer 
and victim but have concluded that the practice is nonetheless 
properly made criminal (at least in its paradigmatic form) be- 
cause of the costs it imposes on other persons who are not parties 
to the transaction (including society at large).'92 The evidentiary 
theory demonstrates that this premise is mistaken. While not de- 
nying that blackmail might harm third parties, it insists that the 
blackmail transaction is not voluntary in the first place. 
As Professor Kathleen Sullivan has cogently explained, coer- 
cion 'is inevitably normative .... It necessarily embodies a con- 
clusion about the wrongfulness of a proposal."'93 Surely, then, if a 
proposed course of action is wrong in itself, the conditional pro- 
posal is coercive (at least where the recipient of the proposal 
views the proposed action as detrimental to her own interests). 
But normative concerns are not limited to whether a proposal is 
inherently wrongful in either an objective or conventional sense; 
they extend as well to considerations of the moral character of an 
actor's motives for advancing a proposal that is itself morally am- 
biguous. Although clarity may sometimes be enhanced by term- 
ing an immoral proposal "wrongful" and an immorally motivated 
one "bad,""'t we should not insist on the distinction at all costs. To 
the contrary, inasmuch as the conditional offer tends to reveal 
"See note 12. 
9 Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1443 (cited in note 130). 
See note 150. 
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that the actor would lack morally adequate reasons for engaging 
in his threatened course of conduct, a refusal to recognize this 
particular proposal-made by this particular actor on this par- 
ticular occasion-as "wrongful" beclouds more than it illumi- 
nates. Put otherwise, perhaps we should not rigidly insist that 
the moral character of acts be judged independently of the mo- 
tives behind them.'95 Itfollows that the blackmail victim is just as 
coerced as the holdup victim. Because people's assumptions about 
the intentions and motivations of others are central to the way 
they experience social intercourse,"9 victims of blackmail, just as 
much as victims of holdups, are likely to view the threatener's 
proposal as a "threat," not an "offer," and to experience them- 
selves as acting under duress.'97 In neither case is the victim's ac- 
quiescence "voluntary" in a sense sufflciently robust to counsel 
against societal interference with his purported transactional 
autonomy. 
III. TESTING THE EVIDENTIARY THEORY: THE CENTRAL CASE 
AND BEYOND 
After demonstrating that the evidentiary theory explains 
criminalization of a threat to expose an adulterer, the previous 
Section moved quickly to contend that the theory generally sup- 
ports criminalizing threats by B to reveal embarrassing informa- 
tion about A unless A pays B to remain silent. But this particular 
conduct-which might be called "central case" blackmail-far 
from exhausts the universe of potential blackmail. The act a 
blackmailer threatens need not be to disclose information. The 
blackmailer need not demand money. Furthermore, ven central 
case blackmail (as somewhat arbitrarily defined) encompasses 
numerous subcategories that perhaps warrant further explora- 
tion. Should it matter, for example, if the information B threatens 
to reveal is not merely embarrassing but relates to A's commis- 
19"See Steven Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness, 106 Ethics 327, 327 (1996) (setting 
forth, and criticizing, the "very widely accepted and rarely questioned" proposition in 
moral theory "that the motive of an action never determines whether it is right or wrong"). 
"See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at 182 (cited in note 134) (observ- 
ing that "persons interpret each other's movements as manifestations of intention and 
choices, and these subjective factors are often more important o their social relations 
than the movements by which they are manifested or their effects"). 
"Put otherwise, theorists who deny that blackmail is coercive or that the blackmail 
victim acts under duress fail to understand or validate the victim's perspective as partici- 
pant in a particular human drama. Were she to articulate her sense of being coerced, the 
victim would be more likely to emphasize the particular complaint hat her blackmailer 
ought not to do as he threatens, not the more abstract objection that what the blackmailer 
threatens ought not be done. 
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sion of a crime? Or what if B "demands" of A no more than B 
could get from other market actors for the same information? 
Questions like these have occupied, and at times confounded, 
blackmail theorists. Accordingly, any adequate theory of black- 
mail must show how the law should treat these and other distinc- 
tive cases. This Section explores several of these variations and 
seeks to demonstrate that the evidentiary theory accounts well 
for common moral intuitions regarding the proper scope of a 
criminal prohibition. 
A. A Blackmail Test 
As Feinberg has observed, every blackmail proposal is a dou- 
ble conditional of the form "if -x then y; and if x then -y." The first 
conditional is a "threat," the second an "offer"; y is the "act 
(threatened)," -y the "act (offered)"; x is the "demand."198 In order 
to explore further the validity and utility of the evidentiary the- 
ory, this Section proposes a test to assess whether any given 
proposition that meets blackmail's formal requirements hould be 
deemed 'blackmail" for purposes of the criminal aw. The test has 
four steps. 
First, assume the actor simply performed the act threatened 
(y) and ask whether that action is itself criminal. If the answer is 
yes, then the proposition is just a threat to perform a criminal act 
and is not blackmail. There is nothing puzzling about criminal- 
izing a conditional threat to commit a crime, and we would con- 
fuse an already confusing subject by bringing such threats within 
the rubric of blackmail. The proposition is usefully and conven- 
tionally labeled "extortion" or "criminal coercion."'99 
Second, if the act, y, is not itself criminal, ask whether it 
causes or threatens legally cognizable harm. If it does not, then it 
cannot be made criminal (or at least not on the strength of the 
third criterion of criminalization). Certainly, one might be 
tempted to call at least some propositions that fall out at this 
stage "blackmail," and the designation could be appropriate so 
long as we are speaking of moral rather than legal offenses. How- 
ever, the purpose of this inquiry is to determine the proper scope 
" Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 246-47 (cited in note 2). 
"WAs Feinberg has explained, distinctions between such terms as "extortion" and 
"blackmail" have not been consistently observed. Id at 240-42 (classifying extortion and 
blackmail within the broad genus of theft). The 'blackmail" label is best reserved for 
threats to perform a legal act, while threats to commit an unlawful act are either "extor- 
tion" (if the threat is to be carried out in the future) or "robbery by threat" (if the threat- 
ened action is immediate). See, for example, Shavell, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1877 & n 1 (cited 
in note 23) (adopting a similar nomenclature). 
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of a criminal prohibition. Accordingly, when performing the act 
threatened would impose a "disutility" that society would not 
deem a legal harm, this step of the test concludes that the propo- 
sition is not blackmail. 
If the act is not criminal yet causes harm that is cognizable 
for purposes of the criminal law, the next task is to explore 
whether the actor has morally bad motives. The third step, there- 
fore, is to identify which particular reason(s) for action would 
have made the actor's harm-causing conduct morally justified. 
The fourth step is to ask whether the actor's offer not to perform y
on condition xmakes it materially less likely that he was actually 
motivated by any one of the morally justifying reasons identified 
in the third step.2"0 If so (and if that perceived likelihood is suffi- 
ciently low) the original proposition should be condemned as 
blackmail.201 
As should be expected, this test supports criminalizing B's 
threat to reveal A's adultery unless A pays $1,000. The first step 
is to disregard the threat and offer, and to assume that B simply 
disclosed A's adultery. That is not a crime. Next, ask whether 
that act causes legally cognizable harm. It does.202 Third, identify 
the motives B must have had in order to keep his disclosure from 
being morally blameworthy. Fourth, consider whether B's pre- 
ceding offer to preserve A's secret upon payment of $1,000 makes 
it materially less likely that B did in fact act because of the mo- 
tives hypothesized at the third step. We have already answered 
this question in the affirmative.203 
'Frequently, such a conclusion will be warranted when the apparent purpose of the 
offer is incommensurable with the hypothetical " egitimate" purposes animating the act, y. 
2 We are still not in a position to specify what the threshold likelihood should be. See 
note 152. The familiar standard of proof in criminal cases might suggest that conduct 
should be excluded from the criminal ban unless the fourth step permits one to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt hat the actor would have lacked morally justifying motives for 
engaging in act y. This formulation would be correct were the question whether the actor 
should be convicted under a statute that prohibits the commission of harm-causing con- 
duct with morally bad motives. The standard need not be so strict, however, when the 
question is whether specific definable categories of conduct should be prohibited by the 
criminal aw, for overbreadth in criminalizing conduct implicates different considerations 
than does overbreadth in convicting individuals. So long as a criminal law gives fair notice 
of proscribed conduct, and individuals are not convicted under such a statute unless they 
are found to have engaged in the proscribed conduct 'beyond a reasonable doubt," crimi- 
nalization can be justified on a substantially lesser showing. However, because we will be 
unable to progress far in articulating the proper equired showing without first adopting a
particular general justifying aim of the criminal aw, perhaps the best we can do at pres- 
ent is to tolerate this vaguely worded test and to focus not on the bottom-line likelihood 
that the actor would have possessed bad motives had he engaged in the conduct hreat- 
ened, but rather on the probative weight he offer lends toward that inquiry. 
' See note 160 and accompanying text. 
"See notes 173-78 and accompanying text. 
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This brief application of the blackmail test should suggest 
that the test is simply a more formalized (though not a purely 
mechanistic) articulation of the evidentiary theory from Section 
II. As such, it does not demonstrate that either the test or the 
theory is correct. A formal proof is, in any event, impossible. The 
following Section does the next best thing: attempting to show 
that the results of the evidentiary theory of blackmail and its test 
conform either to existing strongly shared intuitions, or to judg- 
ments that can be accepted upon reflection. 
B. Applications 
This Section analyzes seven categories of conduct, both 
within and without the central case of blackmail, that challenge 
either the criminalization of blackmail in toto or the integrity of 
any unified explanation of the crime. These seven categories are: 
(1) "hard" commercial bargaining; (2) market price blackmail; (3) 
threats to expose a crime; (4) threats by the victim of the person 
blackmailed; (5) public interest blackmail; (6) noninformational 
blackmail; and (7) bribery. The inquiry throughout is whether 
this particular category of conduct is criminalizable as a matter of 
principle because it satisfies the twin requirements that it ordi- 
narily cause harm and ordinarily be undertaken with morally bad 
motives. Whenever the answer is no, one must ask whether it 
would be practical to carve out an exception for that category 
from a general blackmail ban. Since this Article attempts only to 
answer the broad theoretical questions regarding blackmail, it 
does not explore the particular issues this second question raises; 
doing so would amount to proposing a model blackmail statute. 
1. "Hard" bargains. 
Explicitly or implicitly, every potential commercial transac- 
tion conforms to the same double conditional form as does black- 
mail. The proposition implicitly conveyed by your local retailer, 
for example, is this: "If you pay me the listed purchase price for 
any good in my store, I will give it to you; if you do not, I won't." 
Aside from a formal structural similarity, this proposition does 
not look much like blackmail. Things get a little murkier, how- 
ever, in the case of the "hard bargain," like that presented by Jef- 
frie Murphy's hypothetical owner of the Babe Ruth-autographed 
baseball.21 
See text accompanying note 77. 
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The hard bargainer is a seller who opportunistically jacks up 
his price when he encounters a would-be buyer with an unusually 
great need or desire for the seller's good. Consider an antique 
dealer possessed of a cheap and ugly vase that, despite her best 
efforts, he has been unable to unload for years. One day she re- 
ceives a visit from an eccentric multimillionaire who announces 
that the vase is precisely what he needs to complete his collection 
and cap a lifelong search. When he asks the price, the dealer an- 
swers that she will not part with it for a penny less than $10 mil- 
lion. The collector, not a complete fool, is flabbergasted. "But it's 
not worth anywhere near that much!" he argues. "Very true," the 
dealer responds. "Indeed, just before you walked in, I was consid- 
ering throwing it out to make space for other merchandise. But I 
know both that you want it and that you can afford my new price. 
Take it or leave it." 
Whatever we might think of the dealer's behavior, we could 
not plausibly condemn it as criminal so long as we (rightly) re- 
frain from imposing price controls or a ban on price discrimina- 
tion in all its forms. Any satisfactory theory of blackmail must, 
therefore, coherently explain why the hard bargain is not black- 
mail. The evidentiary theory provides just such an explanation. It 
begins by considering the act threatened-in this case, to retain 
ownership of the vase. Very simply, this action could not be 
criminalized-no matter what an observer might infer about the 
motives of the actor-because it would not satisfy the harm re- 
quirement. Plainly, the collector has no legally protected interest 
in the vase; neither does the public at large (though we can 
imagine systems of property law under which it would). By with- 
holding from the collector a benefit in which he has no legal in- 
terest, the dealer cannot inflict legally cognizable harm. Because 
the dealer's reasons for keeping the vase-or even for destroying 
it, were that her choice are legally immaterial, a conditional 
threat to do either unless paid off cannot provide any legally rele- 
vant information. Therefore, the conditional threat should be as 
legal as the unconditional performance of the act. In terms of the 
evidentiary blackmail test, a "hard bargain" is not criminal 
blackmail because, under the second step from Section III.A, the 
acts threatened (to keep the vase or even to destroy it) would not 
inflict legal harm.205 
It is telling that the hard bargain "fails" the blackmail test at the second step, 
rather than the fourth. The hard bargainer may (at least in certain cases) act with motives 
we might wish to condemn as immoral, though we do not believe her conduct should be 
made criminal. Put another way, there is a reasonable sense in which our hypothetical 
millionaire collector might sputter with outrage, "But that's blackmail!" even though he 
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2. Market price blackmail. 
Imagine B possesses an embarrassing photograph of celeb- 
rity A, for which a supermarket abloid will pay $1,000. Assume 
no external factors would make B's agreement o sell the photo a 
moral wrong (that is, for example, B obtained the photo without 
committing an immoral act and has no prior duty of confidential- 
ity to A). B approaches A with this proposition: "If you pay me 
$1,000, I'll give you this photograph and its negative; if you do 
not, I'll sell them on the open market." Theorists are divided over 
whether this proposal-"market price blackmail"-should be law- 
fu1.2" This scholarly uncertainty is understandable. An eviden- 
tiary analysis reveals this to be one of the most complex riddles 
within the blackmail puzzle. 
At first blush, this might appear an easy case. B's sale of dam- 
aging information about A to tabloid (T) would be no less hurtful 
to A than if B were to give the information to T for free. Conse- 
quently, that T would pay B for the disclosure seems irrelevant. 
In both cases, B would have morally acceptable motives for dis- 
closing to T only if she were to act for the purpose of achieving 
what she (reasonably) perceives to be a greater moral good. Her 
offer to refrain from disclosing the photographs to T if paid by A 
suggests that her disclosure would not be so motivated. The mar- 
ket price proposition to A thus has the same evidentiary signifi- 
cance as it would in the absence of a market. Because B's offer to 
A appears inconsistent with the assumption that B believes pub- 
lication would serve a public interest, the conditional proposi- 
tion-at market price or otherwise-reveals the moral blamewor- 
thiness necessary for making such "blackmail" criminal. 
This argument is sound so long as doubt about B's motives con- 
stitutes one sufficient reason not to criminalize B's sale to T in the 
absence of a blackmail offer to A. Very likely, we would attribute 
public spirited motives to some such unconditional disclosures- 
knows that the dealer's proposition is lawful and believes that it should remain so. See 
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc v Bresler, 398 US 6, 14 (1970) (noting 
that accusing a hard bargainer of blackmail was neither slander when spoken nor libel 
when reported because the implication was so well understood that no one would have 
thought he bargainer was being accused of a crime). 
'Compare Murphy, 63 Monist at 164-65 (cited in note 2) (proposing to decriminalize 
blackmail when the putative blackmailer seeks only the going market price); Ginsburg 
and Shechtman, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1860 (cited in note 2) (same); Feinberg, Harmless 
Wrongdoing at 262-64 (cited in note 2) (deeming "[d]emands for fair compensation for con- 
siderate offers not to publish" instances of "[pilausibly justified blackmail"), with Lind- 
gren, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1987 (cited in note 3) (opining that market price blackmail "seems 
like classic blackmail" and concluding that, "[g]iven the lack of agreement over the ration- 
ale for blackmail," its continued criminalization is sound). 
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principally those that reveal a wrongful act by, or character flaw 
of, some person in a position of public trust. In these cases, the 
market price blackmailer's conditional offer of silence has real 
evidentiary value. But most disclosures that might be leveraged 
into market price blackmail are probably not like this. It is more 
likely, I think, that the bulk of information sold "on the market" 
consists of things like photos of movie star M in the nude, or the 
revelation that former basketball great S is sleeping with a nine- 
teen-year-old. And these sales are probably not motivated by the 
seller's belief that other morally compelling interests outweigh 
the harm caused M or S. Instead, the seller's purpose is to make 
a buck-not a motivation that makes the harm-causing sale mor- 
ally justifiable. 
If this is so, the market price blackmail offer has little or no 
evidentiary value, in which case the evidentiary theory cannot 
distinguish between the threat and the act. And if the evidentiary 
theory cannot distinguish market price blackmail from market 
price public disclosures of information about celebrities-because 
the former is no more likely than the latter to be undertaken with 
bad motives-then one of two conclusions follows: either B's sale 
to T should be made criminal,207 or it should not be, but only be- 
cause other considerations favor its legalization notwithstanding 
that its criminalization would be justifiable under the third crite- 
rion. In fact, one strong reason for allowing B to sell embarrass- 
ing information about public figures hould jump immediately to 
mind: the First Amendment probably forbids government inter- 
vention in this type of information market.208 The likely upshot, 
therefore, is (1) B should be permitted to sell T reputationally 
"7See Murphy, 63 Monist at 165 (cited in note 2) (discussing the market price black- 
mail of public figures in the context of a market created by magazines such as the Na- 
tional Enquirer and concluding that "[i]f one really wants to criminalize ven this as 
blackmail, then it does seem to me that-in consistency-one ought also to seek the prohi- 
bition of the wider market"). 
'There is a separate possible explanation for why we might tolerate the disclosure 
notwithstanding the bad motives urmised. Insofar as public figures have elicited public 
interest-thus creating the market necessary to produce a market price-by voluntarily 
entering the realm of public attention, they have made their private lives, to some extent 
and in some indistinct sense, public commodities. It could be argued, therefore, that by 
seeking and achieving celebrity, public figures have assumed the risk of widespread inva- 
sions of their privacy. Arguably, then, any harm such invasions may cause should not be 
legally cognizable. See Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing atxxviii (cited in note 2) (defining 
"wrongless harms"). Notably, this argument for legalizing the disclosure also favors legal- 
izing the market price blackmail, which turns out to be just like the hard economic bar- 
gain: because it does not matter for purposes of the criminal aw whether one who sells 
reputationally harmful information about a celebrity to a publisher is motivated by her 
view of the public interest or just by narrow pecuniary gain, any potential evidentiary 
value of the market price blackmail proposition is legally irrelevant. 
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harmful information about public figure A, even though (2) the 
class of persons who make the unconditional sale to T are proba- 
bly not less morally blameworthy than those who make a condi- 
tional offer to A. 
Should any of this matter for purposes of deciding whether to 
prohibit market price blackmail? Maybe.209 Insofar as the third 
criterion of criminalization serves a retributivist general justify- 
ing aim, the reasons for tolerating (presumptively) morally 
blameworthy sales of harmful information to third parties are 
probably irrelevant o the criminalization of market price black- 
mail. Even if the average market price blackmailer is no more 
blameworthy (and very possibly less)210 than the average uncondi- 
tional seller, all that matters is whether his conduct is ordinarily 
harm-causing and morally blameworthy. As we have seen, it ap- 
pears that it is. That some other harm-causing blameworthy con- 
duct (the sale of reputationally harmful information to T) remains 
legal is beside the point. 
But to the extent the third criterion serves a consequentialist 
justifying aim, the argument for decriminalizing market price 
blackmail seems strong. After all, the market price blackmailer of 
A differs from one who simply sells reputationally harmful infor- 
mation to T in one conspicuous respect: he gives a right of first re- 
fusal to the person most likely to be harmed by publication of the 
information. This seems like a decent thing to do. Insofar as we 
adopt the third criterion of criminalization in order to reinforce 
desired moral norms,211 we risk disserving those norms by draw- 
ing criminal lines that prominently distinguish two categories of 
' Even if they do not lead us to conclude that this conduct should be decriminalized, 
the foregoing assumptions might nonetheless advise against terming the conduct "black- 
mail." Indeed, if point (2) above is correct, the market price threat would not qualify as 
blackmail under my proposed definition, which specifies that the actor's motives for en- 
gaging in the threatened act would be opaque but for the conditional offer. See text ac- 
companying note 183. Of course, we could keep the market price threat criminal, call it 
"blackmail," and revise my proposed definition. But to do so would risk undermining the 
threat's evidentiary significance-which is the key to unlocking the blackmail puzzle. 
Consequently, if this conduct is to remain criminal, conceptual precision might be better 
served by deeming it a form of extortion, and expanding that definition to include some 
threats to perform acts that, although legal, could be made criminal on familiar principles. 
210ne reason why so many people favor legalizing market price blackmail becomes 
clear by imagining what a market price blackmail proposition might look like: "I happen 
to have a photograph of you for which a tabloid is willing to pay $1,000. I'm inclined to 
take the money," B begins, "however, I know that if I sell it, its publication will cause you 
some degree of discomfort. I have no desire to cause you harm. So I'm willing to turn over 
the photo to you for the same $1,000 the tabloid has offered." See, for example, Feinberg, 
Harmless Wrongdoing at 263-64 (cited in note 2) (describing the "fair compensation" 
blackmailer as "commendably benevolent," "thoughtful," "considerate," and "genero[us]"). 
211 See note 144. 
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conduct but discourage and punish the seemingly less blamewor- 
thy of the two.2"2 In short, then, the particular reasons for legal- 
izing the unconditional sale by B to T should, on consequentialist 
reasoning, entail also legalizing the conditional sale offer by B to 
A.213 
3. Crime exposure blackmail. 
A second special category within the central case is thought 
to arise when the information B threatens to reveal would not 
merely embarrass A, but would subject him to criminal penalty. 
This variation, which we may inelegantly term 'crime exposure 
blackmail," has provoked particular attention from law and eco- 
nomics scholars, who query whether permitting blackmail of this 
type would benefit society as a form of private law enforcement. 
Their answers vary.214 
212Perhaps this anomaly would not send a perverse social message were there strong 
reasons for actually encouraging (rather then merely tolerating) B's sale to T. But this is 
probably not the case, for the First Amendment interests implicated (in the case of public 
figures who are not public officials) are more likely ones of process than outcome. That is, 
the health of a free society does not depend on whether we see photos of Fergie topless; it 
matters only that the government ot decide whether we do. 
23 Legalizing market price blackmail need not entail legalizing "supra market price 
blackmail"-the offer to sell A embarrassing information for a sum substantially in excess 
of what T would pay (as in the recent Bill Cosby case). The state can regulate the price B 
may charge A for nonpublication-capping it at the market price-for the same reason the 
state engages in price regulation elsewhere. Price regulation is a common way of limiting 
the monopolist's price to a hypothetical competitive price. And the blackmailer (market 
price, supra-market price, or otherwise) must be a monopolist (or, at least, an oligopolist) 
of the information hethreatens to reveal, else his offer of secrecy would have little value. 
However, B's possession of information about A does not make him equally a monopolist 
with respect o the rest of the world as it does with respect o A himself. If B is the only 
person with photographs of A in a compromising position, he is, by definition, a monopolist 
supplier. But his monopoly is economically meaningful only to the extent there are no 
adequate substitutes for those photos. In the broader market of "information about public 
figures," substitutes for B's photos of celebrity A usually do exist-embarrassing or scan- 
dalous information (photographs, interviews, etc.) about celebrities C, D, and E. But these 
are not substitutes as far as A is concerned. Consequently, consistent with well- 
established justifications for economic regulation of monopolies, the state could reasonably 
decide to protect A from monopolistic exploitation by prohibiting B from charging A more 
than the hypothetical competitive price for the information i question-a price ade- 
quately approximated by the existing market price. Conceivably, the state could even en- 
force this rule through the criminal aw on the strength of the first criterion of criminali- 
zation. See text accompanying note 142. 
214 Compare, for example, Brown, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1935 (cited in note 12) (arguing 
that legalizing blackmail of criminals would probably increase deterrence of other crimes), 
with Posner, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1823-27 (cited in note 2) (concluding that the effects are 
ambiguous); Landes and Posner, 4 J Legal Stud at 42-44 (cited in note 39) (same); Shavell, 
141 U Pa L Rev at 1899-1900 (cited in note 23) (contending that it is more efficient to 
maintain a ban on crime exposure blackmail, supplemented by public authority to offer 
rewards for the identification fcriminals). 
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Whatever uncertainty a utilitarian (or wealth maximization) 
analysis might engender, it is probably obvious to most people 
that crime exposure blackmail should be a crime. Indeed, under 
the reductivist approach of Feinberg and Gorr, the matter is sim- 
ple: because it is wrongful to withhold information about a crme, 
it is equally wrongful to offer to withhold it for payment.2"5 Both 
the offer and the unconditional performance of the act offered 
may be criminalized. In fact, however, the criminal aw treats the 
conditional offer substantially more severely. Under the common 
law, the mere failure to report information about a crime (in- 
cluding the identity of the perpetrator) was a misdemeanor called 
misprision of felony.216 Modern statutes have tended to ignore it 
entirely.217 In contrast, the conditional threat to report informa- 
tion about a crme is blackmail.218 The evidentiary theory-based 
on the insight that the blackmail proposition is important for 
what it tends to reveal about the reasons this particular actor 
would have for engaging in the act threatened-explains why. 
The critical step is to explore why the law tolerates a failure 
to expose a criminal. Plainly, silence can cause substantial harm 
to the public. It hampers efforts to punish and deter crime, and it 
can be a but for cause of the criminal's future crimes. Moreover, 
the moral blameworthiness of remaining silent in this case also 
seems apparent, at least initially, for it tends to bespeak a disre- 
gard for the common good and the concrete interests of actual and 
potential victims. But a moment's reflection reveals that we 
should not quickly attribute bare selfishness to the silent wit- 
ness.219 Her silence may be motivated largely by fear of retalia- 
tion, by friendship and loyalty toward the criminal, and by fear of 
the police. Our sympathy for these motivations provides an ex- 
planation for the lenient treatment.220 
216 See Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 243-45 (cited in note 2). 
216 id at 243. 
2'7 P.R. Glazebrook, How Long, Then, Is The Arm Of The Law To Be?, 25 Mod L 
Rev 301, 307 n 51 (1962) (No court in the United States has been prepared to adopt the 
English doctrine in its simplicity, and hold that a mere failure to disclose knowledge of a 
felony is itself an offence."). However, through the offense of 'compounding," the Model 
Penal Code would make it a misdemeanor to accept money in consideration for failing to 
report to law enforcement authorities information about the suspected commission of a 
crime. MPC ? 242.5. 
218 See, for example, MPC ? 223.4(2) (defining as guilty of "theft by extortion" anyone 
who "purposely obtains property of another by threatening to . . . accuse anyone of a 
criminal offense"). 
219 Here the term "witness" refers loosely to anyone who has knowledge relevant to the 
discovery of a crime or the capture and conviction of the culprit, no matter the nature of 
the information orthe manner in which it was obtained. 
This seems to be the very sentiment underlying Chief Justice Marshall's famous 
pronouncement inMarbury v Brooks, 20 US (7 Wheat) 556, 575-76 (1822): "It may be the 
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Consider now the threat. Had the witness threatened to ex- 
pose the criminal unless paid off, we infer that her motives for 
violating her civic duty had nothing to do with either love or fear 
of the criminal (either of which would be a morally mitigating fac- 
tor). Rather, we can infer, she was motivated by pure selfishness. 
The fact of her blackmail proposal provides circumstantial evi- 
dence as to her mental state: we now believe that she was in fact 
activated by more culpable motives than, absent this evidence, we 
had hypothesized might have motivated her. 
The evidentiary test (when applied with slight variation) re- 
affirms this conclusion. The variation is to reverse the roles of 
threat and offer in the analysis. Assume, then, that the actor per- 
formed the act offered (-y). The mere act of remaining silent is not 
a crime, or, if a crime, is a fairly trivial one (step 1). The act does, 
however, cause cognizable harm to the public (step 2). The effec- 
tive legalization of the act is due to a surmise that the actor is 
motivated more by fear or loyalty than by selfishness (step 3). 
Consideration of the threat ("I'll tell unless you pay") strongly 
undermines this hypothesis. Therefore, crime exposure blackmail 
should be both a crime and a more serious offense than mere 
misprision of felony. 
4. Victim blackmail. 
Should the preceding analysis of crime exposure blackmail 
change if the individual who threatens to expose A's crime was 
A's victim? What if B threatens to file a criminal complaint 
against A unless A provides B reasonable compensation for the 
harms B actually suffered? The Model Penal Code specifies that 
it should be an affirmative defense to a prosecution for threaten- 
ing to "accuse anyone of a criminal offense . . . that the property 
obtained by threat of accusation . . . was honestly claimed as res- 
titution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstances to 
which such accusation ... relates."221 This defense was added "in 
duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offence which comes to his 
knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty 
is too harsh for man." The immediately preceding sentence provides revealing context for 
the otherwise cryptic qualifier in every case: 'The only feature in the transaction to which 
blame is attached," the Court explained, "is the attempt of a father-in-law toconceal the 
forgeries of a son-in-law, by paying off the notes he had forged." See also Haupt v United 
States, 330 US 631, 64142 (1947) (holding in a treason prosecution that [i]t was for the 
jury to weigh the evidence that the acts proceeded from parental solicitude against the 
evidence of adherence to the German cause" and that the jury could disbelieve defendant's 
contention that he 'merely had the misfortune tosire a traitor and all he did was to act as 
an indulgent father toward a disloyal son"). 
221 MPC ? 223.4. 
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order to assure that one who had a civil complaint for damages 
against another could not be convicted of extortion for threaten- 
ing during negotiations to file a criminal charge"-conduct "many 
regard as legitimate negotiating tactics."222 
Such a negotiating ploy would not be legitimate under an 
evidentiary analysis.223 The purpose of the criminal law is not 
principally compensatory. It serves retributive, deterrent, inca- 
pacitative, and rehabilitative goals that are not comparably well 
served by monetary (let alone confidential) settlement between 
offender and victim. Consequently, if we believe that all members 
of the community have a civic duty to report crime, then it cannot 
be morally acceptable for a victim to offer to ignore her obligation 
for personal gain -ven if that gain is in some sense compensa- 
tory. This is not to claim it makes no moral difference whether B 
is A's victim (rather than a mere witness to A's crime) and is de- 
manding arguably "reasonable" compensation (rather than an ex- 
cessive "penalty"). It is only to conclude that the difference is not 
such as to make B's conduct morally justified. The factors the 
Model Penal Code identifies can properly be considered mitigat- 
ing; they should not constitute an affirmative defense. 
In contrast to the criminal law, victim compensation is the 
chief purpose of tort law. The evidentiary test reinforces the in- 
tuition that B may threaten to sue A unless A compensates B for 
the injuries and losses that A has caused to B. Assume B files 
suit against A. This action is moral and lawful on the presump- 
tion (step 3) that B is motivated by a good faith belief that he has 
a legally enforceable claim for damages against A. Now consider 
the fact that B had offered not to sue if A paid B's damages. This 
evidence is consistent with the motivation we previously ascribed 
to B: either way, B's (morally acceptable) objective is to be made 
whole. 
Id at comment (f). 
2 The ethical rules governing attorney conduct likewise reveal such action to be of 
questionable legitimacy. The 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary 
Rules provides that "[a] lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to 
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct DR 7-105A (ABA 1982). The 
1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct lack any such specific proscription. Instead, 
they generically bar criminal conduct "that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness orfitness as a lawyer in other respects." Model Rules of Professional Con- 
duct Rule 8.4(b) (ABA 1983). As a result, threatening to file a criminal complaint would 
constitute an ethical violation only in jurisdictions where it would violate the criminal law. 
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5. Public interest blackmail. 
The typical blackmailer demands from his victim a cash 
payment to which he has no legitimate claim. But the black- 
mailer need not demand money. Nor need he even seek private 
advantage (narrowly defined). A recurring question, accordingly, 
is whether blackmail should be criminalized when the black- 
mailer's ostensible objective is a public, rather than private, good. 
Under the evidentiary approach, the answer is clear: it depends. 
We can solve the puzzle of "public interest blackmail" by ex- 
amining what is presumed to be one of the most common black- 
mail threats, "homosexual blackmail."224 Assume B threatens to 
expose A's homosexuality (or homosexual acts) unless A pays B 
$1,000. This is an unproblematic case of criminal blackmail. And 
quick application of the evidentiary test explains why. The key 
(step 3) is to identify the morally justifying reasons B might have 
for exposing A. Different observers will have widely differing in- 
tuitions regarding which reasons do in fact supply moral justifi- 
cation for outing A. Most persons, I suspect, would recognize few 
if any motives as morally legitimate beyond protecting a be- 
nighted spouse or suitor. Others might endorse a more general 
interest in exposing homosexuals, perhaps as a means to discour- 
age homosexual activity.225 B's conditional offer of silence (step 4) 
should have evidentiary significance to individuals who fall near 
either pole, however. B's willingness to remain silent for personal 
gain suggests that his motives for exposing A would satisfy nei- 
ther the social liberal nor the cultural conservative. 
The public interest variant on homosexual blackmail arises 
when B threatens to out A unless A takes some specified action 
favorable to homosexual interests. Imagine that a gay rights or- 
ganization threatens to out a closeted gay Congressman unless he 
abandons his support for anti-gay legislation.226 Under an eviden- 
For evidence regarding the possibly great frequency of such threats, see Posner, 141 
U Pa L Rev at 1843 n 47 (cited in note 2). 
= Some people might conclude that outing is categorically unjustifiable. This view 
does not, however, undermine the evidentiary theory. One who believes there are no mor- 
ally acceptable reasons for exposing an individual's homosexuality should, I submit, favor 
making outing illegal (on the second or third criteria of criminalization). They can then 
approve criminalizing homosexual blackmail on the grounds that it is (or should be) sim- 
ple extortion. 
T In the summer of 1996, the Advocate, a gay-oriented national magazine, threatened 
to out Arizona Congressman James Kolbe because of his support for the Defense of Mar- 
riage Act, which provides that states need not recognize same-sex marriages performed in
another state. Kolbe preempted the Advocate by announcing his homosexuality inadvance 
of the magazine. See John E. Yang, Rep. Kolbe Announces He Is Gay, Wash Post A8 (Aug 
3, 1996). 
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tiary analysis, this proposal should be legal because the threat 
provides little support for an inference that, were the threateners 
to expose the legislator, they would do so with blameworthy mo- 
tives. Again, the third and fourth steps of the evidentiary test ex- 
plain this conclusion. Were the gay rights activists to out the 
Congressman, their likely motivation would be to expose the lat- 
ter as a (probable) hypocrite and political opportunist.227 The ac- 
tivists' offer to keep the legislator's homosexuality secret if he 
supports gay political interests is potentially consistent with this 
hypothesis: the activists' (arguably) morally acceptable reason for 
outing the legislator disappears if the basis upon which voters 
might suspect the legislator of hypocrisy is eliminated. This does 
not mean, however, that all blackmail putatively in the public in- 
terest should be permissible. If members of Greenpeace were to 
threaten to out the same closeted Congressman unless he were to 
vote against NAFTA, then the blackmailers' belief that they are 
furthering the public interest should be legally irrelevant. The 
particular content of their offer tends to discredit, rather than 
confirm, the supposition that they harbor morally acceptable mo- 
tives for exposing the politician's homosexuality. 
This discussion reveals that Feinberg is only half right in 
admonishing that a coherent blackmail theory must survey "the 
various types of threats in addition to threats to reveal informa- 
tion; ... the various types of demands in addition to demands for 
money or property; and ... the various types of means employed 
in addition to single-shot random opportunism."228 Threats, de- 
mands, and means all matter. But they must not be assessed in 
isolation. The lesson of public interest blackmail is that a threat- 
ener should not be entitled to escape a criminal prohibition on 
blackmail just because he seeks to achieve what he might rea- 
sonably believe is a public interest, rather than his own (narrow) 
self-interest. This is appropriate: a modern-day Robin Hood 
would have no defense to charges of burglary or robbery, and few 
would criticize this result. Where the act threatened, y, and the 
condition demanded, x, would serve the same public interest, 
I This was precisely the rationale espoused by the Advocate in the Kolbe case. See id. 
This is not to say the suspicion is correct. A homosexual politician can oppose a piece of 
(ostensibly) gay-friendly legislation without being hypocritical, just as an African- 
American politician can with integrity oppose legislation considered to benefit African- 
Americans as a whole or a Jewish politician can oppose policies favorable to Israel. Indeed, 
Barney Frank, an openly gay Congressman from Massachusetts, declared that he ap- 
proves of outing "in cases of gross hypocrisy," but did not think Kolbe's was such a case. 
See Kolbe Won't Be Gay Rights "Poster Boy", Worcester Telegram & Gaz A10 (Aug 4, 
1996). 
' Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at258 (cited in note 2). 
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however, the conditional proposition would properly be excepted 
from a blackmail ban. 
6. Noninformational blackmail. 
Blackmail does not invariably involve a threat to disclose in- 
formation. While cases of noninformational blackmail may be un- 
usual, they are not difficult to imagine. Professor Leo Katz has 
composed a variety of examples: 
"Pay me $10,000, or I will seduce your fiance"; "Pay me 
$10,000, or I will persuade your son that it is his patriotic 
duty to volunteer for combat in Vietnam"; "Pay me $10,000, 
or I will give your high-spirited, risk-addicted 19-year-old 
daughter a motorcycle for Christmas"; "Pay me $10,000, or I 
will hasten our ailing father's death by leaving the Catholic 
Church."229 
As the evidentiary theory explains, all of these threats are clear 
cases of criminal blackmail. 
The acts threatened in noninformational blackmail, as in all 
blackmail, are perfectly legal. But they also cause (or risk) cogni- 
zable harm. Indeed, three of the four examples above involve im- 
posing substantial risk of death upon another. Nonetheless, the 
acts themselves are tolerated, perhaps encouraged, because we 
assume that the people who commit hem have good reasons to 
risk harm. The ordinary assumption, for example, is that when B 
encourages A to enlist, she does so because she believes that it is 
A's duty or that A will profit from the experience. Here, as else- 
where, the conditional threat has evidentiary significance: B's of- 
fer not to encourage A to enlist if B receives a suitable boon seems 
inconsistent with our initial assumption. The offer reveals B's 
willingness to risk A's death, and not for good motives. Hence, the 
threat should be made criminal. 
While the evidentiary theory supports Katz's view that 
blackmail need not be a crime of information,230 Katz's examples 
Katz, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1567-68 (cited in note 92). 
Not everything that looks like noninformational blackmail should be treated as 
such. Nozick, among others, has drawn attention to a deceptively tricky case: B's threat o 
build a structure on his land that will block the view of his neighbor A, unless A pays B 
$1,000. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 84-85 (cited in note 2). Consistent with the 
evidentiary theory, B's proposal should be criminal (assuming, counterfactually, that 
blocking A's view is a legally cognizable harm) only if the offer has substantial probative 
weight oward demonstrating that B would have no actual, legitimate interest in building 
the structure. But does it? Is it not just as likely that B values the structure, but at some- 
what less than $1,000? And why are such structures often called "spite fences" (at least 
when they are, indeed, fences)? Doesn't this nomenclature suggest hat, in this category of 
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likewise support the claim of the evidentiary theory that the 
threat has evidentiary value only. Imagine this variation on 
Katz's last hypothetical: B leaves the Catholic Church; B's father 
dies; B returns to the Catholic Church. Add a few more facts-a 
long history of animosity between B and her father, or a substan- 
tial inheritance- and the inference that B left the Church pre- 
cisely in order to hasten her father's death is easy to make. If so, 
B's actions might suddenly look like a rare (but potentially effec- 
tive) method of homicide-murder by religious conversion. At the 
same time, the blackmail threat would no longer look like a mor- 
ally aggravating factor.23' 
7. Bribery. 
A final puzzle is what Professor Sidney DeLong calls the sec- 
ond paradox of blackmail: why is a conditional offer that would be 
illegal if proposed by the blackmailer legal if initiated by the vic- 
tim?232 DeLong locates the moral difference between blackmail 
and "bribery" (a proposal initiated by a potential blackmail vic- 
tim) in the social meaning of the narratives paradigmatic of the 
respective transactions. '[T]he purpose of the law of blackmail," 
DeLong proposes in a vein similar to Fletcher's, "is to protect the 
community against the conspiratorial agreement of blackmailer 
and victim, which isolates and subjects him to a submissive rela- 
tionship with the blackmailer."233 In contrast, "[t]hrough bribery, 
the victim transforms the menace into an ally whose cooperation 
preserves the victim's place in the larger community."234 
No doubt this explanation touches on one distinction between 
blackmail and bribery. But it does not cut as forcefully as DeLong 
suggests. After all, the briber risks highlighting his vulnerability 
to disclosure, thereby increasing the risk that the recipient of his 
bribe will return for more next time as a blackmailer. In any 
event, the "puzzle" DeLong seeks to solve is not very puzzling. 
Bribery is legal because, ordinarily, there is not the slightest ba- 
sis for criminalizing it. 
cases, the probability that B would make a conditional offer if acting from bad motives is 
actually less than if acting from good motives-thereby denying the evidentiary inference? 
See note 179 and text accompanying note 175. 
' This conclusion should not sound bizarre. Recall the robber who says, "Your money 
or your life" to induce his victim to hand over her money, and compare him to the man 
who approaches a stranger on the street, pulls a gun, declares, "Your life," and shoots him 
dead. The robber can only be convicted of robbery, the murderer of murder. 
"2DeLong, 141 U Pa L Rev at 1663 (cited in note 11). 
2Id at 1691. 
2Id at 1692. 
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When the act the briber solicits is itself clearly wrongful, 
there is nothing perplexing about making the bribe illegal and 
punishing both the giver and the receiver-hence the common 
law crimes of "bribery" (offering a government official payment 
for favorable treatment) and "extortion under color of public of- 
fice" (solicitation or acceptance by a public official of payment).235 
Similarly, the Model Penal Code makes it separately criminal 
both to offer to pay a witness to a crime to remain silent and for 
the witness to accept such a payment.236 Accordingly, the sup- 
posed puzzle of bribery arises only when the moral character of 
the act the briber solicits is indeterminate-as when A offers B
$1,000 for B's promise not to tell A's wife about A's extramarital 
affair, or not to give a motorcycle to A's risk-addicted aughter. 
In these cases, the so-called bribe is legal, and should remain 
so, because it satisfies neither fundamental prerequisite for 
criminalization (under the third criterion, at least). It inflicts no 
legally cognizable harm, and it reveals no morally blameworthy 
motives. The briber's motivation in each case is quite apparent, 
and is no different from that of the driver who parks his car in a 
rough neighborhood and offers to pay some guys loitering nearby 
to "keep an eye on it." Blackmail is criminal, according to the evi- 
dentiary theory, because the blackmailer threatens an act that, 
were he to engage in it, would be blameworthy, harm-causing 
conduct. Bribery, on the other hand, is lawful because the briber 
seeks to stave off potential harm (to himself or to someone else) 
and because he may well have morally acceptable motives. 
All that seems straightforward. The more difficult question is 
whether it should be criminal to accept the bribe. If the nominal 
bribe really is just a payoff by a blackmail victim to a blackmailer 
savvy enough to convey his threat by innuendo, there is no reason 
why the law must respect the formal structure of the transaction; 
so long as a factfinder concludes that the nominal bribe taker in- 
tended to communicate a blackmail threat, it is reasonable to 
treat him as a blackmailer and to punish him accordingly. 
But what if the idea of the bribe really did originate with the 
maker? Here, the evidentiary analysis requires us to examine two 
questions: (1) does the bribe taker cause legally cognizable harm? 
and (2) if so, does he have morally blameworthy motives? Receipt 
of bribes (outside of the special cases noted above) is, and should 
' See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Dis- 
tinction, 141 U Pa L Rev 1695, 1698-1700 (1993). See also MPC ? 240.1. 
'See MPC ?? 242.3, 242.5. 
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remain, lawful on an evidentiary approach because the answer to 
both questions is (ordinarily) no. 
Consider an earlier example: B accepts A's offer of $1,000 in 
exchange for a promise not to tell A's wife of his infidelity. Disre- 
garding the payment, and ignoring causation complications ug- 
gested by the act/omission distinction, we might agree that B 
"causes" A's wife to (continue to) be deceived as to her husband's 
faithfulness. This is probably not legally cognizable harm. Even if 
it were, we would be compelled to examine B's motives. Why 
might B refrain from speaking out? Morally blameworthy motives 
are imaginable-perhaps B takes pleasure in the knowledge that 
A's wife has been made an object of ridicule in the community- 
but seem unlikely. Most probably, B acts out of a habitual disincli- 
nation "to get involved." If pressed to explain himself, though, he 
would probably first invoke a general presumption that one 
should not undertake to "do good" unless one can be reasonably 
confident hat one's intervention will produce more good than 
harm, then observe that he remains ignorant of too many poten- 
tially relevant factors to justify intermeddling. He might wonder, 
"Isn't it possible that unmasking A as an adulterer would serve 
principally to cause A's wife substantial and unnecessary mental 
anguish?" This seems a wholly moral motivation for B's inaction: 
first, do no harm. 
Not much changes once we consider B's acceptance of the 
payoff rom A. It is still likely that B believes intermeddling is
unjustified. He might also believe that A is a cad (or worse). B's 
willingness to profit at A's expense does not make it substantially 
less likely that B would have remained silent even absent a pay- 
ment, and that in either case (paid or not paid) his silence is prin- 
cipally animated by a concern that he not cause harm. One might 
propose, though, that B is now causing harm to A (rather than A's 
wife), and that he does so with morally blameworthy motives. But 
it is hard to see how B, by accepting a payment A voluntarily 
made, is causing A a "harm" with which the law should be con- 
cerned.237 In short, one who refrains from the type of action a 
bribe maker might wish to forestall is not likely enough to have 
(in)acted with morally blameworthy motives as to justify criminal 
punishment in accord with the third criterion. This is true 
"7It is fair to call A's payment "voluntary" in these circumstances. True, A would 
rather B did not know about his affair (in which case there would be no reason at all for 
him to pay B), but this fact alone cannot suffice to make A's offer "involuntary" without 
making the concept of "voluntary" action all but meaningless. Recall that if A's offer is in 
response to B's hinted threat of disclosure, A's offer is not voluntary, and B is properly 
treated as a blackmailer. 
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whether or not B has been offered, and has accepted, payment for 
forbearance.238 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Blackmail is a serious crime. Moreover, it exerts a grasp on 
the popular imagination almost surely out of proportion to its 
frequency. For these reasons alone, seeking to explain and justify 
its criminalization would be a worthwhile endeavor. But there is 
more, for those bitten by the blackmail bug have long suspected 
that a solution to the blackmail puzzle would help to resolve 
other puzzles both within and beyond the criminal law.239 This 
Section explores that suspicion by offering a few preliminary 
thoughts regarding the evidentiary theory's possible implications. 
A. Motive and Mens Rea in the Criminal Law 
At first blush, the evidentiary theory might seem to suggest 
an answer to arguably the most profound and persistent problem 
plaguing criminal theory-the "true" meaning of mens rea.240 Al- 
though Professor Francis Sayre concluded in his pathbreaking 
This is a general claim. There may be contexts in which the bribe taker's inaction 
does cause legally cognizable harm and in which the fact of the bribe provides ufficiently 
strong circumstantial evidence that the bribe taker's motives for inaction are morally 
blameworthy inorder to justify criminalization. For example: A harms C by publishing a
defamatory falsehood. B is in possession of information that disproves the defamatory ut- 
terance. It is plausible that B's failure to disclose that information "causes" C legally cog- 
nizable harm. Nonetheless, uncertainty about B's reasons for remaining silent might be 
great enough to counsel against making B's silence criminal. Naturally, B's silence would 
be morally justifiable were he ignorant of the fact of the defamation, or of the exonerating 
character of the information i his own possession. B's fear of retaliation by A might also 
make it morally excusable for B to remain mute. All of these hypotheses, however, are 
strongly undermined by the fact of B's acceptance of a payoff to remain silent. Here, B's 
bribe taking does suggest selfish motives for engaging in knowing harm-causing conduct. 
Consistent with the evidentiary analysis, then, this particular type of bribe taking-the 
proverbial exception that proves the rule-could be made criminal. 
In the (admittedly partisan) estimation of Katz and Lindgren, "one cannot think 
about coercion, contracts, consent, robbery, rape, unconstitutional conditions, nuclear de- 
terrence, assumption of risk, the greater-includes-the-lesser arguments, plea bargains, 
settlements, exual harassment, insider trading, bribery, domination, secrecy, privacy, 
law enforcement, utilitarianism and deontology without being tripped up repeatedly by 
the paradox of blackmail." Leo Katz and James Lindgren, Instead of a Preface, 141 U Pa L 
Rev 1565, 1565 (1993). 
"See generally Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role 
of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 Utah L Rev 635. See also id at 637 
& n 5 (claiming that "few conceptual pursuits in any area of the law have proven so be- 
guiling as the attempt o give an accurate account of the so-called mental element re- 
quired for criminal iability"); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv L Rev 974, 974 
(1932) ("No problem of criminal aw is of more fundamental importance or has proved 
more baffling through the centuries than the determination fthe precise mental element 
or mens rea necessary for crime."). 
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early study that the term embraced a wide multiplicity of mean- 
ings,24' it has become common, at least since the American Law 
Institute completed its Model Penal Code over a generation ago, 
to distinguish between two fundamentally different conceptions. 
As Professor Martin Gardner succinctly put it in his exhaustive 
recent study: 
The first and historically original concept embodied an ex- 
plicitly normative requirement hat the offender not only in- 
tentionally commit a criminal act, but also do so out of evil 
motivation. The second and currently more predominant 
tradition adopts an essentially nonnormative approach that 
finds sufficient ground for liability in the presence of par- 
ticular states of mind without evaluating or even appealing 
to the motives underlying the offender's actions.242 
Plainly, the classical conception of mens rea-which Sayre 
equates with "little more than a general immorality of mo- 
tive"243-closely approximates, or even mirrors, the notion of 
moral blameworthiness that underpins the evidentiary theory. 
Accordingly, insofar as the evidentiary theory's utility in solving 
the blackmail puzzle amounts to a powerful pragmatic vote in 
support of my third criterion of criminalization, it might weigh 
equally heavily in favor of the classical understanding of mens 
rea. This would be of more than theoretical interest. It is a com- 
monplace assertion that there can be no crime absent the coinci- 
dence of actus reus and mens rea.2" If mens rea "really" requires 
moral blameworthiness, tangible consequences must follow-such 
24' See Sayre, 45 Harv L Rev at 1026 (cited in note 240) (concluding that "[t]he old con- 
ception of mens rea must be discarded, and in its place must be substituted the new con- 
ception of mentes reae"). 
"2 Gardner, 1993 Utah L Rev at 640 (cited in note 240). 
23 Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in 
Roscoe Pound, ed, Harvard Legal Essays 399, 411-12 (Harvard 1934). See also United 
States v Thomas, 459 F2d 1172, 1176-77 (DC Cir 1972) (discussing the necessity of a re- 
quirement "beyond a mere intentional ... act, one involving evil intent or a bad purpose' 
in jury instructions); Mullen v United States, 263 F2d 275, 276 (DC Cir 1959) (defining 
mens rea as "evil state of mind"); Sayre, 45 Harv L Rev at 1019 (cited in note 240) (ob- 
serving that as late as the mid-nineteenth century, "the conception of mens rea was based 
largely on moral blameworthiness"). For an argument hat Sayre overstates the signifi- 
cance of motive in the early conceptions, ee Hall, General Principles at 138-49 (cited in 
note 150). 
Consider the oft-quoted maxim frequently traced to Coke, actus non facit reum, nisi 
mens sit rea. See Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 
*107 (1641). The translation is "an act does not make [the doer of it] guilty, unless the 
mind be guilty; that is, unless the intention be criminal." Black's Law Dictionary 36 (West 
6th ed 1990). 
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as abolition of strict liability crimes and recognition of an igno- 
rance of law defense for all mala prohibita crimes.245 
On reflection, though, it is doubtful whether the evidentiary 
theory alone has anything of importance to say about mens rea. 
The evidentiary theory appears to demonstrate that the fact that 
particular conduct ordinarily causes harm and reflects moral 
blameworthiness constitutes a prima facie justification for crimi- 
nalization. However, it does not demonstrate that the coincidence 
of these conditions is necessary for particular conduct to be crimi- 
nalized. More likely, all three criteria are valid bases for crimi- 
nalization. Moreover, even when criminalization of conduct is jus- 
tified on the strength of the third criterion alone, moral blame- 
worthiness is still not necessarily required to justify imposing 
punishment in a given case. To be sure, if the third criterion rests 
on a retributivist general justifying aim, then no individual 
should be punished unless he is morally blameworthy for his of- 
fense. As H.L.A. Hart noted, retributivism in general justifying 
a entails retributivism in distribution.2' But it is not certain 
that the third criterion does rest on a retributivist foundation. 
While a retributivist justifying aim would almost certainly yield 
the third criterion or something very much like it, so might a con- 
sequentialist justifying aim.247 And if criminalizing (ordinarily) 
blameworthy, harm-causing conduct is justified on consequen- 
tialist grounds, then the propriety of punishing one who violates 
the resulting criminal prohibition but is not morally blameworthy 
himself must remain an open question, dependent more upon 
contestable mpirical assumptions than on logical deduction. 
It seems, in short, that caution is warranted when assessing 
the significance of the evidentiary theory for criminal aw in gen- 
eral. The instant solution to the blackmail puzzle (if correct) 
might entail the classical conception of mens rea, but it might 
not. 
This is not the end of the matter, however, for at least one 
implication of the evidentiary theory is clear. Contrary to the fa- 
miliar contention that "motive is immaterial in the substantive 
"248 1a criminal aw, motive has substantial relevance. First, as the 
equally familiar objection to this contention observes, the motives 
of an individual defendant can prove critical for the satisfaction of 
X For a thoughtful discussion of the implications of the classical conception, see H.L.A. 
Hart, 23 Law & Contemp Prob at 412-27 (cited in note 142). 
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at9 (cited in note 134). See note 142. 
2 See note 144. 
'Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 227 (West 2d ed 1986). 
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various af ative defenses or for purposes of sentencing.249 
Moreover, as the evidentiary theory reveals, the criminal law 
does seem to care at least sometimes about the motives of the 
class of potential defendants as a whole. Previous efforts to re- 
solve the blackmail puzzle reflect one or the other of the custom- 
arily competing justifications for the state to criminalize con- 
duct-that the conduct reduce utility (or its rough proxy, wealth), 
or that it be inherently wrongful. The conspicuous lesson of the 
evidentiary theory is to focus not on consequences, nor on acts, 
but on actors (at least at the stage of offense definition, if not nec- 
essarily when assessing liability). If criminal law theorists take 
this simple lesson seriously, I believe, the instant proposed solu- 
tion to the blackmail puzzle will indeed facilitate a deeper under- 
standing of the criminal law and might resolve a variety of 
seemingly intractable puzzles. 
B. Governmental Motives: Understanding Unconstitutional 
Conditions 
One concrete example of the evidentiary theory's potential 
relevance, outside the criminal law, is provided by the so-called 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine-that is, the question of 
when it should be unconstitutional for a government o condition 
a benefit it is not compelled to provide on the recipient relin- 
quishing a constitutional right. Although governments attempt 
this maneuver frequently and in many contexts, courts have yet 
to provide clear rules for when the principle that a state may not 
do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly should 
trump the principle that the greater power (to withhold the bene- 
fit entirely) includes the lesser power (to grant it on condition). 
Enormous scholarly commentary on the subject has not clarified 
matters.250 While scholars widely agree that the conditional ten- 
"9The traditional view regarding motive is challenged in Douglas N. Husak, Motive 
and Criminal Liability, 8 Crim Just Ethics 3 (Winter/Spring 1989) (noting the familiar 
qualifications regarding the role of motive in sentencing decisions and the significance of 
specific intent crimes, and arguing that an actor's motives are also central to the criminal 
law's treatment of euthanasia, justification, and some excuses). Although a valuable con- 
tribution in its own right, Husak's essay is better read to initiate a debate than to offer a
well-developed competing vision of the role of motive in the criminal aw. Unfortunately, 
Husak's conclusion that "much important work ... remains to be done" respecting "the 
significance of motives to criminal iability," id at 12, is as apt now as it was nearly a dec- 
ade ago. 
2"Among the most illuminating contributions are Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev 1413 
(cited in note 130); Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State 
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational 
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293 
(1984); William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu- 
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der of governmental benefits hould sometimes be held legitimate 
and sometimes unconstitutional, there is almost universal dis- 
agreement over where and why to draw the line. 
The evidentiary theory of blackmail suggests an obvious an- 
swer: motive matters. Although it is sometimes aid that the mo- 
tives behind state action are constitutionally irrelevant,25' that is 
a demonstrable misstatement of existing constitutional doc- 
trine.252 In several disparate areas of the law, a "bad" governmen- 
tal motive will prove per se fatal to state action.253 In various 
other contexts, a bad motive will provoke strict scrutiny.2" 
When a constitutional violation (or level of scrutiny) turns on 
governmental motive, the plaintiff shoulders the burden of prov- 
ing that it was illegitimate. In theory, this difficult task can be 
accomplished in several ways.255 Assume, for example, a nonten- 
ured public school teacher is fired, and that the teacher suspects 
tional Law, 81 Harv L Rev 1439 (1968); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and 
Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum L Rev 321 (1935). 
2 See, for example, United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 383-84 (1968); Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 208 (Yale 
1962). 
"For a recent houghtful rumination on the relevance of motive in public and private 
contexts, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes 
Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 S Ct Rev 1. The classic 
arguments regarding the proper significance, for constitutional law, of state actors' moti- 
vations are Paul Brest, Palmer v Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu- 
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 S Ct Rev 95; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative 
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L J 1205 (1970). 
For example, governmental ction motivated to disadvantage a protected class will 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Personnel Administrator f Massachusetts v 
Feeney, 442 US 256, 279 (1979). Action motivated to advance religion violates the Estab- 
lishment Clause. See Stone v Graham, 449 US 39, 40-41 (1980). Similarly, action by any of 
the several states runs afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause if undertaken for protec- 
tionist purposes. See Baldwin v GAF Seelig, Inc, 294 US 511, 522 (1935). And civil incar- 
ceration animated by a punitive purpose might violate constitutional protections against 
double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. See Kansas v Hendricks, 117 S Ct 2072, 2090 
(1997) (Breyer dissenting) (noting that although the majority found that Kansas's civil 
commitment law was not punitive, "[t]he majority agrees that the [Ex Post Facto] Clause 
'forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated'), 
quoting California Deptartment ofCorrections v Morales, 514 US 499, 505 (1995). 
'Under rapidly changing voting rights jurisprudence, for example, the courts apply 
strict scrutiny to redistricting decisions when the linedrawers appear to have "subordi- 
nated" other, legitimate districting principles to race. See Bush v Vera, 116 S Ct 1941, 
1951 (1996). See also id at 1972-73 (Thomas concurring) (arguing that strict scrutiny 
should apply whenever redistricters consider race). Likewise, under ordinary First 
Amendment doctrine, facially neutral laws are subjected to strict scrutiny if adopted for 
the purpose of favoring or disfavoring speech of a particular content. See Turner Broad- 
casting System v FCC, 512 US 622, 641-42, 645-46 (1994); Harry T. Edwards and Mitchell 
N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 Nw U L Rev 1487, 1512-13 (1995) (dis- 
cussing this aspect of Turner). 
See Village of Arlington Heights v Metro Housing Development Corp, 429 US 252, 
265-68 (1977). 
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she was terminated because of the school board's hostility to her 
communist sympathies. It is well settled both that her termina- 
tion would violate the First Amendment if it were so motivated 
and that the burden rests on the teacher to establish that motiva- 
tion.256 The teacher could satisfy her burden (thus shifting to the 
school the burden to demonstrate that it would have fired the 
teacher notwithstanding her political leanings) in numerous 
ways. She could hope to rely on statistical evidence of fiings by 
the school board of other communist eachers that shows a dra- 
matic correlation between a teacher's politics and her job history. 
Or she could introduce minutes from a school board meeting in 
which board members expressed hostility to her because of her 
political views. Alternatively or additionally, she could testify 
that her school principal offered to renew her contract, but only if 
she resigned her position on the board of the American Commu- 
nist Party. This example suggests that a governmental condition 
is just another piece of circumstantial evidence that might help 
establish motive in a given case. 
Accordingly, an evidentiary analysis might resolve the un- 
constitutional conditions doctrine as follows: if and only if the 
particular condition ("resign from position in communist organi- 
zation") appears sufficiently inconsistent with any of the permis- 
sible reasons the state might have for withholding the benefit at 
issue (that the teacher's job performance was unsatisfactory, or 
that the school was eliminating the teacher's position for budget- 
ary or curricular reasons), then the fact of the offer supports a 
presuimption that the state's (but-for) motive for withholding the 
gratuitous benefit was improper,257 in which event the court is re- 
quired either to hold the state action invalid per se or to subject it 
to the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny. Indeed, this solu- 
tion closely approximates that advanced over sixty years ago by 
'See, for example, Mt. Healthy City School District v Doyle, 429 US 274, 287 (1977); 
Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593, 598 (1972). 
"7As in the blackmail context, the inference is not ironclad. In the termination case, 
the state could argue that it terminated the teacher solely because of her poor job per- 
formance. It could then try to explain away the conditional offer of continued employment 
by arguing, say, that the teacher was ill-prepared for class and chronically overtired, that 
the school board suspected these problems were due to the fact that she devoted many 
hours each day to her officership n the Communist party, and that, because she showed 
promise as a teacher, the board was willing to give her a second chance if they could have 
adequate confidence that she would devote sufficient ime to her teaching duties. Of 
course, a comparable argument intended to rebut the inference of bad motive is not open 
to the ordinary defendant in a blackmail prosecution. Whether it should be available to 
the government in an unconstitutional conditions case depends upon whether the inquiry 
into motives is made ex post and particularistic or (as in the blackmail situation) ex ante 
and categorical-a question beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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Professor Robert Hale.258 Unfortunately, though, subsequent 
commentators have either overlooked or misunderstood Hale's 
analysis.259 The evidentiary theory suggests that attention to 
Hale's thesis might prove profitable if we can articulate more 
precisely than Hale did how the notions of "germaneness" and 
'impermissible motive" can do real work. Because the govern- 
mental proposal involved in cases in which the doctrine might 
apply shares the double conditional form of all blackmail proposi- 
tions (if x then -y; if -x then y), the evidentiary test will be of 
promising utility in resolving the mystery of unconstitutional 
conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a safe bet that blackmail's criminalization does not ap- 
pear puzzling to the casual observer. Not only does it resemble 
Hale begins by insisting that "there is no logical incongruity inholding that the va- 
lidity of a state's exercise of power may depend upon the purpose for which it is exerted; 
that a power which is valid when exerted for most purposes may be invalid when exerted 
for others." Hale, 35 Colum L Rev at 322 (cited in note 250). After examining a host of un- 
constitutional conditions cases, he opines that, when 'determining the validity of a condi- 
tional burden," the Supreme Court would likely be influenced "by its views as to whether 
or not the condition is germane to the purpose for which the government might normally 
impose the burden, without conditions." Id at 352. 
9The most thorough critique of Hale's argument comes from Sullivan. Her analysis 
proceeds in three steps. First, she demonstrates persuasively that heightened scrutiny is 
not invariably appropriate whenever government attaches a condition to a gratuitous 
benefit hat is not germane to the legitimate purposes the government might have for 
withholding the benefit categorically and unconditionally. See Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 
1461 n 196 (cited in note 130). Second, she asserts that because germaneness per se is not 
dispositive, "[s]ome theory of appropriate legislative process would seem necessary to ex- 
plain" attention to the "germaneness" of governmental conditions. Id at 1468. Third, she 
canvasses the three principal contending theories of legislative process-interest group 
pluralism, civic republicanism, and public choice-en route to arguing that each either 
fails to explain any concern with gerrnaneness of conditions and benefits or reflects too 
tenuous a relationship to unconstitutional conditions problems to be useful. Id at 1468-76. 
The upshot is that "germaneness theories fail to resolve unconstitutional conditions prob- 
lems." Id at 1476. 
Sullivan's analysis suffers from two defects. First, it rests on an ungenerous reading of 
Hale. Although Hale could no doubt have been clearer, he is better understood, I think, to 
recognize that it is illegitimacy of governmental purpose, not nongermaneness between 
condition and benefit per se, that raises constitutional problems. Lack of germaneness is 
significant only insofar as it often allows courts to infer that the legislature was motivated 
by illegitimate purposes. Second, even if this were not Hale's view, it is one that deserved 
consideration. As noted above, see notes 250-59 and accompanying text, existing constitu- 
tional doctrine identifies some governmental motives as substantively illegitimate (abso- 
lutely or presumptively) without itself resting upon any particular model of normative 
governmental process. Sullivan's critique of Hale is infirm because it never gives adequate 
attention to the theory that some governmental motives are simply illegitimate (no matter 
the legislative process that effectuates them), and that nongermane conditions are use- 
ful-though not dispositive-tools for identifying when such improper motives were at 
work. 
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other varieties of theft, the criminalization of which rarely raises 
eyebrows, but blackmail just smells likes a nasty practice. Theo- 
rists from a wide range of disciplines, however, have long identi- 
fied a puzzle-that it is illegal to threaten what it is legal to do- 
and have worked vigorously to propose solutions. 
Those solutions have been of two broad types. Some scholars, 
including many of a law and economics bent, have proposed that 
toleration of blackmail would produce a variety of adverse social 
consequences not arising in a regime that permits the acts a 
blackmailer threatens. Other writers, more deontologically in- 
clined, have argued that the blackmail threat is inherently 
wrongful in a way that the acts threatened are not. But all extant 
theories suffer from serious failings. Blackmail does not always 
produce the consequences that the first set of theorists allege, 
and claims about the moral difference between blackmail threats 
and the acts threatened prove unconvincing. 
This Article has originated from a wholly different perspec- 
tive. Whereas prior theories have proceeded on the express 
premise, or implicit assumption, that criminalizing particular 
conduct is justified on one of two competing rounds either that 
it yields net adverse social consequences or that it is wrong in it- 
self-this Article has supposed that criminalization of conduct is 
prima facie justified when it is likely to cause harm and to be un- 
dertaken by a morally blameworthy actor. This simple proposi- 
tion, which might rest on either consequentialist or retributivist 
conceptions (or both) of the general justifying aim of the institu- 
tion of criminal punishment, explains why blackmail is criminal 
even though the acts a blackmailer threatens are not. It is prob- 
able that one who simply undertakes an act of the sort a black- 
mailer might threaten lacks morally bad motives. Therefore, the 
unconditional act should not be criminal. But more evidence 
might warrant a different conclusion. In particular, it is probable 
that one who undertakes the same act, but only after offering to 
forego the act if paid, acts with bad motives. The threat has evi- 
dentiary significance: if the actor had good motives for engaging 
in the act, he likely would not have offered his abstention. If this 
inference is sound (and its strength will vary depending upon the 
totality of circumstances), then this particular act could be made 
criminal as harm-causing, morally blameworthy conduct. And 
blackmail-the threat to commit a harm-causing, morally 
blameworthy act-could be criminalized too. 
The two fundamental bases of the evidentiary theory, then, 
are these: (1) motives matter, and (2) conditional threats can offer 
powerful (albeit not conclusive) circumstantial evidence of im- 
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permissible motive. By employing these two principles, this Arti- 
cle has attempted to resolve one stubborn puzzle of the law. That 
is, it has sought to explain and to justify the criminalization of 
"core cases of blackmail, as well as to suggest a reconsideration 
of the contours of the crime. Finally, it also has provided some 
reason for hope that the principles underlying the evidentiary 
theory might (whether singly or in tandem) have broad explana- 
tory reach both within and without he criminal aw. 
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